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The papers presented here are the written output of a series 
of three symposia held in the spring of 2013 on the topic of 
Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research. The format 
for each symposium was the same: a main speaker introduced 
a paper that had been circulated in advance and this was 
followed by two formal discussants and then participation 
from the floor. Discussion in groups took place in the 
afternoon and there was then a brief plenary session. The 
stimulus paper from each event is reproduced in this 
publication along with papers from discussants and a summary 
of each discussion. The proceedings were recorded and the 
summaries, which have been endorsed by all the participants, 
were written from these by Nathan Emmerich. 
Attendance at the symposia was deliberately restricted to 
around 40 participants in order to promote good discussion. 
Over half were representatives of the learned society 
members of the Academy of Social Sciences. In addition to the 
speakers, formal discussants and members of the organising 
committee there were representatives from the Association 
of Research Ethics Committees (AREC), the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC), the Health Research 
Authority (HRA), the Social Care Research Ethics Committee 
(SCREC), the UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO) and 
Universities UK (UUK). 
The organisers were a working group of four Academicians, 
Professor Robert Dingwall, Dr Ron Iphofen, Dr Janet Lewis 
and John Oates, who had a shared interest in seeking to 
strengthen the ethical practice of social science research. The 
aim was to promote the widespread adoption of a common 
set of ethics principles to augment, rather than replace, 
existing ethics guidelines and codes of practice. 
The idea of developing a social science-wide statement on 
ethics first arose in February 2009 at a meeting organised by 
the Academy of Social Sciences and the British Psychological 
Society to prepare an Academy response to the ESRC 
consultation on revisions to their Framework for Research 
Ethics (FRE). This led, through discussions at various 
conferences, to an exploratory seminar in March 2010, 
organised by the Academy and AREC, and involving a number 
of learned societies, on Ethics principles for social science 
research. The idea of exploring a common set of principles 
covering the conduct of research in the social sciences was 
endorsed and the Academy was encouraged to pursue it. 
The working group was set up in mid-2010 and became 
involved in preparing a submission to the Rawlins Review of 
medical research regulation on behalf of the Academy. In early 
2011 the group met to discuss how to take forward the 
principles work but it was not until 2012 that the funding to 
run the symposia was in place. 
The working group and the Academy are extremely grateful 
to the ESRC, BPS and British Sociological Association (BSA) 
for their financial support to supplement the Academy’s 
contribution and the Open University and AREC for their 
moral support and assistance in kind. 
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Discussion ‘Stimulus’ Paper for Symposium 1 (Principles) 
Dr David Carpenter 
University Research Ethics Adviser, University of Portsmouth 
This paper is intentionally designed to encourage discussion; I 
hope that I might be forgiven for some departures from 
normal academic conventions. As this is the first paper in the 
series I intend to explore some wider issues in the course of 
responding to the brief, which I take as positing some core 
generic principles which might be used to inform the ethical 
conduct of social research. The wider brief assumes that 
principles and values are distinct but interrelated; I am content 
to accommodate this assumption but it might be a matter for 
further debate. I would suggest the following broad areas for 
wider consideration. 
1. Normative ethical theory: Theories of ethics are 
founded on varying principles, an elucidation of these 
might help in the identification of potential common, 
generic principles in social research. 
2. Social and political philosophy: It might be useful to 
consider the importance of contextualisation of 
research. Social research clearly takes place in social 
contexts, it might well be that socio-political concepts 
such as liberty, equality, and justice act as a more 
effective guide to social research than practical ethics. 
3. Scope and application of any putative principles: The 
construction of a single set of principles aiming to guide 
the ethical design, research ethics review and ethical 
conduct of research might be challenging. 
4. The focus of ethical review: The current tendency 
seems to be to focus ethical review on studies rather 
more than on researchers. Principles which are 
currently used in ethically reviewing studies are 
abundant when compared with ‘with integrity’ which is 
one of the few explicit expectations of researchers 
when considering how they should conduct research. 
Perhaps there might be some value in considering 
researcher duties in complex social organisations as a 
source of a set of common generic principles. 
5. Cross-disciplinary principles: The background rationale 
sets the challenge of constructing ‘a common set of 
ethics principles to augment existing guidelines and 
codes of practice’. There might be scope for 
considering the possibility of replacing and /or revising 
existing guidelines; plans to augment them seem rather 
modest and might be a tactic to duck some of the 
biggest challenges. 
Perhaps the most recent ‘theory’ to be accepted in general 
ethics discourse is ‘principlism’. It has achieved popularity in 
professional contexts including research ethics and biomedical 
ethics. Principlism as a theory and a tool for ethical analysis 
was developed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and 
used to structure their text Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
now in its sixth edition (2009). Principlism is based on the idea 
that there are foundational ethical principles which, in 
themselves, do not stand in need of any further ethical defence 
or analysis. Putting matters fairly crudely, they are seen as 
goods-in-themselves. The principles are broadly used as 
‘headings’ which collectively comprise a framework for ethical 
analysis. The four principles are Beneficence, Non-maleficence, 
Respect for Autonomy and Justice (distributive). The use of 
the four principles is relatively commonplace, particularly in 
biomedical contexts. Given the statement in the rationale 
document: 
This has left a vacuum for articulated, harmonised and 
widely supported principles that is at risk of being filled by 
imposed approaches derived from biomedical research, 
which are often inappropriate. 
I wonder whether a search for principles is wise. Of course, 
construction of principles and adoption of principlism are 
distinct but it should be noted that there is a lot of common 
ground between the principles proposed in March 2010 and 
those featured in Beauchamp and Childress’s list. 
Beauchamp and Childress have many critics but the most 
outspoken is Bernard Gert (1997) and, more recently Stephen 
Hanson (2009: 77) who highlights the limitations of the 
principles in a secular, pluralistic society. The main objections 
are summarised by Gert: 
The dominant view in question we have labelled 
‘principlism.’ It is characterized by its citing of four 
principles which constitute the core of its account of 
biomedical ethics: beneficence, autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
and justice. So entrenched is this ‘theory,’ that clinical 
moral problems are often grouped (for conferences, 
papers, and books) according to which principle is deemed 
most relevant and necessary for solving them. It has 
become fashionable and customary to cite one or another 
of these principles as the key for resolving a particular 
biomedical ethical problem. Throughout much of the 
biomedical ethical literature, authors seem to believe that 
they have brought theory to bear on the problem before 
them insofar as they have mentioned one or more of the 
principles. Thus, not only do the principles presumably lead 
to acceptable solutions, but they are also treated by many 
as the ultimate grounds of appeal. 
It would seem self evident that if the continuing aim is to 
construct principles then there must be a caveat that it would 
not include any adoption of principlism. I will continue to 
address the stated aim and use the term ‘principles’ but it 
might be worth considering the possibility of moving directly 
towards a search for common, generic, values. 
Less contentious theories include consequentialism and 
deontology. I don’t propose to elucidate the detail of either of 
these theories; as stated earlier, I propose to identify 
underlying principles. In the case of the former, morality is 
measured by the outcomes of actions; contemporary accounts 
of utilitarianism (a form of consequentialism) posit preference
Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research 
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satisfactions (Peter Singer (2011) is probably the best known 
exponent) as an objective measure of morality. An action (we 
could substitute ‘study’) is moral insofar as it brings about the 
greatest number of preference satisfactions (or the least 
number of expressions of dissatisfaction) from those affected 
by it. To grossly over simplify this perspective, it might be 
seen as a simple matter of social acceptability. An obvious 
concern is the risk of circularity and contradiction; social 
research typically focuses on matters such as norms and 
mores, would the use of ‘social acceptability’ as a criterion of 
morality lead quickly to circular, contradictory arguments? It 
might, but inevitable endeavours to resolve tensions and 
contradictions could be a pathway to rigorous ethical analysis. 
I tentatively propose that a simple, but not simplistic, principle 
that social research ought to be socially acceptable should be 
considered. The principle would have a further advantage 
because it invites the question of how it might be measured. 
Measurement would be readily facilitated by greater 
involvement of the wider public at all stages of social research. 
A further principle might be that researchers ought to involve 
members of the public in the designing, planning, delivery, 
ongoing monitoring and dissemination of research. 
Deontology is frequently contrasted with consequentialism in 
that it relates the morality of an action to the duties of the 
moral agent rather than the consequences of the act. 
Consequentialism is easily criticised on the ground that it 
could be used to support significant degrees of harm to 
minorities as long as an action results in the maximisation of 
benefit for a majority. Deontology is equally criticised on the 
ground that unwavering adherence to duty could nevertheless 
lead to significant harm to many as a result; for example it is 
not difficult to envisage circumstances when a refusal to lie 
could have devastating consequences. Notwithstanding the 
differences in the approach that each take, there is no 
necessary conflict in the outcomes of moral analyses drawing 
on the respective theories. For example, in most situations 
telling lies leads to harmful consequences so should be 
avoided; similarly a duty to not lie generally results in the best 
consequences. Kantianism in the form of the categorical 
imperative, is probably the best example of deontology. The 
categorical imperative demands that we: 
act only on that maxim that we can, at the same time, 
will to be a universal law 
In simple terms, it is the golden rule – do as you would be 
done by. An underlying imperative of universalisability strictly 
implies that an action is right insofar as the moral agent would 
be content with others behaving similarly in relevantly similar 
circumstances. The demands of universalisability and the 
derived duty to treat people as ends in themselves rather than 
means to ends, result in a shift from a focus on the moral 
agent to the social context in which he acts. Kantianism can 
be extended in recognising that it is the capacity of the 
rational moral agent to make moral decisions which 
distinguishes him from other animals and makes him worthy 
of moral respect. 
The Kantian social researcher would be compelled to reflect 
on the broad issue of social responsibility recognising his duty 
to meet the demands of the categorical imperative, noting that 
he or she might, one day, be subject to the principles which 
guided his or her own research. He or she might equally be 
subjected to the outcomes of the research in question. 
Principles derived from Kantianism might include acting in a 
socially responsible manner and treating people with respect – 
as ends in themselves and never means to ends. 
The final theoretical perspective I will consider is that of 
virtue ethics. Virtue ethics focuses on the individual and their 
duties where those duties are basically a mean position 
between two vices – the Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean. 
Bruce Macfarlane (2009) has developed this perspective into a 
formalised approach to ethical research. He constructs a 
framework identifying phases of research enquiry. 
RESEARCH PHASES 
He then undertakes an Aristotelian analysis to determine the 
virtues demanded in each phase. 
THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF RESEARCH 
Tables from Macfarlane (2009) 
Macfarlane then goes on to elaborate the virtues thereby 
providing clear descriptions of required conduct. 
Phase Meaning 
Framing questions, problems, hypotheses, issues, 
projects, proposals 
Negotiating access, consent, permission, time, 
support 
Generating data, materials, ideas, inspiration 
Creating results, interpretations, models, 
concepts, theories, critiques, designs, 
artefacts 
Disseminating through publication, exhibition, 
performance 
Reflecting on epistemological and personal learning 
Phase Vice 
(deficit) 
Virtue Vice 
(excess) 
Framing Cowardice Courage Reckless- 
ness 
Negotiating Manipulative- 
ness 
Respectful- 
ness 
Partiality 
Generating Laziness Resoluteness Inflex- 
ibility 
Creating Conceal- 
ment 
Sincerity Exaggera- 
tion 
Disseminating Boastfulness Humility Timidity 
Reflecting Dogmatism Reflexivity Indecisive 
-ness
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Living out research virtues 
Courage 
· seeking to challenge one’s own presuppositions or 
conventional wisdom 
· developing a project that might not necessarily at- 
tract funding or represent a ‘fashionable’ topic 
· pursuing a line of research without undue regard to 
career and other financial imperatives 
· freely admitting when research does not go to plan 
or when you feel your previous research was factual- 
ly or conceptually mistaken 
Respectfulness 
· being respectful to others including vulnerable indi- 
viduals and communities 
· being aware of the temptation to take advantage of 
organisational, social or intellectual power over oth- 
ers 
· taking care not to cede too much power to others 
who may wish to distort the research process for 
their own ends 
Resoluteness 
· being transparent about circumstances when the ex- 
tent of data collection or creative endeavour has 
been compromised from original intentions 
· being aware of the temptation to start analysing data 
or other results before a representative sample or 
case study has been completed 
Sincerity 
· ensuring that the results of research are based on an 
accurate representation of all the relevant infor- 
mation collected 
· resisting overt or covert pressure from a powerful 
sponsor or stakeholder to skew results to meet their 
needs or expectations 
· being aware of the temptation to conceal or exagger- 
ate results in order to gain some advantage, either 
materially and/or to reputation 
Humility 
· fully acknowledging one’s intellectual debt to others 
· ensuring all research partners are fairly represented 
in being accorded publication credit corresponding 
with their relative contribution 
· inviting others to challenge your own thinking and/or 
results 
Reflexivity 
· being self-critical about one’s own research findings 
or personal performance as a researcher 
would also mean selflessly) in recognising their social 
responsibilities and contribution to the common good by 
undertaking scientifically worthwhile and valuable 
research would appear to be worthy of further 
consideration. 
Putting the common good at the heart of social research 
raises further interesting ideas with regard to the analysis of 
the socio-political context in which research takes place. It 
might be argued that a major shortcoming of biomedical 
research is its underlying assumption that the overriding 
guiding principle for all research must be respect for 
individual liberty. The assumption is reflected in pre- 
occupations with individual consent, concern for the privacy 
of individual data and little consideration of the wider 
interests of society. Perhaps controversially it might be 
argued that this is a reflection of the consumerist culture 
fostered by the political New Right under Mrs Thatcher’s 
leadership. In claiming that there is no such thing as society 
Mrs Thatcher promoted the interests of the individual (and, 
to be fair, families) above other wider social concerns. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that the principle of respect for 
autonomy gained strength in biomedical and research ethics 
discourse at the time. Few philosophers have had the 
courage to turn Mrs Thatcher’s dictum on its head – ‘there is 
no such thing as an individual, just communities and 
societies’; to do so would invite accusations of promoting 
totalitarianism. Communitarian critiques of individual 
liberalism do make a compelling case for seeing justice as 
nothing more than some sort of remedial virtue whilst 
promoting virtues such as love and solidarity which are to be 
found within communities rather than to be imposed upon 
them. Although somewhat nebulous, it might be argued that 
David Cameron’s interest in ‘Big Society’ is a step away from 
the more selfish aspects of individualism though the cynically 
disposed might see it more as an attack on state collectivism. 
Tensions between prioritisation of individual liberty and the 
pursuit of the common good might serve to identify further 
ethical principles. A totalitarian state showing little 
consideration for individuals would not be acceptable; so 
why should a libertarian state, preoccupied with individual 
autonomy, as evidenced in the proliferation of individual 
rights claims, be any more acceptable. It would seem obvious 
that there should be a principle requiring a balance 
between respecting the needs of individuals and pursuing 
the overall common good. Onora O’Neil (2011) has 
provided a persuasive argument for shifting public health 
research away from concerns of individual liberty towards a 
common good: 
Work that takes public and global health seriously 
needs to be anchored in political philosophy, to look 
beyond informed consent and individual choice, and to 
ask which interventions are permissible without the 
consent of those whom they may affect, and which 
are not. Public health encompasses more than health 
‘promotion’ and ‘nudges’ – and these too require 
justification – and even clinical interventions that are 
directed to individuals presuppose standards, 
technologies, and structures that cannot be a matter 
of choice. 
It might be argued that O’Neil’s analysis provides the ground 
Highlighting researcher virtues as a source of principles has 
the effect of shifting the focus from studies to researchers; this 
has the advantage of prompting an analysis of researcher 
intentions. It might be reasoned that the virtuous researcher, 
‘living out’ the virtues identified above, would be more inclined 
toward social responsibility, and social justice; taking social 
responsibility seriously would require the researcher to ensure 
that their research was both socially and scientifically valuable. 
A principle requiring researchers to act virtuously (which
Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research 
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for distancing, but not divorcing, social research ethics from 
contemporary biomedical (research) ethics; her approach to 
public health research has much in common with the 
ambitions of social researchers. O’Neil’s analysis is derived 
from sound theory including Rawlsian notions of social justice, 
(developed from Kantian moral philosophy) and communi- 
tarian eschewal of universalism. Further elucidation of these 
theoretical perspectives is beyond the scope of this paper but 
might well be useful as the overall project progresses. 
A further socio-political issue is evidenced by political shifts as 
a reaction to Mrs Thatcher’s libertarian perspective. ‘New 
Labour’ sought to distance itself from both individual 
liberalism and state collectivism in adopting Giddens’s ‘Third 
Way’ (1998). Amongst the key elements of the third way is a 
call to balance rights with responsibilities; its philosophy 
requires citizens to consider their duties and contributions to 
the society of which they are part as well as the rights that it 
might afford them. Individual liberty and privacy should be 
balanced with a duty to contribute to learning resulting from 
social research. A principle of duty might be argued as 
establishing a default position 1 requiring citizens to 
contribute to the learning from which they and others 
might benefit. In this situation the prevailing idea that citizens 
should somehow be ‘protected’ from research becomes much 
less compelling. 
In the introduction to this paper I identified what might be 
seen as a challenge posed by the aim of constructing a single 
set of principles guiding the ethical design, research ethics 
review and ethical conduct of research. I would propose 
that the principles I have outlined 2 could be used in the ethical 
analysis of the design and conduct of social research. 
Principles which might be deployed in undertaking ethical 
review of research might be derived from those I have 
identified but there is also a compelling argument that they 
should either be distinct or supplementary. I am sure that I am 
not alone in observing that members of research ethics 
committees often lose sight of ethical issues and become 
preoccupied with procedural bureaucracy and conformity to 
imposed standards reflected in various templates such as 
information sheets and consent forms. Whilst there are 
numerous codes, declarations and policies directed at ethical 
design and conduct of research I am not aware of any that 
focus specific attention on the ethics of reviewing research as 
opposed to the review of research for ethical considerations 
and issues. What virtues should reviewers ‘live out’? What 
principles should reviewers adopt? Would it be possible to 
develop a foundational, common, generic reviewing tool? I 
would suggest that addressing these questions might bring the 
various academic and / or professional disciplines together in 
the pursuit of a shared objective. 
Notes 
1 This would obviously be rebuttable. 
2 I am not claiming principles I have identified to be either 
necessary or sufficient – this is a matter for discussion in 
the symposium. 
Bibliography 
Beauchamp, T and Childress, J (2009). Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics. (6th edn). Oxford University Press. 
Gert, B (1997). Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. Cary NC: 
Oxford University Press. 
Giddens, A (1998). The Third Way. The Renewal of Social 
Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. 
Hanson, S (2009). Moral Acquaintances and Moral Decisions: 
Resolving Moral Conflicts in Medical Ethics, Heidelberg: 
Springer. 
Macfarlane, B (2009). Researching with Integrity: The Ethics of 
Academic Enquiry. New York NY: Routledge. 
Macfarlane, B (2010). ‘Values and virtues in qualitative 
research’. In: Savin-Baden, M and Major, CH (eds) New 
Approaches to Qualitative Research: Wisdom and Uncertainty. 
New York NY: Routledge. 
O’Neil, O (2011). Broadening Bioethics: Clinical Ethics, Public 
Health and Global Health, NCoB Lecture, Royal Society of 
Arts. Retrieved February 27 from 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/files/ 
Broadening_bioethics_clinical_ethics_public_health_&glob 
al_health.pdf 
Singer, P (2011). Practical Ethics (3rd edn). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
David’s paper usefully maps out some of the topics, but for 
me there are a series of prior issues that need to be 
addressed and that shape my reaction to his argument and to 
the project behind this symposium. 
a) The first issue concerns the context and function of the 
task of producing generic principles. David starts from 
what he takes as his brief, namely the need to posit 
‘some core generic principles which might be used to 
inform the ethical conduct of social research’ (p 1). I 
want to know why there is a need for these principles. 
What’s wrong with the principles we have, and what role 
are principles being expected to serve? 
Part of the background here, necessarily, are the 
various regimes of ethical regulation that now operate 
in the social sciences. My view is that any form of 
ethical regulation in this context is itself unethical, 
because it damages the quality of research and infringes 
the legitimate autonomy of researchers, without there 
being any counterbalancing need for it (the situation is 
different in some areas of medicine). I won’t argue the 
case for this position here, I’ve done it elsewhere 
(Hammersley 2006, 2009; Hammersley and Traianou 
2011), but for me it is an important part of the 
picture.) 1 
Response 1 to ‘Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research’ 
Professor Martyn Hammersley 
Education and Social Research, The Open University
7 
Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research 
b) A second point concerns what the term ‘principle’ 
means. It seems to me that the phrase ‘generic 
principle’ involves redundancy. It is in the nature of 
principles that they are generic, or abstract: it is this 
which forms the contrast with specific value 
judgements about particular actions, situations, and 
people. The Belmont Commission (1979) was very 
influential in developing an approach to research ethics 
based on principles. They identified three (or perhaps 
four): respect for autonomy, beneficence and non- 
maleficence, and justice. I notice that the proposal on 
which this symposium is based also identifies four 
principles, though a slightly different selection. 
David distinguishes between ‘principle’ and ‘value’, 
though I’m not sure on what grounds. More significant, 
I think, is that we have a continuum here. Thus, 
another relevant term, this time identifying a mid-point 
along the continuum between principles and specific 
judgements or imperative instructions, is ‘policy’. We 
might think of some professional codes as specifying 
policies, in some sense. 
David distances himself from principlism, though it is 
not entirely clear how or why. This term has been 
used in different ways, but it seems to me that the 
basic idea, in words taken from the BPS Code of 
Human Research Ethics (2010: 7), is that ‘ethical 
research conduct is, in essence, the application of 
informed moral reasoning, founded on a set of moral 
principles’. Here principles are treated as the 
foundation from which particular ethical judgements 
are to be derived, presumably drawing on situational 
information to indicate their relevance and specific 
implications. This is, more or less, the process that 
Beauchamp (2003) refers to as ‘specification’: ‘spelling 
out where, when, why, how, by what means, to whom, 
or by whom the action is to be done or 
avoided’ (Richardson 1990: 289). Thus, Beauchamp 
distinguishes between principles, ‘frameworks of 
particular moralities’, which he sees as interpretations 
of basic principles, and particular moral judgements. 
Beauchamp suggests that specification parallels ‘the 
associated method of reflective equilibrium’, but there 
is a significant conflict between Rawls’ notion of 
reflective equilibrium and principlism. Rawls (1993: 8) 
writes that ‘one feature of reflective equilibrium is that 
it includes our considered convictions at all levels of 
generality; no one level, say that of abstract principle or 
that of particular judgements in particular cases, is 
viewed as foundational’. 2 While, in considering 
particular issues, Beauchamp comes close to a 
reflective equilibrium approach, the very label 
‘principlism’ suggests that principles have priority. 
We can think of a ‘principle’ as a statement to the 
effect that some particular consideration should or 
must be taken into account. Even in a mild (i.e. non- 
imperative) form, there are those who reject the very 
notion of principle, on the grounds that all we can have 
are situational judgements, perhaps even based on 
sensibility, that are intrinsically incapable of being 
captured in general statements or even in formal 
judgements (MacIntyre 1971: ch 12; Dancy 2004; Crary 
2007). Some versions of virtue ethics also come close 
to this position. 
Interestingly, one of the members of the Belmont 
Commission (The National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, 1979), Albert Jonsen, went on to 
write a book with Stephen Toulmin which advocated a 
very different approach from principlism, drawing on 
the ancient tradition of casuistry (Jonsen and Toulmin 
1988). Beauchamp argues that this is not a rival to 
principlism because all analogical reasoning relies upon 
assumed norms of relevant similarity. However, in part 
what we have here is a contrast in view about the 
nature of moral reasoning, and the character of what is 
taken as fixed. Most casuists would argue that what 
should be taken as given in any particular case will 
often be a matter of judgement rather than of explicit 
principle, and that there are many more such 
considerations than four. 
My own view is that while ethics must be primarily 
concerned with situational judgements, principles are 
useful as a way of summarising and reminding us of the 
considerations that we need to take into account. 
However, this function becomes problematic when we 
are no longer talking about an individual formulating 
principles to guide her or his behaviour but of some 
association or community not simply stating its 
commitments but laying down regulatory principles. 
Here we have to ask: who is setting principles on 
behalf of whom, with what authority, and with what 
potential effects? 
An issue of some significance here is whether principles 
are conceived as matters of rational discovery of 
fundamental truths, as matters to be decided by 
negotiation among those with different commitments, 
or as a matter of convention or ‘positive law’, invented 
by some association or community, and imposed by a 
sovereign, individual or collective. 
c) Another important issue concerns whether what is 
produced is a system of principles, such that when the 
principles are interpreted in particular cases they 
generate a single, coherent judgement. Or, instead, do 
we have a plurality of principles that generate 
conflicting interpretations? 
David has drawn attention to the different meta-ethical 
theories that underpin the sets of ethical principles we 
find in professional codes: such as deontology, 
consequentialism, and virtue ethics. 3 He suggests that 
‘there is no necessary conflict in the outcomes of 
moral analyses drawing on the respective theories’ (p 
3). Yet these approaches are fundamentally at odds as 
regards the principles on which they rely, and the 
methods of moral reasoning that they recommend. As 
a result, they necessarily generate conflicts, which is 
not to say that their implications are always in conflict. 4 
I suggest that no system of principles is possible, so that 
we must find ways of resolving conflicts. In fact, there 
are conflicts built into single principles: for instance, in
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respecting one person’s autonomy we may be infringing 
someone else’s. 
All this counts against any simple appeal to ‘the 
common good’, a phrase that David employs later on in 
his paper (p 6). Any conclusion about what is in the 
common good will almost certainly involve trading off 
some people’s interests against those of others, both at 
particular points in time and over time. And an issue 
that arises here is: who has the authority to do this, in a 
manner that does not infringe the autonomy of 
individuals, or of particular communities or 
organisations? 
d) A final issue I will mention concerns whether any set of 
principles can capture all the various considerations 
that might be ethically relevant in particular situations. 
We might call this the question of exhaustiveness. I 
suggest that no set of principles can be exhaustive: it is 
not possible entirely to anticipate what could be 
relevant considerations in particular situations. This is 
not an argument against formulating principles, but it is 
an argument against principlism, and ethical regulation 
based on principles. Incidentally, this relates to another 
fundamental issue, which concerns the definition of 
‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’ and its boundaries with, say, 
‘politics’ and ‘political’ (see Hammersley and Traianou 
2012a: ch 1). 
Conclusion 
The implications of my points here are to suggest that 
principles cannot provide the strong guidance role that the 
background proposal requires them to play. They are no more 
than, and should be no more than, reminders of matters that 
we ought to take into account. 
Furthermore, in practice, in the context of ethical regulation, 
they will almost always be turned into prescriptions. If one 
looks at ESRC or BPS codes, despite the insistence that what 
is being provided is principled guidance, we frequently find 
prescriptions. For example in the BPS Code of Human 
Research Ethics respect for autonomy is specified via the 
following set of imperatives: ‘psychologists have a 
responsibility to develop and follow procedures for valid 
consent, confidentiality, anonymity, fair treatment and due 
process’ (p 8). 
For all these reasons, in my view the project of specifying a 
system of generic ethical principles is of doubtful viability, and 
under conditions of ethical regulation is very likely to be 
undesirable. 
Notes 
1 For useful extended discussions of the operation of ethical 
regulation, see van den Hoonaard 2011 and Stark 2012. 
2 For an interesting elaboration of this notion of reflective 
equilibrium, see Elgin 1997. 
3 There are, of course, more than these three, see 
Hammersley and Traianou 2012a and b. 
4 Incidentally, I think David misquotes Kant to the effect that 
we should treat people ‘as ends in themselves and never as 
means to ends’ in a way that results in an even sharper 
conflict between deontology and consequentialism than 
there actually is. Kant’s statement is, I believe, ‘never solely 
as means to ends’. 
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Introduction 
The first in a series of three Academy of Social Science 
symposia was convened on 5th March 2013 at the British 
Psychological Society’s offices in London and chaired by Birgit 
Whitman of Bristol University. This first symposium debated a 
proposal for generic ethics principles in social science 
research and practice. The subsequent two symposia would 
focus on Values and Standards. The day was organised around 
a discussion paper written by David Carpenter (University 
Research Ethics Adviser, University of Portsmouth). Professor 
Martyn Hammersley (Open University) and Professor Sharon 
MacDonald (University of York) were invited to respond to 
this paper. The presentations of these three speakers 
occupied much of the morning session. The afternoon session 
saw the attendees breaking into three working groups to 
conduct more focused discussions, summaries of which were 
then fed back to the whole group for plenary debate. 
Stimulus paper: David Carpenter 
David Carpenter’s presentation opened with a critical 
discussion of ‘principlism’ (predominantly based on the 
Beauchamp and Childress four principles model), perhaps the 
most common approach to research ethics. The Beauchamp 
and Childress model has become the dominant biomedical 
model of research ethics. Despite attempts to move away 
from this model in social science research ethics, it is still very 
much in evidence in, for example, the ESRC’s REF/FRE. 1 As 
the focus in social sciences is broader than the (biological) 
individual, Carpenter suggested that its ethics should be 
similarly recalibrated to focus on groups, collectives and 
communities and the social identities of individual research 
participants. Carpenter also discussed broader moral theory 
as well as social/political philosophy, commending the virtue- 
based approach of Macfarlane (2009, 2010). He also drew a 
distinction between the ethics work involved in different 
stages of a research project - these being design, review and 
conduct – and asked whether different principles or 
imperatives were more or less relevant in each case. Indeed 
Carpenter questioned the extent to which a search for 
principles was itself wise. Whilst he appeared to answer in the 
affirmative, his reservations about ‘principlism’ remained. 
Reflecting on utilitarian moral theory, Carpenter suggested 
that researchers might adopt the principles that: social 
research ought to be socially acceptable; and researchers 
ought to involve members of the public in all stages of a 
research project. Reflecting on Kantian deontology he 
concluded that it would support the principle of: acting in a 
socially responsible manner and treating people with respect – 
as ends in themselves and never as means to ends. 
Carpenter then turned to MacFarlane’s use of virtue theory to 
articulate some principles that can guide the ethical conduct of 
research and which are rooted in the ‘virtuous researcher’. 
However whilst arguing that the principle of virtuous conduct 
must precede any more detailed research ethics that are 
rooted in virtue theory, Carpenter also sought to connect this 
perspective with the wider aims of the social sciences in their 
broader socio-political contexts. He sought to recognise that 
researchers have social responsibilities and that scientifically 
worthwhile and valuable research contributes to the common 
good. Furthermore we might consider the need to find a 
balance between respecting the needs of individuals and 
pursuing the overall common good to be a principle of social 
science research ethics. Here Carpenter drew our attention 
to the work of Onora O’Neill (2011) on the ethics of public 
health research, epidemiology being an example of the 
meeting point between biomedical and social science research. 
In addition Carpenter suggested that a principle of duty might 
suggest citizens should, through participating in research, 
contribute to the common good produced by the social 
sciences. 
In the conclusion to his talk, Carpenter returned to his 
suggestion, taken up in later discussions, that the ethical 
design, review and conduct of research might each be 
governed by different principles. He noted that, when 
reviewing the ethics of research proposals, it is easy for 
committees to become preoccupied with the bureaucratic 
process, something confirmed by research on such 
committees (e.g. Stark 2011). In conclusion, Carpenter posed 
the questions of the ethics of ethics review, of what would 
make a good or virtuous reviewer of research ethics, whether 
any principles of ethics review could be discerned and 
whether it might be possible to develop a generic reviewing 
tool for use in the social sciences and, perhaps, beyond. 
Responses by discussants 
Professor Martyn Hammersley followed David Carpenter 
and agreed that having principles that informed the ethics of 
social science research was wise but what was of vital 
importance was the context of their application and use. He 
argued that the discussion and use of principles in the context 
of regulation was deeply problematic. Hammersley also raised 
the question of what was and was not a ‘principle’ and, by 
extension a ‘value.’ It is unclear whether principles are 
discovered, negotiated or decided and, similarly, whether they 
are matters of fundamental truth or of social convention. In 
his view there is a continuum between values, principles and 
actions or instructions. Into this continuum we might insert 
some ethical policies and professional codes. Hammersley 
suggested that we ought to examine carefully our attitudes to 
principles in the light of the situational features of ethical 
judgements. He briefly discussed the work of Jonsen and 
Toulmin 2 (one of the Commissioners of the Belmont Report, 
alongside Beauchamp and Childress) and their argument that 
we should revive the casuistic tradition. This tradition refuses 
to allow principles to become overly abstracted from 
particular cases and particular instances of their use. 
Hammersley argued that principles are useful when individuals 
seek to formulate guidance for their future behaviour (as 
when planning research) or when an association or 
A Summary of Symposium 1: Principles 
5th March 2013, British Psychological Society, London 
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community states its commitments. However he saw them as 
deeply problematic when this becomes a matter of laying 
down regulatory principles, suggesting we must consider: ‘who 
is setting principles on behalf of whom, with what authority, 
and with what potential effects?’ Are sets of ethical principles 
an abstract systematisation of research ethics that produces 
single, coherent judgements across a set of cases or are they 
plural, overlapping and competing concepts that will, 
potentially, produce multiple interpretations of a conflicting 
nature? Hammersley considers the latter to be more likely the 
case, rendering the idea of the (or a) common good deeply 
problematic. Finally, Hammersley questioned whether any set 
of principles could be exhaustive, arguing that there will 
always be unanticipated cases that will require us to go 
beyond any previously considered ‘principle.’ Thus, whilst he is 
in favour of principles, Hammersley is against principlism, 
something that any approach to ethical regulation that is 
founded on principles will be hard pressed to avoid. Here 
principles – ethical guides - are easily turned into prescriptions 
– ethical solutions. This conclusion draws our attention to the 
border between, on the one hand, ‘ethics’ and ‘the ethical’ and 
‘politics’ and ‘the political’, on the other. 
Professor Sharon Macdonald began her talk (unfortunately 
her paper has been unavailable for publication here) by pointing 
out that social scientists were often engaged in the ethical 
project of trying to understand the perspectives and values of 
others and that such others may be less powerful than 
ourselves and have little voice in society. Less often did they 
engage in the study of those more powerful than themselves 
with a strong voice in society. Nevertheless in both cases 
anthropologists were engaged in ‘studying-up’. Anthropology 
is not a top-down process that imposes a (theoretical) 
perspective but an inductive discipline with a bottom-up 
approach. This is what the discipline has to offer, something 
that might well be very useful to the development of a social 
science research ethics which was trying to counter the ‘top- 
down’ approach that results not only from principlism but 
from importing a specific kind of principlism from biomedical 
research governance. She confessed to being frustrated by 
some of her experiences with ethics review and concerned 
that, for some researchers, review was becoming a 
predominantly procedural or tick-box exercise due to the way 
it was conducted. She felt greater transparency of ethics 
review and the creation of ethical governance was essential. 
Macdonald suggested that we might usefully consider the 
different commitments that research might make in trying to 
find methods and approaches that will facilitate the 
development of a social science understanding of the 
perspectives, concerns and values of those whom researchers 
are studying and thereby working with or within. While it is 
important for social science to have and articulate its own 
ethics norms it is also important that social scientists 
understand and respect the moral norms relevant to the 
cultural locations and individuals they study. She asked us to 
consider the difference between an ‘upfront 
ethics’ (procedural, soliciting signed informed consent forms 
prior to research taking place) and an ‘embedded 
ethics,’ (something implied by working with cultural groups 
with the aim being to develop an understanding over time) 
and which of these was more appropriate to the kind of work 
social scientists and, in particular, ethnographers do. 
Macdonald suggests that a top-down procedural ethics could 
be seen as ethnocentric. She then reflected on the virtues, and 
vices, of principles and considered if we should be searching 
for them. She questioned the extent to which they might be 
underpinned by the values and virtues of social science 
research and researchers. Thus it might be important to 
understand the nature of the virtuous social science 
researcher, something that might vary across disciplines, prior 
to articulating any ethics principles or specifying any further 
detail about their relevance or use within specific contexts of 
research. 
She felt that distinguishing between treating people as means 
and as ends was useful but countered that it was unavoidable 
that social science research ‘objectified’ its subjects and 
therefore could not avoid treating research participants as 
means to the ends of the researcher and their research 
project. Nevertheless, we could still respect our participants 
as ends in themselves and, indeed, much social science 
research aimed to learn from research participants and 
communities. Social scientists often seek to articulate the 
voice and perspective of their research participants and to 
effect positive change on their behalf or in accordance with 
their interests. Of course not all social science research has 
the collective interest of its subjects at its heart. Nevertheless, 
we might say that social science research does, for the most 
part, aim at the common good, even if that is a fundamentally 
contested notion. In the contemporary context of the ‘impact 
agenda’ Macdonald counselled us to be wary of the notion of 
the common good becoming politicised, or being led by the 
contemporary attitudes of politicians towards academic 
research. This would lead to research becoming ‘results led’ 
implying that such research would become aimed at producing 
known or predetermined outcomes for the purposes of 
creating impact. 
Macdonald appreciated the idea of the virtuous researcher and 
linked it to the ongoing engagement in a self-reflexive form of 
research. She wondered how we could build such reflexivity 
into the culture of research and researchers themselves. 
Macdonald also felt that the scientific value of truth and, more 
recently, integrity could be placed under threat by the impact 
agenda that created imperatives for researchers that may not 
be consistent with the ends and goods of the social sciences. 
Macdonald seemed to suggest that one way in which we could 
encourage a reflexive culture in social science research, and 
counter the politicisation (or political direction) of the social 
sciences, would be to embrace a culture of pluralism and to 
do so transparently. She concluded with the question of 
whether pluralism and transparency could be considered 
principles of ethical social science. 
Morning Discussion 
Following the presentations of the stimulus paper and the 
responses by discussants there was a session for comments 
from those in attendance. Some of the discussion centred 
around a defence of a principle-based research ethics. Mark 
Sheehan (Ethox, Oxford and advisor to the Health Research 
Authority) noted that Beauchamp and Childress’s four 
principles were intended to capture the range of ethics issues 
that arise in medical practice and research. However they are 
not supposed to be free of conflict; in any given context one 
principle can often be understood to be in conflict with 
another. The point is to examine the principles in relationship 
to the case at hand and, in doing so, give greater specification 
to both. As such, principles should not be understood as 
prescriptive but as functioning to outline the range of
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considerations that should be taken into account. In each 
case the range should be considered. We should, therefore, 
aim to articulate the range of ethical considerations that 
determine whether or not research is ethical without saying 
in advance the ways in which they come into play in any 
particular case. Michael Dunn (Ethox, Oxford, Social Care 
REC) further suggested that having an overly rigid conception 
of the relationship between principles and judgements was 
problematic but this need not be the case. We can work to 
improve the quality of ethical deliberation and that this can 
include returning to first principles. He also suggested that 
focusing on the social responsibilities of the social science 
profession(s) would be a fruitful line of enquiry. David 
Carpenter suggested that principles might not be anything 
more than reminders of areas of ethical concern. However, 
Robert Dingwall (Academy of Social Sciences) expressed 
concern about the context in which principles are used and 
the way in which the theoretical intent or ideal becomes 
bureaucratised. Research ethics have migrated from a 
professional discourse into a regulatory domain where it can 
all too easily become a tick-box process. Where we all agree 
is that the ethics of research should be constituted 
dialogically and centred on an inclusive and deliberative 
process that allows any ethical principles used the flexibility 
to inform, rather than determine, discussion. This was 
echoed by a delegate who noted that there might be some 
second-order (or meta-ethics) principles which underlie the 
use of first order ethics principles, these being: plurality of 
interpretation and open approach to discussion and debate. 
Subsequently Robert Dingwall raised the question of what 
kind of professionals we want researchers (academic and non 
-academic) and social scientists to be and whether we should 
focus on what their moral qualities (properties, or virtues) 
might be. These questions stand apart from any specific 
regulatory concerns. Hammersley proposed that a 
prerequisite for finding ‘common ethics ground’ amongst the 
learned societies of the Academy of Social Sciences (as 
proposed by the symposia series) was to map the existing 
diversity. 3 Hammersley furthered that such principles - that 
respect, or provide for, diversity among the social sciences - 
may be at risk of being so broadly draw as to be vacuous. 
What we are attempting to do may risk not being viable. 
Kirstein Rummery (University of Stirling and Social Policy 
Association) discussed her experience in drawing up the 
SPA’s ethics guidelines noting that they deliberately rejected 
the idea of a framework of overarching principles. The SPA 
thought that a set of overarching ethical principles was 
beyond the scope of any statement on research ethics 
offered by a Learned Society or Societies as these more 
properly belonged to society as a whole. She suggested that 
‘the social’ and role of the social scientist should be the 
foundation and centre of any social science research ethics. If 
we are to build an ethics consensus we must focus on the 
context(s) in which we, as social scientists, operate. Matei 
Candea (Association of Social Anthropologists) made a 
related point by suggesting that when addressing concerns for 
ethics regulation (both in the sense of bureaucratic oversight 
and in the sense of regularising ethics practices) it was 
important to recognise that what was required, such as 
requesting participants to sign informed consent forms, can 
alter what subsequently occurs and, therefore, what we 
subsequently study. Ethics regulation and regularisation can 
have distinct methodological implications. 
Representing the British Educational Research Association 
(BERA) Gemma Moss (Institute of Education) suggested that 
her association’s code was constructed around the principle 
of ‘do no harm.’ This was particularly important when 
conducting research with those less powerful than ourselves. 
She further suggested that ethics should be seen to be about 
acknowledging and dealing with conflicts across the design, 
conduct, review and use of research. This latter point was 
also made by Stina Lyon (LBSU, BSA) who pointed out that 
researchers are responsible to the public and that there was 
a particular issue with the way research was sometimes 
discussed outside the university and used by partisan social 
actors. She highlighted the fact that the dissemination and use 
of research was further stage of research, beyond design, 
review and conduct, which had an ethics dimension. Nic 
Groombridge (British Society of Criminology) pointed out 
that the statement on ethics issued by the BSC addressed 
much more than ‘research ethics’, something we might adopt 
when focusing on how research participants are treated by 
the researcher and the research protocol. The BSC code of 
ethics also discussed researchers’ responsibilities regarding 
the use and dissemination of their research in the media. 
Debrah Harding (Chief Operating Officer of the Market 
Research Society) questioned the extent to which 
researchers could control the discussion and uses to which 
their research was put. If data are misrepresented 
researchers can try to correct misleading pictures but the 
media may not wish to listen. 
Annabelle Mark (Society for Studies in Organising Healthcare, 
SHOC) commented that these ethical waters were muddied 
by the fact that research often has multiple funders. Sally 
Hardy (Regional Studies Association) commented that the 
RSA had considered adopting a code of research ethics but 
had decided against it because researchers were governed by 
their HEI. However, the Society was reconsidering its 
position because it is now funding some research. There 
were further concerns about funders and the associated 
pressure to have ‘impact’ and whether this created a 
structural imperative to ‘talk-up’ one’s own research without 
being open about the broader perspective of the field. One 
example of this is the current focus on phonics in children’s 
literacy education. It was felt that this approach was over- 
promoted and, rather than dichotomising pedagogic 
approaches, as has occurred in public, political and policy 
discourses, researchers should be open about the diversity of 
perspectives in any one field and to promote views other 
than their own when appropriate. The fact that ethics 
guidance often omitted any talk of the media’s use of 
research and the researcher’s responsibilities regarding 
dissemination of their own work and the work, or knowledge 
-base, of their field more broadly was also made. Phil Sooben 
(ESRC) questioned whether funders and the impact agenda 
were necessarily threats to ethical research and proposed 
that they should not always be consistently positioned as 
dangers or sources of conflict. As with moves towards open 
access research there is something fundamentally ethical 
about aiming for research, both generally and in the social 
sciences, to have an impact, which is to say, to do good in the 
world. In response one of the participants gave an example of 
some research findings which had been used by the 
government in such a way that the researchers in these fields 
were encouraged to focus on the government’s approach by 
the imperative to have an impact. This was at the cost of 
disseminating and communicating the broader picture.
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Stina Lyon suggested that if we are to have precepts, principles 
and values then there must be some way of addressing any 
breaches. She thought there should be structures to handle 
complaints and whistleblowing and noted that the BSA 
occasionally receives complaints. These are then discussed 
and, if necessary, addressed. BSA members can be dismissed 
from the society for ethics breaches. She also noted that there 
were organisational differences between learned societies and 
universities. The former are evolving organisations, changing 
and developing with, and at the behest of, their members, 
whilst universities can be characterised as more hierarchical 
and centralised. In the context of a changing ethics context it 
is the learned societies that are in a position to respond with 
greater rapidity. Peter Lugosi (Oxford Brookes, Council for 
Hospitality Management Education) observed that the 
University of Otago had developed a ‘pluralistic’ or ‘open’ 
approach to research ethics that seeks to be sensitive to 
cultural nuances both within and beyond the academy. He 
thought it might offer some useful insights for this series of 
seminars and the project as a whole. 4 
This issue of the burdens of ethical regulation was raised at 
various points in the day. Sharon Macdonald raised the issue of 
whether we should oppose regulation or the over-extension 
of regulations articulated by other bodies. One participant 
questioned if this project could, itself, add to the burdens 
facing researchers. There was general agreement that ethics 
review should be proportionate and facilitate rather than 
obstruct research. Madeleine Hatfield (Officer for the Royal 
Geographical Society [with IBG]) suggested that the RGS-IBG 
saw itself as a body that sought to facilitate the research and 
ends of its members. If the learned societies have a role in 
articulating principles or any other ethics aspects of research 
or professional practice they should continue to adopt a 
facilitative approach. Furthermore it may be that research 
ethics committees should be understood similarly i.e. as 
facilitating research and encouraging researchers to reflect on 
the ethics of their research. Libby Bishop (researcher liaison 
with the UK Data Archive) pointed out that her organisation 
was centrally concerned with the reuse of data and facilitating 
researchers’ access to the data. 
Kirstein Rummery commented that our unifying factor was 
that we were all social scientists interested in creating the best 
possible conditions for ethical social science research to take 
place. Annabelle Mark flagged up the role of the researcher 
themselves, a point that was echoed by others in suggesting 
we consider the role of researcher professionalism and 
integrity. This was a theme that recurred throughout the day’s 
discussion and it became apparent that a research ethics 
focused on the participants of research was only one aspect of 
the professional ethics of researchers. As Carpenter’s stimulus 
paper made clear, ethics review was one aspect of ethics in 
the conduct of a specific research project. Similarly research 
projects are only one aspect of the occupation ‘researcher.’ 
Social scientists also engage in other tasks including teaching, 
administration, and the (peer or ethics) review of other 
researchers’ proposals. If, in the interests of ethical research, 
we are to address the idea of a virtuous researcher then we 
should fully grasp the role of the researcher in its entirety and 
not simply focus on particular projects or proposals. 
Afternoon Discussion 
The afternoon session was organised around three group 
discussions which then reported back to the whole 
symposium. Each of the groups was asked to consider the 
principles that governed, first, the ethical practice and, second, 
the review of social science research ethics. In regard to 
ethical practice the groups were steered to consider: respect 
for the autonomy and dignity of individuals; scientific value; 
social responsibility; and to maximise benefit and minimise 
harm. In regard to ethics review the groups were steered to 
consider: independence; competence; facilitation and 
transparency and accountability. The groups were, of course, 
free to consider other principles or factors in the ethical 
practice and review of social science research. 
The feedback from group one was that after spending some 
time ‘coming to terms with terms’ they discussed social 
science research ethics as an ‘occupational ethics’ and 
distinguished between retrospective and prospective ethics. 
They considered the need for a statement of what it is we do, 
as members of various social science disciplines. They also 
considered the relevance of such disciplinary (and 
professional) identities for the professional and research ethics 
of social scientists. They suggested that the basis of research 
ethics was being critically reflective on what it is we do as 
researchers and that in the context of accountability we must 
be reflexive. This can be taken to mean that the critically 
reflective researcher must maintain a positive relationship to 
the ways in which they are ethically accountable whilst 
recognising that their ethical responsibilities as researchers are 
not abrogated by the accountability created by being reviewed 
by an ethics committee. The researcher must continue to 
exercise critical reflection on ethics while conducting 
research. They commented that knowledge was an (ethical) 
good in itself but that it should not be sought at any price. 
They questioned whether ethics committees that review social 
science research were always ethical in their treatment of 
researchers and considered who was represented on such 
committees and why. They noted that researchers should be 
able to expect members of ethics committees to exercise 
critical (self) reflection on their own activities. They concluded 
that whilst they made little headway in agreeing any principles 
– there was always a counter example – there were 
commonalties in the principles articulated by the various 
codes of ethics currently published by the Learned Society 
members of the Academy of Social Sciences. 
Group two connected the ethical practice of social research 
with the social responsibilities of researchers. They also 
suggested that, in social science research, the autonomy of 
individuals should be coupled with those of (their) social 
groups. They highlighted the need for informed consent to be 
an on-going social process and the interconnection between 
social science researchers’ responsibilities to individual and 
communities and the potential harms to both. Group two 
questioned the notion of ‘scientific value’ (as an ethics 
principle of social science practice). It was suggested that this 
was becoming confused with the social value of research. It 
was felt that integrity was a preferable term in that it drew on 
a broader range of principles including honesty, reflexivity and 
transparency. In regard to ethics review group two felt it was 
important to talk of the duties of reviewers and committee 
members. They also questioned from what should ethical 
review (and reviewers) be independent? It seems clear ethics 
review cannot be conducted independently from disciplinary 
knowledge and, therefore, disciplinary colleagues. However 
they did feel it could, and should, be independent of practical 
concerns about insurance, university reputation and ‘risk’.
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They questioned whether it was better to think in terms of 
accountability (and interdependence) rather than 
independence. 
Group two suggested that ethics review should be about 
facilitation and that it should be aimed at helping the 
researcher to reflect on ethical issues raised by their research. 
The suggested reviewers may (or may not) have virtues and 
that they should respect the diversity and multiplicity of 
intellectual and disciplinary traditions and of researchers and 
research participants. Committees should foster an 
environment for deliberation, should be ‘consultative’, and 
engage in on-going conversations with researchers. The group 
wondered if researchers should first present their research 
proposal and its ethics dimensions to a committee and only 
subsequently submit a formal ‘application’ that took into 
account the discussion they had with the committee following 
their presentation. Review should be decentralised and 
discipline specific. Therefore it should occur at the level of the 
department whilst faculty or university level oversight should 
pertain to the committee’s activities rather than the 
researchers. 
Group three expressed clear agreement on the need for a 
strong collective and public voice on ethics in social science 
research. They questioned whether we could construct a 
framework or a set of principles for guidance as, whilst it was 
clear what the function might be, it was unclear who it was 
for and if they were representative. However, since the 
Academy of Social Sciences project is not aimed at replacing 
other codes, particular those of the Learned Societies, this 
need not be too problematic. They thought that ethics review 
ought to be redesigned into a deliberative process and that 
social responsibility and political awareness are important 
facets of a deliberative research ethics. They wondered what 
distinctive contribution the social sciences made and so what 
might be distinctive about its ethics. They felt that respect for 
the autonomy and dignity of persons as individuals and 
members of communities (carriers of social identities) was 
vital and that it should be a central consideration of research 
ethics at all stages of research (design, conduct, review, 
funding and use). The also felt that researchers ought to be 
accorded the same autonomy and dignity as research 
participants, i.e. as individuals and as members of discipline 
communities. Group three considered whether a framework 
could be constructed around ethical questions and issues that 
are hard to reconcile and represent difficult to resolve 
conflicts. They suggested that research ethics and governance 
should be considered as distinct and independent from each 
other. They noted the limits of the biomedical model and the 
importance of the relationship between the researcher and 
the researched. 5 They noted that the relationship between the 
researcher and the organisation (ethics committee, HEI) 
affects the outcome and that ethics review should be seen as a 
participatory deliberative process (and practice) involving a 
dialogue and negotiation between researchers and 
organisations. 
Following the presentation of the individual groups’ 
discussions there was a short time for questions, comments 
and further discussion. It was noted that there was a potential 
trade-off between risks and originality of a research proposal. 
It was suggested that research should be ‘good enough’ and 
meet minimal (or median) ethical standards rather than being 
ethically perfect. There was a suggestion that the primary 
concern of an ethics committee should be whether they had 
adequately equipped the research proposal and researcher 
with the tools to complete the research ethically. In closing 
one member re-iterated their approval of the virtue-based 
approach used by McFarlane and drawn on by Carpenter in 
his opening presentation and stimulus paper. 
Conclusion 
The following bullet points were felt to be the primary 
messages of the day’s presentations and discussions: 
· A virtue based approach holds promise for articulating 
an account of the professional social scientist. 
· This should be further explored as a potential ground 
for any principles of research ethics in the social 
sciences. 
· Any principles of research ethics should be connected 
to the wider professional ethics and values of social 
science and its sub-fields (disciplines). 
· Ethics principles should not be deterministic or be 
allowed to become deterministic in practice. 
· There may be a set of values or meta-principles (meta- 
ethics) that guide the application and use of the first 
order ethics principles of social science research. Such 
values would include a commitment to dialogue, open 
structure of ethics and ethical review, and on-going 
ethics engagement. 
· A distinction should be made between the ethics 
principles relevant to different stages of research. 
· The Academy of Social Sciences project should not 
seek to take over the role of the Learned Societies (or 
their codes) in guiding the ethics of research. 
· A summary of existing codes should be drawn up. 
· The autonomy of individuals should be understood in 
its broader social and cultural context. Individuals 
should be understood as social actors whose actions 
reflect and impact upon their communities. 
· Ethics review should be conducted ethically. Review 
(ethics and peer) of research is a core aspect of the 
social sciences and, therefore, a role of the social 
scientist. It should be conducted virtuously and in such 
a manner that reviewers/committees are accountable 
to researchers, disciplines and social science 
communities as well as universities, research 
participants and the public. 
· Ethics review in the social sciences should be designed 
so as to facilitate a more discursive encounter between 
researcher and reviewer/committee. Review should, at 
least in the first instance, occur at the departmental/ 
school level. Its connection to the governance of 
research in the wider sense should be reflected upon 
critically.
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In the light of the papers, responses, discussions and 
comments summarised above, the project team concluded 
that there appeared to be a broad consensus for taking 
forward the following principles: 
· The practice of research should demonstrate: 
¨ respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons as 
individuals and members of communities 
¨ integrity 
¨ social responsibility 
¨ maximise benefit and minimise harm. 
· The review of research protocols should demonstrate: 
¨ independence 
¨ competence 
¨ facilitation 
¨ transparency and accountability. 
Notes 
1. http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research- 
ethics.aspx 
2. He is referring to their ‘Abuse of Casuistry.’ Both 
Jonsen and Toulmin being, alongside Beauchamp, 
members of the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research which produced the Belmont 
Report. 
3. Note: the project team is summarising the existing 
codes of research ethics published by the LS members 
of the Academy of Social Sciences. 
4. The University of Otago has recently started The 
Ethics Application Repository (TEAR: http:// 
tear.otago.ac.nz/) that archives IRB/ REC application 
forms and consent statements in the interests of 
developing a more comprehensive approach to 
research ethics in Otago, New Zealand and across the 
world. Submission from all scholars are welcome. 
5. A similar commitment is often said to guide the ethics 
of medical practice, however this is the relationship 
between a patient and their doctor, distinct from that 
which may (or may not) exist between a biomedical 
research and a research subject. 
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Responsible to Whom? Obligations to Participants and Society 
in Social Science Research 
Discussion ‘Stimulus’ Paper for Symposium 2:  (Values) 
Dr Matt Sleat 
University of Sheffield 
The social sciences play a crucial role in helping us understand 
our social world and critically and normatively reflect upon it. 
One might say that social scientists have a responsibility to 
engage in such activities in order to nurture an informed 
public which will then be better placed to make more 
informed decisions on matters of public concern, and offer 
innovations in our thinking about the social world that can 
help society better respond to changes and crises. In light of 
this responsibility, how should we conceptualise the nature of 
the relationship between the social science researcher, the 
research he undertakes, and the society which he hopes to 
both speak about and speak to? What are the obligations 
owed between the researcher, the individual participants in 
the research, and society at large? And, crucially for our 
purposes here, what do these tell us about the normative 
principles that should underpin a form of ethical regulation 
suited to the particularities of the social sciences? I want to 
explore these questions here through the issue of whose 
interests and rights should take priority when thinking about 
the appropriate ethical constraints for social science research, 
contrasting this with the normative assumptions that underpin 
the ethical regulation in the biomedical sciences. A crucial 
lesson of this discussion will be that it is at best inappropriate 
to import and impose regulation from the biomedical sciences 
into the realm of the social sciences, and at worst actually 
hinders our ability to successfully execute the responsibilities 
of the social scientist noted above. 
The participant protection model (PPM) 
I want to start by setting out a model of thinking about the 
duties and obligations of the researcher that underpin the 
ethical regulation of the social sciences in those countries 
where it is further entrenched and developed than it is in the 
UK, such as Australia and the US; though I should say that I 
also think that the same normative and ethical commitments 
of this model are present in the ESRC’s current Research 
Ethical Framework (REF) documents. This model, which I call 
the participant protection model (PPM), is at the heart of the 
ethical regulation of the biomedical sciences and, for reasons 
that are well-known but I cannot go explore here, has often 
either influenced or been directly imported as the model for 
thinking about similar regulation of the social sciences. The 
PPM prioritises the risks that any research study poses to 
those individuals who participate in it, seeking to protect the 
rights of the participants over and above the rights and 
interests of other individuals including the researcher and 
society more generally. The researcher has a moral duty not 
to harm those who participate in his research, an obligation 
which ‘trumps’ any other possible concerns. So it is strictly 
prohibited to undertake research on a participant that is likely 
to result in significant harm to the participant even if doing so 
is likely to lead to advances that might have substantial 
widespread benefits to many other individuals or society more 
broadly. This sort of consequentialist calculation (the harm 
caused to one outweighed by the benefits to many more) is 
rightly seen as morally inappropriate, violating as it does the 
respect due to that participant as an end in himself rather than 
a mere means to the realisation of the ends of others. While 
the primary aim of the research might be the increase of 
knowledge and scientific or social advancement, the rights of 
the participants not to be harmed cannot be violated in this 
pursuit. 
This ultimate concern for avoiding harming research 
participants and prioritising their rights over all other 
considerations clearly reflects a post-World War Two moral 
consensus on the primacy and the non-violability of 
individuals’ human rights. But it also reflects a concern about 
the structure of research projects themselves, and in 
particular the fact that participants of biomedical research 
often sit in a deeply unequal relationship of power to the 
researcher such that the latter’s possession of greater 
knowledge and the former’s often vulnerable status (as less 
knowledgeable, as sick or dependent upon the researcher for 
medical care, etc.) creates a context in which abuses could 
easily occur. One of the central normative objectives of 
ethical regulation in the biomedical sciences has therefore 
been to equalise this imbalanced or asymmetrical relationship 
of power by protecting the rights of the participants and 
severely constraining the legitimate actions of the researcher. 
Correcting, as far as is possible, this asymmetry of power is a 
key way in which the participant is respected as a moral agent 
and the possibility of harm further minimised. 
In developing ethical frameworks for the social sciences, the 
temptation has always been to more or less import the PPM 
models employed in the biomedical sciences. There might be 
very good reason for this. These frameworks have often been 
in place for several decades and have the benefit of having 
evolved through testing and experience in practice. And that 
they have been largely successful means that they are taken to 
be ‘models of good practice’ from which there are no good 
prima facie reasons (from the perspective of the regulators 
that is) to deviate from. Why reinvent the regulatory wheel? 
Hence the PPM frameworks have been generalised and 
universalised to apply to all research conducted ‘with or about 
people’. I now want to suggest that this is a mistake because 
the PPM contains often implicit principles or ethical 
commitments that are inappropriate to research undertaken 
in the social sciences and may hamper the ability for the social 
sciences to successfully execute its normative and critical 
social responsibilities. Once this is properly understood then 
where it is the case that the public responsibilities of the social 
sciences are being served, the particularities of social science 
research justify (contra the PPM) a presumption in favour of 
prioritising the public or social interest over the individual 
rights of participants. 
Conceptualising harm 
At the heart of the PPM is an ethical concern about avoiding 
harming participants that is clearly informed by the abuses 
that litter the history of biomedical research and intended as a
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way of preventing instances of such scandals occurring again 
in the future. The first thing to say is that the social sciences 
differ from biomedical research insofar as the latter often 
involve trials and studies that may cause physical pain or even 
death (e.g. from the use of novel drugs or experimental 
surgical techniques). While it is true to say that some social 
science research has the possibility to cause physical harm, in 
the vast majority of studies the potential for causing physical 
harm to the participants is clearly lower than in the 
biomedical sciences. Where social science research does have 
the potential to cause harm this is more likely to be of a 
psychological kind (e.g. stress, offence or upset) or harm to 
the participant’s interests (e.g. reputation, finance, career, 
etc.). We should not denigrate such forms of harm as 
irrelevant ethical considerations, but there clearly is a sense in 
which the human stakes of social science research are more 
often than not lower than that of biomedical sciences. 1 
Sometimes the aim of social science research is to explore 
(and often oppose) social and economic injustices, such as 
abuses of power, mistreatment, exploitation, malpractices, 
and so on, which is likely to have detrimental effects on the 
interests and reputation of specific individuals, groups, or 
corporate bodies like companies or institutions that benefit 
from them. In such cases it is very likely that ‘social’ forms of 
harm will be unavoidable and predictable. How do we justify 
this harm? One obvious route is to appeal to the objectives of 
the research itself, which in such cases is often to prevent or 
alleviate future harm by examining ways in which institutions 
and practices can better track the interests of those subject 
to them. Crucially, this is not the same as saying that causing 
harm is the direct intention of the research (as has been 
suggested elsewhere) 2 , but it does mean that causing harm 
might an inevitable and inescapable dimension of much social 
science research. Furthermore, such utilitarian calculations of 
trading-off rights seem more appropriate when the level of 
potential harm that could be caused to the participant is not 
so grave as to include physical or serious psychological pain. 3 
But according to the ESRC’s Framework for Research Ethics 
(FRE), and this is indicative of injunctions included in 
regulatory frameworks for the social sciences elsewhere, 
‘Harm to research participants and researchers must be 
avoided in all instances’ (2012 – emphasis added). 4 It is 
therefore wrong to interview employers whose 
discriminatory or unjust practices the researcher was hoping 
to expose and thereby end, or to seek information on the 
relationship between politicians and particular groups or 
individuals that might be resulting in prejudicial policy 
decisions. Giving priority to the rights of the participants and 
employing an expansive account of harm in the manner of the 
PPM therefore sits in some considerable tension with the 
social sciences’ moral responsibility to (amongst other things) 
explore prejudicial practices, uncover injustices and scrutinise 
prevailing power relationships. 
It is also important to remember that the knowledge or 
understanding that we as social scientists seek to ascertain 
through our research is not knowledge about a private 
individual but knowledge that is of or about the public social 
or political body. Though this knowledge might be revealed as 
part of our interactions with individuals, we interact with 
them in their role as occupants of public office (e.g. elected 
representative, judge, a Vice Chancellor, an economic advisor 
to a Prime Minister) or as someone who operates in a social 
context beyond their private individual selves (e.g. terrorist, 
public broadcaster or a private broadcaster with political 
influence, a CEO of a company that employs significant 
proportion of a population, an enemy combatant). 
Importantly, we do not engage with them as private 
individuals. Likewise the knowledge that we ascertain is not 
private knowledge about a private individual, which an ethical 
framework puts very strict conditions on using or releasing, 
but knowledge that is public in the sense of being about the 
common. While the harm social science research might do 
can clearly affect the individual and many of their private 
interests, it is their public role that is of interest to us (though 
admittedly these are not easily separable). The point is that 
social science research only harms the private interests of 
individuals indirectly, as an often inescapable ramification of 
pursuing their public responsibility to study and analyse public 
matters. A different set of ethical considerations thus come 
into play and the prioritisation of individual rights and the 
avoidance of harm seems inappropriate. 
Conceptualising the researcher/participant 
relationship 
As we have seen, a key assumption underlying the PPM is a 
conceptualising of the relationship between the researcher 
and the participant in which the inequality of power between 
the two creates an ethical justification for protecting the 
latter from potential harm from the former. The researcher is 
a potential threat to the participant of his research. This 
concern generates a series of intuitively desirable regulations 
such as participants must freely consent to be involved in the 
research (what the 1948 Nuremberg Code formally 
established as the first and ‘essential’ principle of research 
ethics) and there must be full disclosure of the purpose to 
which the research will be put, the nature of the information 
sought from the participant, and the motivations of the 
researcher in seeking this particular information. 
This asymmetrical power relationship is often neither as stark 
in the social sciences as it is in biomedical research nor in 
many instances actually completely the reverse of what the 
PPM assumes. There clearly are some fields of social science 
research in which the relationship remains balanced in favour 
of the researcher. Research undertaken with children or 
other potentially vulnerable individuals such as the elderly, 
immigrants, the mentally ill very often – though not always, it 
is important to add – place the researcher in a position of 
greater power with the ability and potential to cause some 
considerable harm. And where this is the case then it is clear 
that the presumption should be in favour of protecting the 
participants’ rights as in the PPM. 
But very much social science either has a negligible 
asymmetry of power and knowledge or reverses the positions 
such that it is the researcher who is often in the weaker 
position and the participant in a position to potentially harm. 
There are several aspects of this that we need to appreciate. 
The first is that much social science research addresses 
aspects of the social world in which significant power 
relations are in play, and, as such, it is often the case that the 
individuals who will be of interest to social scientists will be 
those in a position of power and influence by virtue of the 
fact that they are decision-makers or holders of public office, 
or indeed by being in possession of relatively greater 
knowledge. They are the subject of our interest because of 
their relatively more powerful/knowledgeable position, unlike 
in the biomedical sciences where it is often a subject’s
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vulnerability or weakness that makes them a suitable or 
interesting participant, and it is not possible to artificially 
equalise this relationship. And this asymmetry might also make 
the participant the most likely to have the authority, prestige 
and capacity to harm the researcher, either physically (as in 
the case of some more hazardous fieldwork projects) or 
through harming their interests (e.g. reputational, financial, 
cutting off future funding or access), rather than the other way 
around (Langlois 2011). 
It should also be remembered that when the aim of research 
is to criticise the status quo or to suggest better alternatives, 
such participants in the research are themselves interested 
stake-holders who may well not support the aims of the 
research or the purposes to which it is put (and may act in 
ways to protect those interests). Our research participants 
are often neither the disinterested objects of the natural 
sciences or the vulnerable individuals seeking our help. 
Neither therefore, in light of its social responsibilities, can the 
social sciences always engage in research through the 
gathering of information willingly or freely offered through 
consent. 5 At least some research might require recourse to 
legal and hence coercive means to acquire information, such 
as the use of the Freedom of Information Act. Likewise the 
fact that the social sciences often come up against vested 
interests and takes place in conditions of power asymmetry 
balanced more strongly against the researcher raises the 
question as to whether deception or duplicity is justified in the 
pursuit of information relevant to the public issue being 
investigated. 6 Is it necessarily unethical to lie about one’s 
religion in order to gain access to a self-professed anti-Semite? 
To pretend to be sympathetic to a particular form of political 
extremism in order to interview members of a certain party 
or group? And so on. Such cases clearly involve duplicity in 
which the participant is not in full possession of all the 
relevant information and hence being used as a means to 
acquiring more information rather than an end in him or 
herself. When information is obtained through coercion or 
deceit, it is hard to think of it as being voluntarily offered, and 
hence in keeping with the first principle of the Nuremberg 
Code or the fourth key principle of the ESRC’s Framework 
for Research Ethics which states that ‘Research participants 
must take part voluntarily, free from any coercion’ (ESRC 
2012) 7 . Yet clearly fully informing the participants of the 
research can often radically alter the results we get, or 
prevent us from getting any at all. And simply asking for 
information that is likely to implicate particular individuals or 
institutions is not always likely to prove successful. Hence 
there is again a case for claiming that the ethical assumptions 
underpinning the PPM are not always appropriate for the 
social sciences, and may indeed hinder its ability to carry out 
its social responsibilities. 
Conclusion 
The social sciences are alive with healthy debates surrounding 
the ethics and politics of research. Indeed, and here I speak 
only for my own discipline (though see Dyer and Demmeritt 
2009 for a similar account of debates in human geography), 
one of the main debates of the past decade or so in political 
science/theory has been the extent to which it has become 
increasingly abstract and disconnected from the real-world of 
politics as it has reflected more and more on the 
epistemological, ontological, metaphysical, and ideological 
nature of its basic assumptions and presuppositions. Far from 
not thinking enough about the ethical implications of our 
research, many have claimed that such concerns have 
dominated our discipline at the expense of research about 
politics itself (and in doing so failed to properly engage with 
politics as its responsibilities demand). Admittedly this sort of 
ethical soul searching and the sort of self-regulation that it 
engenders has not been communicated well beyond academia, 
and hence what are important ethical debates about the 
principles which should guide our research have been 
interpreted as navel-gazing and slides into ivory tower 
irrelevance. They thus have not provided the sort of 
reassurance to others (society at large, funding councils, 
governmental institutions, etc.) that there are ethical 
principles which regulate our research, that these are 
principles which are under constant review, and that they are 
upheld. It may be that at least in part the imposition of a 
framework derived from the medical sciences reflects the fact 
that the social sciences have failed to properly communicate 
the relevance and import of these internal activities. 
What I have suggested here is that the prioritising of 
participants’ rights, avoidance of harm and assumptions 
regarding the dominant position of power that the researcher 
stands in relation to the participant, assumptions that are at 
the heart of the PPM, are ethical commitments that do not 
map on to the realities of much social science research and 
are incongruous with it fulfilling its normative and critical 
social responsibilities. Does this mean, for example, that we 
should always prioritise the interests that would be served by 
exposing certain practices that might harm the reputation and 
career of research participants rather than their individual 
rights? Or that we must always be more concerned about 
reducing the potential harm caused to the more vulnerable 
researcher over and above any harm that might be caused to 
the relatively more powerful participant? Part of the difficulty 
with thinking about ethical regulation of the social sciences is 
that the complexities, contingencies and vagaries of our social 
world rarely makes it possible to determine hard and fast 
rules as to which should take priority. These are judgement 
calls and, being such, it is rarely possible to say anything 
beyond abstract generalities, and even those might not apply 
in particular concrete circumstances. And much of what I have 
suggested here requires us to make further judgement calls 
about what counts as ‘public’ in the first place, as a ‘public 
role’ that legitimates a private person becoming a subject of 
our interest, and as an issue that is truly a matter of ‘public 
concern’ or ‘public interest’ that justifies the use of particular 
methods that would otherwise be unethical. As social 
scientists, and in the face of creeping regulation, we must 
press for our freedom to be able to make these judgement 
calls, for it is more often than not the researcher him or 
herself who is best-placed to make them (and to take 
responsibility for when the wrong decision is made). All I want 
to have raised in this brief paper is the thought that the ethical 
considerations that pertain to the social sciences are not 
always the same as those which rightly underpin the 
biomedical sciences, and that however our discipline is 
regulated, be it through the inculcation of professional values 
or more formal regulative frameworks, it must be through a 
framework that understands and enables rather than 
misconstrues and hinders good social science research. 
Notes 
1. The American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP) has recently recommended that any research 
that imposes no more than minimal risk of harm in its
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subjects should be exempt from requiring approval by 
an Institution Review Board (IRB). It is clear from their 
discussion about which methodologies are minimal risk, 
such as interview and surveys, that an implication of 
their recommendations is to exempt much social 
science research from the requirements of IRB 
approval. 
2. Here I disagree with Langlois who argues that the 
causing of harm ‘may be the whole point of the 
exercise’ of social science research (Langlois 2011: 
150). There is a question here, of course, as to 
whether what I am calling ‘social harm’, e.g. damage to 
reputation, career, employment, financial interests etc, 
should count as a harm. Here I am assuming that it 
does insofar as it is a form of damage to the interests 
of the participants. This also seems to be the position 
of the ESRC when they define risk to include that to a 
subject’s ‘personal social standing, privacy, personal 
values and beliefs, their links to family and the wider 
community, and their position within occupational 
settings, as well as the adverse effects of revealing 
information that relates to illegal, sexual or deviant 
behaviour’. 
3. Another way this might be justified is as a form of 
‘double effect’, the doctrine in just war theory that 
harm is permissible to non-combatants in war if and 
only if causing that harm was the unintentional outcome 
of the pursuit of a noble or worthy outcome, even if 
that harm was foreseeable or inevitable. This is a 
controversial and complicated doctrine, but not one 
without its merits in a world where there is often a 
sizeable gap between the intentions of an action and its 
actual consequences. 
4. This key principle seems to sit in some considerable 
tension with a claim made later in the ESRC’S FRE 
document that ‘Not all risks can, or in some cases, 
should be avoided’ and that, in cases such as this where 
research seeks to question and explore social, cultural 
or economic processes and in doing so negatively 
impact upon particular institutions or their agents, 
‘Principles of justice should, however, mean that 
researchers would seek to minimise [not eliminate] any 
personal harm to individual people’. As someone who 
works in normative political theory, I can confidently 
say that there is a huge amount of disagreement as to 
what principles of justice might demand of researchers. 
It is also unclear what is meant here by ‘personal’ harm. 
5. For an excellent discussion of the problems of consent 
in social science research, and in particular the standard 
method of declaring consent via signed forms, see van 
den Hoonard 2008, pp 29–32. 
6. Interestingly the AAUP report recommends that the 
use of duplicity and deceit not be sufficient to mark a 
project as needing IRB approval (AAUP 2013: 11). 
7. In some cases it may violate the FRE’s sixth key 
principle also: ‘The independence of research must be 
clear, and any conflicts of interest or partiality must be 
explicit’. 
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Response 1 to ‘Responsible to Whom? Obligations to Participants and Society 
in Social Science Research’ 
Professor Rosemary Hunter 
University of Kent and Socio-Legal Studies Association 
Introduction 
In the spirit of reflexivity – which appears to be one of the 
shared values which emerged from the discussion at the 
previous symposium – I will begin by reflecting on the various 
perspectives I bring to bear on the question of generic ethics 
principles in social science research and the values that might 
inform them. These perspectives are, in no particular order, 
those of: 
· a (socio-) legal scholar 
· a researcher trained in the United States and Australia 
· a teacher of research ethics to undergraduate and 
postgraduate students 
· a feminist 
· the Chair of a Learned Society which has its own 
Statement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice. 
How these perspectives have informed my thinking will no 
doubt become evident in what follows, and no doubt provide 
sources of disagreement. 
One of the key insights that social scientists can contribute to 
debates about research ethics is that research is a social 
activity, which brings the researcher into relationships with a 
range of others. Thus, the biomedical model or PPM (as Matt 
Sleat refers to it in his stimulus paper) captures only a small
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part of the picture. In addition to research participants, the 
researcher is brought into a relationship with: 
· her institution, including its ethical review mechanisms 
· her research team 
· her broader disciplinary and research communities 
· her research funder/s and/or sponsors 
· potential non-academic ‘users’ or ‘beneficiaries’ of or 
stakeholders in her research. 
Each of these relationships can give rise to ethical duties and 
the need for ethical judgements. One of the things I 
particularly value about the SLSA’s Statement of Principles of 
Ethical Research Practice 1 is that it does acknowledge and 
address this range of relationships, including, for example, the 
need to maintain the integrity of the discipline as a whole by 
reporting findings accurately and truthfully (2.1.1); to 
appropriately acknowledge and give weight to other people’s 
research (2.2.2, 4.3); to publish and disseminate the results of 
research to reach the range of appropriate audiences (2.1.2); 
to appropriately credit all contributions to research 
collaboration (4); to provide research staff with reasonable 
working conditions and not subject them to unreasonable 
expectations (5); to ensure that funded research and 
consultancy retains intellectual and ethical integrity (10); and 
to behave with probity when bidding for contracts (10.1.1). It 
also encourages members in their capacity as consultants to 
funders or sponsors to advise their clients to adopt 
transparent and inclusive bidding processes (10.3.2). 
An important point made in previous discussions is that 
relationships do not operate only in one direction, and that 
while the researcher may owe duties to a variety of others, 
they may also owe duties to her, particularly in the case of 
institutions and ethical review bodies, but certainly also in the 
case of peer reviewers of grant applications, funders and 
sponsors, and perhaps also stakeholder groups and research 
participants themselves. The next section of the paper focuses 
on the ethical duties of the researcher, but in the third section 
I will return to this point about the responsibilities of other 
actors in the system. 
Ethical decision making, ethical review and the PPM 
In making ethical judgements, it seems to me that a researcher 
can usefully be guided by both ethical ‘principles’ and ‘values’. I 
do not intend to engage here with the debate about the 
respective meanings of and the distinction between ‘principles’ 
and ‘values’. My working definition is that ‘principles’ are 
general statements designed to guide behaviour and decision 
making, while ‘values’ are fundamental normative commit- 
ments which may underpin ‘principles’. In particular, 
‘principles’ are not rules or prescriptions, although I accept 
the argument that this is another distinction which can be 
difficult to maintain in a regulatory context. Nevertheless, we 
should be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath- 
water. Ideally, principles draw attention to things that ought to 
be taken into account, and provide parameters for, without 
determining, specific judgement 
In my experience, the requirement to submit research 
proposals for ethical review provides a very useful discipline in 
drawing attention to things that ought to be taken into 
account when designing and conducting research. In the 
managerial university we spend an increasing amount of time 
filling out forms for risk assessment and audit purposes which 
get in the way more and more of actually doing our teaching 
and research. Ethical review forms are one of the few such 
processes that I actually find helpful, that provoke me and my 
students to be better researchers rather than actively 
obstructing us from doing research – although I acknowledge 
that the ethical review process may actively obstruct some 
kinds of research, and will return to this point later. For now, 
taking the process as one which requires us to take a series of 
issues into account (and leaving aside the kind of judgements 
made by ethics committees), the fact that the PPM only draws 
attention to some of the things that ought to be taken into 
account (i.e. focusing only on the researcher–research subject 
relationship) suggests that it should be built upon rather than 
jettisoned altogether. 
In relation to the PPM itself, I have to say that I have been 
shocked by the apparent ignorance of ethical considerations 
concerning research participants evident in some of the 
funding applications I have reviewed, so I don’t think we 
should be complacent about leaving it to the good judgement 
of individual researchers to safeguard their subjects 
adequately. I would also take issue with Matt’s argument about 
the nature of the relationship between researchers and 
respondents in positions of power and authority. Having done 
my fair share of research with ‘elite’ respondents, including 
senior lawyers, judges and civil servants, Matt’s picture is not 
one that I recognise. To be sure, such subjects stand in a 
position of power in relation to the researcher in that they 
can decide whether to provide or withhold information. Their 
lack of cooperation could torpedo the project. But at the 
same time, of course, they exist in a network of relations 
extending well beyond the researcher, in which they are also 
likely to have something to lose by being open and honest in 
giving her their views. Hence they are highly concerned about 
confidentiality, anonymity and the form and venue in which 
results will be published. Indeed, I was recently refused an 
interview with a senior judge whom I have known for years 
(and hence who I expected would trust me) on the basis that 
she had been ‘burnt’ by another researcher who wrote up her 
results in a way that, while maintaining strict anonymity, was 
completely identifying. No thanks to that researcher for 
neglecting not only her ethical responsibility to the research 
subject, but also her relationship with the wider disciplinary 
and research community. My point, however, is that a 
Foucauldian conception of power is perhaps more apposite in 
this context. The fact that someone is in a position of 
authority does not simply reverse the power relationship 
between researcher and subject. Rather, power circulates 
through and around the two parties in several directions. Both 
have access to certain power resources, and both have the 
capacity to harm the other. Ethical judgements need to be 
made within this context. 
Values 
Turning then to the specific subject of this Symposium – values 
– we might consider three questions. First, should values have 
any place in a statement of generic ethics principles in social 
science research? I have already suggested that both values 
and principles are useful touchstones in the design and 
conduct of research. The critique of principlism might suggest 
that values rather than principles should be the main focus of 
any statement emerging from this project. However, I would 
suggest that values (at least on my working definition) are too 
general to stand alone, and need to be elaborated in the
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research ethics context by means of principles. The values and 
principles do, of course, need to be related. 
Secondly, is it possible to agree on a set of values for our 
purposes? For someone more at home in the world of value 
conflicts than value consensus this is a challenge. It may be 
that the number of values we can agree on is quite small, 
although whether it is worth producing only a lowest 
common denominator statement is questionable. 
Thirdly, if we can agree on some common values, what are 
they? Reading back through the account of the discussion at 
the last Symposium, a number of candidates present 
themselves: 
· Social acceptability (David Carpenter: ‘social research 
ought to be socially acceptable’). I would not want to 
include this in any list of values for social science 
research, precisely because of the lack of consensus 
about social acceptability. What is considered socially 
acceptable or unacceptable varies substantially by social 
location. So the question would devolve to one of who 
decides. If it was the researcher, the result could 
simply be self-serving. If it was the ethics committee, 
the result is likely to be conservative, and possibly even 
more restrictive than what happens already. 
· Democratic participation (David Carpenter? 
‘researchers ought to involve members of the public in 
all stages of a research project’). This seems more like 
an aspiration than a value, and one that would be quite 
difficult to achieve in practice, and again could stymie 
some kinds of research. 
· Individual autonomy and dignity (treating people with 
respect, as ends in themselves rather than means to 
ends). This is the classic value underpinning the PPM. I 
would contend that it ought to be retained but 
extended to apply not only to how researchers treat 
research subjects, but how institutions and ethical 
review bodies treat researchers, and how members of 
research teams treat each other. 
· Respect for cultural difference/pluralism (Sharon 
Macdonald: ‘it is important that social scientists 
understand and respect the moral norms relevant to 
the cultural locations and individuals they study’). I 
would certainly include this on my list of values, 
although with the caveat that while it is important to 
respect cultural difference, it is also important to avoid 
cultural essentialism, and to recognise that cultures are 
dynamic, internally differentiated, and often contested. 
· Reflexivity. As noted at the beginning of this paper, this 
seems to be a universally acknowledged good for 
researchers and, one might add, for ethics committees 
and research funders. 
· Integrity. Another universally acknowledged good 
which again might apply not only to researchers but to 
other actors in the system, including peer reviewers 
and funders and commissioners of research. 
· Transparency, social responsibility, independence, 
competence, accountability. These are all values that 
both appear to command wide agreement in relation 
to researchers, and that should apply to ethical review 
processes as well. 
Several further values may not have been raised previously, 
but are worth consideration: 
· Collegiality. Collegiality within the disciplinary 
community is noted as a value in the preamble to the 
SLSA Statement, although it could clearly also extend 
to collegiality with the wider research community, and 
collegiality within institutions (including in the relations 
between ethics committees and researchers). 
· Trust. Should this be a desirable characteristic of all 
relationships within the research system? Should there 
be reciprocal duties to engender and extend trust? 
· Inclusiveness. The SLSA Statement says: 
6.7 When designing research, including identi- 
fying research participants, and disseminating 
research findings socio-legal researchers should 
give due consideration to principles of diversity 
and inclusivity. These principles may include 
consideration of the ethical implications of 
excluding participants from research on the 
basis of their class, gender, ethnicity, age, sexual 
orientation, physical ability, race or religious 
belief. 
The value of inclusiveness could also be invoked to 
encourage ethics committees to take a more facilitative 
approach where researchers propose to include 
participants who would be excluded by the standard 
requirement to sign a consent form. 
· Empathy. I find this is one of the greatest problems I 
have with my students, and hence once of the values I 
have to try hardest to inculcate. Undergraduate 
students in particular seem to find it very difficult to 
put themselves in the shoes of their intended subjects 
and to imagine the impact of their research on those 
subjects. It seems to me that empathy is an essential 
companion to individual autonomy/dignity and 
pluralism, without which these values cannot be fully 
operationalised. Ethics review bodies might also 
usefully embrace the value of empathy with the 
researchers they regulate. 
· Open-mindedness. This is the other problem area I 
experience with students, and with some colleagues as 
well. The importance of asking questions to which the 
answer is genuinely open; of gathering, interpreting and 
analysing research data in a spirit of open inquiry rather 
than seeking to confirm a pre-conceived view – these 
are points on which I find myself hammering away 
repeatedly. It may seem too obvious, but to me, open- 
mindedness is a key value underpinning the conduct of 
any social research, and is worth spelling out for that 
reason. 
Conclusion 
In summary while the PPM may not be a good fit for social 
science research – or for any conception of research as a 
social practice – it is not wholly without value for social 
science researchers, and can be improved upon. Thinking 
carefully about the range of relationships involved in social 
science research and the nature of those relationships can 
help us to consider what ethical judgements need to be made 
and by whom, as well as what values and principles might 
appropriately inform those judgements. 
Note 
1 Available at http://www.slsa.ac.uk/ethics-statement
21 
Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research 
Response 2 to ‘Responsible to Whom? Obligations to Participants and Society 
in Social Science Research’ 
Professor Kenneth Boyd 
University of Edinburgh 
Thank you for inviting me to comment on Matt Sleat’s paper. I 
was particularly interested in what he said about justifying 
deception in social science research. I shall come back to that 
at the end, but first let me say something more about the 
biomedical research ethics model and why it is inappropriate 
for the social sciences. 
The oldest rule in medical ethics is primum non nocere, ‘above 
all do no harm’. Doctors can do more serious harm to more 
people than can members of most other professions – except 
perhaps the oldest, or of course the military. But these are not 
professions to whose skill and judgement vulnerable people 
often need to entrust their health or life itself. The 
Hippocratic Oath seems to have been designed, among other 
things, to assure prospective patients that those who swore it 
were trustworthy – unlike shady practitioners who performed 
abortions, poisonings or surgery. Symbols of trustworthiness 
provided to assure and attract patients were in evidence again 
in more recent centuries, in the creation of medical guilds and 
colleges from which perceived quacks and charlatans were 
excluded, and later in official recognition and regulation of the 
profession through a variety of national and international 
councils and codes. And where medicine had boldly gone, 
other occupations aspiring to professional status followed, 
creating their own councils and codes and seeking official 
recognition. 
Until the mid-20th century, the ethics of medical practice, let 
alone the ethics of medical research, was discussed if at all 
only among doctors in private. The osmosis theory of medical 
education assumed, in the spirit of the Hippocratic Oath, that 
ethics was absorbed from the medical ethos, commonly from 
father to son; and formal teaching was often limited to the 
‘rule of As’: prohibition of abortion, addiction, adultery, 
advertising, and association with unqualified practitioners. The 
unspoken ethics of medical research seems still to have rested 
on an implied contract from the early days of charity hospitals, 
where patients, mostly from the poorer classes, provided the 
human material for research, in return for better medical care 
and treatment than they, unlike the wealthy, could afford at 
home. 
That implied contract, of course, was shattered in the mid- 
20th century by what became publicly known about seriously 
harmful medical research, conducted without patient consent, 
notably in Nazi Germany, but to some extent also in the UK 
and America. The professional reaction to this once again 
involved the creation of ethical codes, including the to-be- 
repeatedly-revised Declaration of Helsinki, and also the 
gradual development of research ethics committees, 
increasingly with lay involvement and under official regulation, 
eventually at national level. At the heart of all this effort was a 
determination that never again should patients be subjected to 
potentially harmful biomedical research without their informed 
consent. Like all ethical reactions, however, the danger of 
overreaction was waiting in the wings, and so it has proved. 
It is now beginning to be accepted that insistence on fully 
informed consent from everyone who might possibly be 
harmed in any way by their involvement as subjects of any kind 
of medical research is an impossible ideal and contrary to the 
public interest in improving its health and healthcare. There 
are areas of public health research for example where it is 
impossible to gain individual consent to data from the past, and 
others where the future use of data and human tissue cannot 
be predicted. Informed consent to research, or for that matter 
treatment, involving physically or psychologically invasive 
procedures on people with capacity clearly must remain 
mandatory, in order to ensure, as Onora O’Neill has put it, 
that people are ‘neither coerced nor deceived’ into research 
or treatment. But patient involvement (through questionnaires 
or review of anonymised health data) in non-invasive clinical 
audit, service evaluation and public health surveillance, for 
example, no longer require to be subjected to research ethics 
committee scrutiny. 
Such developments imply a dual recognition: the history of 
medicine’s unique capacity to harm as well as heal clearly 
requires continued regulatory oversight of medical research; 
but people also need trustworthy doctors, and 
trustworthiness is not encouraged if no room is left for virtue 
ethics and the motivated conscience, individual and collegial, of 
medical researchers. But these aspects of research do seem 
unique to medicine and perhaps in a lesser degree to some 
other ‘caring professions’. It is difficult to see how they are 
appropriate to non-clinical social science research, in which 
the risk of direct harm to participants normally is small, and 
where the researcher is not normally someone to whom 
vulnerable people turn for trustworthy care and treatment. 
The suspicion must be that scientific and social scientific 
associations, and also academic institutions, have borrowed 
the medical model of ethical codes and ethics committees, 
because these associations and institutions have been swept 
along in the wake first of medicine’s successful 19th-century 
professionalisation, and then of its 20th-century overreaction 
to its own sins – an overreaction now, ironically, being 
moderated in medicine itself. 
There may however also be another reason; and while the 
desire for a principle-based ethics for the social sciences may 
be yet another carry-over from medicine, it may also be more 
morally defensible. Principle-based medical ethics arose in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century to meet, among other 
challenges, the need to communicate effectively and 
acceptably, on the increasingly complicated choices of modern 
medicine, with colleagues, patients, and a wider public, many of 
whose views were more democratic and more morally 
pluralistic than those of previous generations. The well-known 
four principles of bioethics accordingly included listening to 
patients and trying to be fair to everyone as well as the more 
traditional medico- moral aim trying to do more good than 
harm. Many doctors find these principles, and the frequent 
tensions between them, helpful to bear in mind when, 
individually or collegially, they are coming to a judgement on a
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difficult ethical issue they have to deal with, or explaining the 
reasons for that judgement to others, or indeed in reflecting 
on how they are shaping their own character or the ethos of 
their team. These particular aids to reflection, of course, are 
tailored to medical practice: but they are rooted in the more 
generally applicable ethical principles of trying to do more 
good than harm in our lives, of trying to respect other 
individuals, and of trying to be fair to everyone, including 
ourselves. Respecting these general ethical principles and the 
tensions between them – in professional or academic work, in 
relations with colleagues or students, in personal, social and 
civic life – is surely an appropriate moral aim for professionals. 
Spelling them out in any greater detail as a principled-based 
ethics for the social sciences or indeed for any one social 
science however, is much more difficult and may not be 
desirable. 
Some reasons for this are suggested by the philosopher 
Simone Weil in The Need for Roots, written in 1942 as a report 
to the Free French on the post-war regeneration of their 
country. Discussing what she calls ‘the needs of the soul’, or 
what individuals need to be fully human, she identifies freedom 
of thought as an essential need. She then argues that to 
protect this freedom, associations concerned with their 
members’ interests (trades unions for example) should be 
allowed to promote those interests but not to express 
collective opinions on wider matters. ‘For’, she writes: 
when a group starts having opinions, it inevitably 
tends to impose them on its members. Sooner 
or later these individuals find themselves 
debarred … from expressing opinions opposed 
to those of the group, unless they care to leave 
it. 
People on the other hand should of course be able freely to 
associate with others in order to discuss ideas, but in ‘fluid 
social mediums’ where the arguments for and against ideas of 
all kinds can be canvassed and tested: ‘set out in their full 
force, all the arguments in favour of bad causes’ could even be 
published, with the proviso only this ‘did not pledge their 
authors in any way and contained no advice for readers’. 
What this publication sounds like of course is the kind of 
journal in which ideas are fiercely contested and tested to 
destruction by otherwise mild-mannered academics. Her 
distinction between associations concerned with interests and 
associations concerned with ideas might be seen as that 
between for example, trades unions and learned societies, or 
more generally still between politics and science, a distinction 
she also characterises as between a field that ‘forms part of 
action’ and a field that is ‘outside action’. Considered as an 
ideal type, science, including social science, is ‘outside action’ 
in that it allows freedom of thought and enquiry to disciplined 
intelligence – provided only that that intelligence does not 
intrude on the field that ‘forms part of action’, namely politics, 
again considered as an ideal type. A different metaphor for this 
might be that science is like the assessor sitting by the judge 
who provides all the information required before the judge 
can come to a judgement. 
In practice, of course, these ideal types and fact–value 
distinctions are much more blurred, not least nowadays by 
how research is funded and by the involvement of scientists at 
certain levels of policymaking. The ultimate reason for both 
the funding and the involvement however nevertheless does 
seem to be that scientific research is valued because it is 
considered to be in some fundamental sense ‘outside action’. If 
therefore a scientific association ‘starts having opinions’ by 
giving more or less weight to one or other ethical principle in 
the constellation all of which deserve to be kept in mind, and 
even more by spelling out the implications of this for its 
members, it might well be moving into the political field that 
‘forms part of action’, and thereby possibly diminishing its 
authority and usefulness. This is not to say that there no 
political issues on which scientific associations should have 
opinions – doctors and torture is one example and climate 
change may be another. But the influence of such opinions in 
the political field is probably in proportion to their rarity; and 
without such specific stimuli, ‘having opinions’ seems a high- 
risk area for scientific and social scientific associations. 
Turning finally to the specific issue of deception raised in Matt 
Sleat’s paper: 1 mentioned Onora O’Neill’s remark that the 
basic reason for informed consent in medical ethics is that 
people should be ‘neither coerced nor deceived’ into 
treatment or research. But this, as I have suggested, reflects 
the particular importance of both harm and trust in medicine, 
which is very much less in social scientific research. In that 
context, Sleat’s paper, I think, makes a good case for 
deception in at least some circumstances, including those 
when the research participants (whom the ESRC says ‘must 
take part voluntarily, free from any coercion’) are being 
investigated not as individuals but because of their possibly 
powerful role as public office holders or again as parties 
interested in the research not being conducted. 
An interesting question here however, concerns the 
researcher’s own ‘possibly public role’ as an impartial and 
unbiased scientist. If the role of the duplicitous researcher is 
‘to criticise the status quo or to suggest better alternatives’, it 
might be argued that it has passed into the field that ‘forms 
part of action’ and has therefore largely forfeited the 
protection afforded by science to freedom of thought and 
enquiry. The duplicitous researcher’s role here seems 
analogous to that of the investigative journalist or undercover 
policeman, the ethics of whose activities are widely contested 
and not afforded privileged protection from political 
judgements. This is probably a question which associations 
concerned with the interests of their members would be wise 
not to foreclose, but to leave matters to the ‘fluid social 
medium’ of general ethical discussion and debate in, for 
example, learned societies and universities, but also in the 
conversations of society – in the hope, ultimately, that the 
ethical assessor may be able to supply the political judge with 
appropriate material for a mature judgement on the subject.
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Discussion Paper:  Are we Asked to ‘Other’ Ourselves? 
Social Scientists and the Research-ethics Review Process 
Professor Emeritus Will C van den Hoonaard 
University of New Brunswick 
This paper underscores the manifold ways that the formal 
research-ethics codes perpetuate an imbalance. The most 
obvious imbalance relates to the imposition of a biomedical 
model of ethics review on the social sciences which numerous 
scholars have already commented on. I argue that while this 
imbalance constitutes a sufficient reason for social scientists 
to jettison the current review system as a whole, there are 
also other imbalances that make the ethics regime wobble. I 
refer to the uneven demands placed on researchers and 
incumbents of ethics committees. Taking the Canadian ethics 
code regime, TCPS 2 (CIHR,2010) as an example, we see that 
researchers must specifically uphold at least 23 virtues (ethical 
obligations), in contrast to incumbents of ethics committees 
who can go about their business ‘virtue free.’ Despite this 
powerful discrepancy of virtues, ethics regimes continue to 
insist that social researchers refine their ethics in research 
based on an extraneous model of research. In effect, ethics 
regimes are asking us to ‘other’ ourselves, and to define the 
ethics of our research through the lens of biomedical 
paradigms. If this alone were enough to sunder the whole 
system of ethics review, we as social scientists are also finding 
ourselves in a crisis of mission with the rise of many 
alternatives in methods and purpose. This paper, I hope, 
shows that the current research-ethics review system lacks a 
moral or ethical basis. 
This paper starts with describing the current crisis of 
sociology, spells out the inherent contradictions of ethics 
research-ethics review system, and then delves into the 
double-standard of the research-ethics review process; no 
ethical standard is demanded of incumbents of ethics 
committees, in contrast to the social researchers who must 
follow a bevy of ethical standards. The paper concludes with a 
number of approaches to solve these dilemmas. 
1 Situating contemporary social research 
The unstable feature of research-ethics review impinging on 
the social sciences is partly on account of the social sciences’ 
own loss of identity and mission. The current state of the 
social sciences, and especially sociology is similar to the crisis 
that visited anthropology 35 years ago. At the apogee of that 
crisis, Anna Grimshaw and Ken Hart (1994: 227–8) raised 
doubts about the prospects of anthropology: 
… since the wave of independence movements 
[anthropology was] shattered [in] its empirical base 
and posed serious intellectual and political challenges 
to many of its fundamental assumptions. 
Anthropologists themselves have made many attempts 
to address this crisis and to find new practices suitable 
to a changed world order. But the problem of whether 
anthropology can survive as a discipline in the twenty- 
first century stubbornly remains as pressing as ever. 
Some professionals feel that millenarian predictions of 
the end of anthropology are tired and repetitive; 
others deny that there is any crisis at all, except an 
uncontrolled outbreak of navel-gazing; a number look 
for new areas to colonize (documentary film, 
literature, tourism); while others seek a solution to the 
politics of anthropology through the invention of new 
writing strategies. 
These observations, I believe, bear an uncanny resemblance 
to the current state of sociology, with one exception. While 
anthropology was then seen as a coloniser, sociology today 
has become the object of being colonised and it is the ethics- 
review system that is effectuating this colonisation by the 
biomedical paradigm. 
The after-effects, within sociology, include a search for our 
soul and identity as sociologists. Sociologists are increasingly 
adopting the biomedical language (e.g. ‘protocol’, 
‘investigator’) and contorting themselves and their research 
to suit the colonising paradigm. As has been universally noted, 
at the rate of 10 publications a year since 2000, the 
biomedical paradigm is vastly different than the sociological 
one. 1 So much so, that the application of the biomedical 
paradigm offers nothing that might be even remotely helpful 
to sociologists in their search for ethics in research. Besides, 
sociologists already have a treasure trove of insights about 
ethics in research, as expressed through manifold ethics 
guidelines in their own professional and academic societies. 
Here are some important differences between sociology and 
biomedical research frameworks (see Table 1 below): 
Table 1: Comparative differences between social & 
biomedical research 
Social research Biomedical research 
1 stresses interdepend- 
ence 
highlights autonomy of res. 
part. 
2 affirms aggregate, col- 
lective, patterns 
speaks mainly about the 
individual 
3 critiques of status quo does not critique of status 
quo 
4 sees worth of research 
in numerous ways 
values worth of research in 
terms of social good 
5 admits to interpreta- 
tions and multiple per- 
spectives 
celebrates one perspective 
6 has developed keen 
sense of ethics on the 
ground 
takes its cue from template 
7 acknowledges hierarchy 
of credibility 
‘what’s this? 
8 continues ethical reflec- 
tions through to publi- 
cation 
is less prone to wrestle 
about ethics in publica- 
tions
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I realise that this table offers a Promethean fit of each 
paradigm; it is highly generalised but it illustrates some of their 
principal difference as a basis for a rudimentary comparison. 
These formal opposites lead us to think that we need to 
reconceptualise the schema of research-ethics review for 
social researchers. Annette Hemmings (2006: 12) speaks 
about ‘seemingly intractable divides between notions of good, 
ethical ethnography and qualitative research and the ethical 
frameworks … endorsed by … IRBs’ (2006: 12). But, what 
values will guide us if the biomedically based ethics-review 
system is not suitable for social research? As sociologists, we 
intend to portray society in the hopes of exposing inequality, 
injustice, and the routines of the everyday life of individuals 
and institutions. How do we become better analytical mirrors 
of society? How do we become authentic mirrors of society 
(Kleinecht, 2007: 229)? Who tilts this mirror these days? 
Research ethics committees and ethics policies. The quest to 
understand society has become more and more remote … 
and more difficult given these obstacles. 
2 Inherent contradictions about current research- 
ethics review regimes 
There are conceptual contradictions in the way ethics policies 
articulate ethical stances. They fail to realise that every 
principle of ethics involves relationships and interdependence. 
For example, ethics codes call for ‘trust’ or ‘trustworth- 
iness’ (CIHR, 2010: 44, 56, 59, 91, 105, 110, 118, 140) but also 
engage in the clarion call of ‘trust-but-verify’. The same 
contradictory stance should apply to their deliberations about 
‘ethics applications’. These deliberations express cynicism; 
they speak of a deep distrust for researchers. Applications are 
researcher-evacuated, and the ethics-review process 
exemplifies control and bureaucratic gerrymandering. The 
process falls entirely short of the vital principle of ethics as 
something that pertains to human relationships (in this case, 
the relationship between ethics committees and researchers). 
The treatment by ethics committees of researchers’ 
applications cannot be divorced from ethics which must give 
due regard to human relations. Unless ethics committees 
connect the ‘treatment’ of ethics applications from 
researchers as a de facto ethical relationship with researchers, 
the research-ethics review is a doomed moral or ethical 
enterprise. 
As presently constituted, the research-ethics review process 
cannot be an ethical, or even a moral project. The research- 
ethics review process now boils down to an administrative 
process. Ethics is always about human relationships because 
how can virtues (e.g. trust,. charity, generosity, respect, etc.) 
manifest themselves except through relations? As mentioned 
above, in their consideration of research applications for their 
ethical viability, ethics committees see that process as 
primarily a bureaucratic exercise involving control and the 
like, usually disconnected to the relations that must connect 
the committee to the researcher. We learn that Kant, in his 
concept of ethical conduct, advocated the idea that we should 
never treat something as merely an end in itself. In that light, I 
disagree with Howe and Moses (1999: 23) who believe that 
ethics committees employ ‘de facto Kantian’ principles. The 
guardians of the ethics regime consider the application as a 
test of ethics, rather than their relationship to researchers. In 
such a consequentialist approach, the ends justify the means. 
More is vested in vetting applications than in cultivating 
relations with the researcher. As Annette Hemmings averred, 
members of a social community have moral obligations flow 
from each other; when ethics committees do not see 
themselves as part of a social community (but as independent 
guardians), the notion of ‘ethics’ is absent. from their 
deliberations, decisions, and outcomes. The terror or fear 
that committees strike in the hearts of students expresses, 
paradoxically, this lack of ethics. It is not virtuous to 
‘terrorise’ students (van den Scott, 2013), As Hemmings 
points out (2006: 14), ‘the life of students is made miserable’. 
Second, although relations between researchers and individual 
research participants are acknowledged as part of the 
research, they do not, however, constitute the whole 
research. Sociologists value the search for interactional, 
collective, and institutional patterns. As Sleat (2013: 4) has 
stated, 
It is also important to remember that the knowledge or 
understanding that we as social scientists seek to ascertain 
through our research is not knowledge about a private 
individual but knowledge that is of or about the public 
social or political body. Though this knowledge might be 
revealed as part of our interactions with individuals, we 
interact with them in their role as occupants of public 
office (e.g. elected representative, judge, a Vice Chancellor, 
an economic advisor to a Prime Minister) or as someone 
who operates in a social context beyond their private 
individual selves (e.g. terrorist, public broadcaster or a 
private broadcaster with political influence, a CEO of a 
company that employs significant proportion of a 
population, an enemy combatant). Importantly, we do not 
engage with them as private individuals. Likewise the 
knowledge that we ascertain is not private knowledge 
about a private individual, which an ethical framework puts 
very strict conditions on using or releasing, but knowledge 
that is public in the sense of being about the common. 
Our ‘representation’ of research participants would be a 
failure if we, as sociologists, do not abstract the larger 
patterns that tend to culture and social structure. Moreover, 
much of the thrust of ethics codes is to equalise the power 
imbalance between researcher and research participant (Sleat 
2013: 2), but the social sciences have tended to recognise 
such potential imbalances anyway. In many social-research 
settings, it is the research participant who generally has more 
power. I am relying on Martin Sleat’s stimulus paper (2013: 4) 
that expresses a different notion of harm as articulated in 
biomedical models of research: 
While the harm social science research might 
do can clearly affect the individual and many of 
their private interests, it is their public role that 
is of interest to us (though admittedly these are 
not easily separable). The point is that social 
science research only harms the private 
interests of individuals indirectly, as an often 
inescapable ramification of pursuing their public 
responsibility to study and analyse public 
matters. 
Third, we aim to change the status quo, or at least not 
follow the ‘party line’ in our attempts to discover these 
patterns. ‘Ethnographers were taught to be adventur- 
ous, generate knowledge of wide relevance’, says 
Annette Hemmings (2006: 12). The critical stance is
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important, especially in this era of oversight and upside- 
down democracy. ‘Inverted totalitarianism’ is a term 
coined by political philosopher Sheldon Wolin to 
describe what he believes to be the emerging form of 
government (especially in the United States; in the UK, 
Thatcherism expresses that form). Wolin believes that 
the United States is increasingly turning into an illiberal 
democracy, and he uses the term ‘inverted 
totalitarianism’ to illustrate the similarities and 
differences between the United States governmental 
system and totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany 
and the Stalinist Soviet Union (Wikipedia). Today, 
challenging the status quo is perhaps the single most 
important task facing social scientists. As Matt Sleat 
(2013) at our Symposium has already stated, the social 
sciences ‘play a crucial role in helping us understand 
our social world and critically and normatively reflect 
upon it’. 
Fourth, following the idea that the ‘sociological stance 
may be experienced as betrayal or rejection by 
participants who expect researchers to affirm or 
endorse their version’ (Murphy and Dingwall 2002: 
342), sociologists are not naive about the import of 
their research. To some extent, sociologists carry a 
heightened sense of the moral peril in which they find 
themselves. We find an applicably good statement in 
Murphy and Dingwall (2002: 342) about sociologists 
wanting to assert multiple perspectives, but cannot say 
as much to research participants. The opacity of 
sociological and anthropological research raises 
concerns when dealing with research participants. For 
example, Murphy and Dingwall (2002: 342–3) raise the 
issue of a study on parents with disabled children. 
Parents thought the study was about to see whether 
they were ‘good’ parents. 
Fifth, social scientists struggle with the authorial voice in their 
writings. Do their perspectives, interpretations, and 
understandings override those of the research participants? 
Do social scientists have a right to privilege their own voice? 
To fight the authorial voice in our culture, is the only 
legitimate role for researchers to reproduce the research 
participants’ perspective? As Murphy and Dingwall (2002: 345) 
point out, do we have the right ‘to go beyond this [to usurp] 
the right of people to define their own reality’? If sociologists 
swallow what research participants say and do, do we claim 
that those genuine expressions mirror a false consciousness? 
Ethics codes are supremely silent on this basic, elementary 
issue in ethics for social researchers. There is no guidance 
forthcoming from the ethics regime. 
There is a way out despite the silence. I have derived most of 
the remaining points from the work by Murphy and Dingwall 
(2002: 345–6). They propose that (1) authors have to become 
visible in the texts; (2) we need to present evidence upon 
which our interpretations are based; (3) we should 
acknowledge that for some it is not about the validity of the 
interpretations, ‘but the question of control over the 
interpretative process’; (4) we need to acknowledge our 
interests and the extent to which they differ from the research 
participants; (5) we need ‘to alert participants to the ways in 
which we will re-frame their versions of their experiences’; (6) 
reflecting on conflicts of interpretation is also needed; and, 
finally (7) in the face of ‘solipsism and radical relativism’, the 
researcher should resort to consequentialist ethics and show 
the power of research to ‘produce valued social 
outcomes’ (Fine, in Murphy and Dingwall 2002: 346). 
Sixth, still following Murphy and Dingwall (2002: 343) if we 
judge research by its effects, we can become apprised of the 
hopeful fact that research ‘often do not lead to exploitation’. 
Still, we find highway signs that potentially warn us of the 
dangers that we could exploit the community we are studying. 
We are ‘disingenuous’ (Murphy and Dingwall 2002: 344) in our 
‘attempts to downplay inequalities and develop reciprocal 
relationships’. With financial benefits to researcher, are we 
not exploiting research participants? How do we go about 
returning benefits to research participants (Murphy and 
Dingwall 2002: 344)? Can we conclude with the thought that 
although biomedical research has colonised social research (via 
ethics committees), social researchers exercise a ‘new form of 
colonisation’ (Murphy and Dingwall 2002: 345) by interpreting 
the experiences of others? In other words, are we ‘usurping’ 
the rights of others to define themselves? 
Finally, if research leads to self-awareness among research 
participants, it may also ‘lead to trouble’ (Murphy and Dingwall 
2002: 340). We need to agree with Murphy and Dingwall 
(2002: 341) that ‘ethnographic publications can hurt’. ‘Does 
the researcher,’ say Murphy and Dingwall (2002: 344), ‘actively 
support’ groups (e.g. KKK) or undermine them? Even by 
publishing about them? Research ethics codes are silent on the 
specifics of these dilemmas. That silence is deafening. And, yet, 
in all other matters, social researchers must carry the burden 
of having been colonised by a biomedical paradigm that gives 
no insight into these vexing problems. 
The mission of the social sciences is disappearing. As I 
mentioned elsewhere (van den Hoonaard 2011), ethics 
committees have homogenised and pauperised social 
research, and social scientists and we are complicit. 
3 Situating ethics codes 
This section of the paper even troubles me. My investigation is 
still ongoing, but my premise is that ethics codes do not speak 
about virtues which members of ethics committees must 
demonstrate, 2 but the ethics codes have spelled out plenty of 
them for researchers to acquire. This problem goes to the nub 
of our dilemma. The guardians of ethics committees (for 
whom virtues are not significantly spelled out) are insisting 
that we, the social researchers, take an uncompromising look 
at the ethics of our own research. We are to produce ethical 
perspectives even though most of social research has had 
them without the benefit of ethics committees. In other 
words, we have been asked to ‘other’ ourselves, to ‘explain’ 
and ‘elaborate’ our research lives in terms of what the 
biomedical model of the ethics framework is driving us to do. 
As Martyn Hammersley in response to David Carpenter 
(2013) asks, ‘What’s wrong with the principles we have …?’. 
This colonising mind-set offers no warrants (unlike open 
courts) and secrecy is touted as the norm. In addition to the 
diversity of opinion among ethics committees, researchers 
have a difficult time sorting through the demands and wishes 
of these committees. Research proposals are sometimes so 
contorted and changed by ethics committees that one has the 
feel that we are doing ‘research by committee’. We find an 
abundance of values in ethics codes, but a shortness of virtues 
(except those demanded of researchers). The widely held
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belief by the guardians that research-ethics review can be 
standardised is irritating, to say the least. 
Reading the (Canadian) TCPS 2 as a guide of virtues for both 
researchers and incumbents of ethics committees, one is 
struck that researchers are ideally required to have 23 
virtues (see Appendices A and B) but no list of virtues has 
been set aside for members of ethics committees. 3 
Obviously, researchers are in much greater need of them! 
However, there is a list of institutional virtues attached to 
ethics committees which do not translate into virtues of 
individuals. 
As a research note, I systematically read the TCPS 2 and 
traced the listed virtues. Using http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
List_of_virtues, which has a list of 114 virtues, I tried to 
match the nature of the virtues in the TCPS 2 with those 
listed in the relevant website. It was possible to make a 
straightforward match in some cases; in other cases, it was 
not that easy and I had to infer what virtue a particular 
phraseology would refer to. No doubt, the ‘virtues list’ is not 
complete and probably reflects a Western bias. For example, 
some virtues are missing from the list, such as Respect for 
elders (which is critical when doing research in Aboriginal 
communities). 
The most ardently sought-after virtues that Canadian 
ethics policies wish researchers to follow include 
Respect, Openness, Truthfulness/Honesty, and 
Sensitivity (see Appendix A). The next set includes 
Trust(worthiness), Responsibility, Justice, Co- 
operativeness, Balance, and Compassion (e.g. concern 
for welfare). At the next level, the TCPS 2 promotes 
these virtues: Understanding, Flexibility, Fairness, 
Impartiality (separate roles), Benevolence (that 
research is of benefit to res. part.), Cautiousness, 
Integrity, Thoughtfulness, and Vigilance (protect 
participants). The final set of virtues includes Courage 
(adopt critical perspective) (challenge mainstream 
thought), Fair-mindedness, Freedom (freedom from 
coercion), Commitment, Loyalty, and Independence. 
Institutionally speaking, the ‘top’ virtues that TCPS 2 
welcomes the most in terms of dealing with research 
participants are Openness, Truthfulness/Honesty 
(reveal Conflict of Interest, Transparency), and 
Sensitivity. The virtues less emphasised in TCPS 2 
include Respect, Justice, Responsibility, Cooperative- 
ness, Fairness, Impartiality, Integrity, and Fair- 
mindedness. The least emphasised one involve Trust 
(worthiness), Balance, Understanding, Flexibility, 
Thoughtfulness, Courage, Attention, Loyalty, and 
Independence. Appendix C 2 provides a schematic 
overview of virtues according to the different levels of 
relative importance: 
Is there a Way Out? 
It seems clear that the current research-ethics regime is not 
in a position to guide social researchers. The most urgent 
and satisfying approach, in the words of Martin Sleat (2013: 
6), for social scientists (‘in the face of creeping regulation’) is 
to: 
press for our freedom to be able to make these 
judgement calls, for it is more often than not the 
researcher him or herself who is best-placed to make 
them (and to take responsibility for when the wrong 
decision is made) 
The ethics codes of academic and professional societies, 
developed over many years through the experience of their 
respective memberships, are very adequate in guiding 
researchers through periods of ethics on the ground. 
Despite our fervent and provocative pleas we might still see 
the endurance of the kinds of ethics codes that cannot 
sustain the sort of ethics that make sense in social research. 
Failing to dispense with those biomedically based codes, we 
should make the case for developing a parallel system of 
ethics policies. This can take several forms. We should either 
consign individual ethical obligations (virtues) to incumbents 
of ethics committees, much like ethics codes today spell out 
individual ethical obligations of researchers. 
Failing to elicit attempts by policymakers to assign personal 
obligations for incumbents of ethics committees, we might 
argue that ethics codes drop the personal obligations of 
researchers and, instead, specify only the ethical obligations 
of disciplines in general (and not of researchers). This parallel 
arrangement speaks to a more balanced approach. The 
professional and/or academic societies can then spell out the 
obligations of individual researchers (which they now do 
anyway). 
Whether we disband the research-ethics regime or 
reconfigure it with or without personal ethical obligations 
(for committee incumbents and researchers), it remains all 
too clear that ethics always involves human relations. If the 
basis of judgements by ethics committee about applications 
from researchers does not acknowledge that central fact (as 
is currently the case), ethics is an empty page. 
Rediscovering the sociological imagination represents 
another way out. Caught in the maelstrom of being colonised 
by the biomedical paradigm, social scientists, and sociologists 
in particular, must find a new way of asserting the foundation 
of their discipline, taking a critical and/or analytical stance in 
research. Murphy and Dingwall has set a course, namely to 
combine ‘a commitment to social constructionism with the 
pursuit of truth as a regulative ideal’. They also claim that 
‘[s]ubtle realists accept the idea that there might be multiple, 
non-contradictory versions of reality which, although 
different from one another, may nevertheless all be true’, a 
perspective also voiced by Murphy and Dingwall (2002: 346). 
The latter two offered this vision, namely that such an 
approach ‘opens up the possibility that participants’ versions 
of events may be ‘reality tested’ through empirical work. The 
researcher is not obliged to treat any particular version as 
authoritative simply because it is offered by a participant’. 
The ethical imperative is about fair dealing (Murphy and 
Dingwall 2002: 346). 
In the meanwhile, one can also suggest that ‘Slow 
Scholarship’ is something that all researchers might consider 
to find their way out of this maelstrom (see, e.g. Hertz et al 
2013; and a FB page http://www.facebook.com/ 
groups/188202231458/). 
Notes 
1. Martin Sleat, in a paper prepared for our Symposium
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has articulated the clear difference between bio- 
medical conceptions of harm and those in the social 
sciences, relating such profound differences to the 
varying natures of their research. I highly recommend 
his insights. 
2. When under ‘FAQ’ on US Human Research 
Protections, I searched the term ‘virtue’, the reply was 
as follows: Q: ‘How do the regulations define 
“prisoner”? A: The regulations define “prisoner” as 
follows: “Prisoner” means any individual involuntarily 
confined or detained in a penal institution …’. 
3. In some cases, it is relatively easy to infer what virtues 
TCPS 2 refers to because the terms are equivalent to 
those found on the virtues website (e.g. integrity). In 
other cases, one might want to assume that ‘being 
transparent’ (p 92) is the same as ‘being open’. There 
are also descriptions in TCPS 2 that one would need 
to translate more vigorously, such as when it asks 
researchers to be considerate of the nature of the 
research when it ‘invades sensitive interests’ (p 141). 
Are we to assume that the virtue of Sensitivity is to be 
applied here? 
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APPENDIX A 
PROVISIONAL LIST OF VIRTUES AS EXEMPLIFIED 
IN CANADA’S TCPS 2 (2010): THE INITIAL SCAN 
OF THE TEXT 
Instances of pages in TCPS 2 where I have inferred a virtue, 
directly or indirectly 
Instances of pp 
virtues appearing 
on pp in TCPS 2 
Researchers Õ 
Res. Participants 
REB Õ Res. 
partici- 
pants 
Respect 8, 28, 52, 58, 89, 103, 105, 
106, 107, 109, 114, 117, 
119, 123, 126, 143 
8, 67, 89 
Openness, Truthfulness/ 
Honesty (reveal CoI) 
(transparency) 
7, 32, 58, 89, 91, 94, 95, 
96, 150, 152, 157, 158, 
161, 164, 183, 186 
90, 91, 92, 93, 
94, 95, 152, 157 
Sensitivity 8, 55, 88, 107, 120, 130, 
141, 169, 174 
55, 88, 100, 144, 
169 
Trust(worthiness) 44, 56, 59, 91, 105, 110, 
118, 140 
90 
Responsibility 27, 42, 56, 80, 103, 153, 
154, 160 
80, 153 
Justice 10, 41, 47, 48, 109, 116 47, 67, 88 
Cooperativeness 108, 110, 115, 123, 124, 
128 
86, 99 
Balance 41, 106, 107, 111, 166 41 
Compassion (e.g. concern 
for welfare) 
10, .40, 109, 162, 173 10, 67 
Understanding 24, 138, 140 24 
Flexibility 81, 138 85 
Fairness 10, 110 90, 160 
Impartiality (separate roles) 32 , 95 21, 79 
Benevolence (that research 
is of benefit to res. part.) 
41, 124 
Cautiousness 138, 182 
Integrity 58, 163 68, 93 
Thoughtfulness 7, 177 177 
Vigilance (protect partici- 
pants) 
57, 155 
Courage (adopt critical per- 
spective) (challenge main- 
stream thought) 
35 21 
Fair-mindedness 47 47, 79 
Freedom (freedom from 
coercion) 
29 
Attention? 28 28 
Commitment 7 
Loyalty 90 
Independence 93 
Total virtues 23 20
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APPENDIX B 
PROVISIONAL LIST OF VIRTUES AS EXEMPLIFIED 
IN CANADA’S TCPS 2 (2010): 
THE INITIAL SCAN OF THE TEXT 
Number of pages that has at least one reference to the indi- 
cated virtue 
APPENDIX C 
LEVELS AND KINDS OF VIRTUES MANDATED IN 
TCPS 2 
Different levels of virtues as expressed in TCPS 2 
Level 1 expresses the most-mentioned virtue; Level 4, the 
least. 
Note 
When a virtue appeared at least once on a page, I scored it 
one time. So the levels of the virtues are based on the number 
of pages in which a particular virtue has appeared. 
Instances of virtues 
appearing on 
pp in TCPS 2 
Researchers 
Õ Res. 
participants 
Ethics 
Comm- 
ittees 
Respect 16 3 
Openness, Truthfulness/ 
Honesty (transparency) 
(acknowl. with CoI) 
16 8 
Sensitivity 9 5 
Trust(worthiness) 8 1 
Responsibility 8 2 
Justice 6 3 
Cooperativeness 6 2 
Balance 5 1 
Compassion 
(e.g. concern for welfare) 
5 2 
Understanding 3 1 
Flexibility 2 1 
Fairness 2 2 
Impartiality (separate 
roles) 
2 2 
Benevolence 
(that research is of bene- 
fit to res. part.) 
2 0 
Cautiousness 2 0 
Integrity 2 2 
Thoughtfulness 2 1 
Vigilance (protect partici- 
pants) 
2 0 
Courage (adopt critical 
perspective) challenge 
mainstream thought 
1 1 
Fair-mindedness 1 2 
Freedom (freedom from 
coercion) 
1 0 
Attention? 1 1 
Commitment 1 0 
Loyalty 0 1 
Independence 0 1 
Total virtues 23 20 
Researchers 
are mandated 
to have 
Ethics commit- 
tees should 
have 
Level 1 Openness Openness 
Truthfulness/ 
Honesty 
Truthfulness/ 
Honesty 
Sensitivity 
Level 2 Trust(worthiness) Respect 
Responsibility Justice 
Justice 
Cooperativeness 
Balance 
Compassion 
Level 3 Understanding Responsibility 
Flexibility Cooperativeness 
Fairness Fairness 
Impartiality Impartiality 
Benevolence 
Cautiousness 
Integrity 
Thoughtfulness 
Vigilance 
Level 4 Courage Trust(worthiness) 
Fair-mindedness Balance 
Freedom Understanding 
Attention Flexibility 
Commitment Thoughtfulness 
Loyalty Courage 
Independence Attention 
Loyalty 
Independence
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A Summary of Symposium 2:  Values 
15th April 2013, British Psychological Society, London 
Organising Committee: Robert Dingwall, Ron Iphofen, Janet Lewis and John Oates 
Summary by Dr Nathan Emmerich, Queen’s University Belfast 
Introduction 
The second in a series of three Academy of Social Sciences 
symposia was convened on 15th April 2013 at the British 
Psychological Society’s offices in London. The day, chaired by 
Paul Atkinson (Cardiff University), was concerned with Values 
and followed the first symposium (5/3/13) where the 
discussion focused on Principles. The final symposium will 
focus on Standards. 
There was an initial discussion of the previous symposium, the 
written summary and the direction the project was moving. 
The morning was focused on the discussion paper written by 
Matthew Sleat (Department of Politics, University of Sheffield) 
and responses by Rosemary Hunter (University of Kent and 
the current chair of the Socio-Legal Studies Association) and 
Kenneth Boyd (University of Edinburgh). This was followed by 
a wide-ranging discussion. 
The afternoon session recommenced with a paper by Will van 
den Hoonaard (University of New Brunswick) and, following a 
brief discussion, the attendees were divided into working 
groups to conduct more focused discussions, summaries of 
which were then fed back to the whole group for plenary 
debate. 
Initial discussion 
The first order of business was to discuss whether the 
Chatham House Rule could be abandoned for the purposes of 
summarising the discussion. Whilst there was general 
agreement about the need to include names and affiliations of 
contributors, some members felt they needed to have an 
opportunity to ensure comments about their Societies were 
correct. Robert Dingwall concluded that, prior to being made 
public, summaries would be circulated to participants on a 
confidential basis for comment and minor amendment. The 
summary still reflects what was said and is, therefore, an 
abridged version of a social exchange; nothing reported in 
these documents can be taken as authoritative. When seeking 
advice individuals should always refer to the current guidance 
published by their Learned Society and are encouraged to 
contact them if further clarity is required. 
The second order of business was a brief consideration of the 
direction which the Symposia Series and the ‘Generic 
Principles’ project was taking. Following the confidential 
distribution of the summary of the previous Symposium there 
was some concern that the working party was seeking a 
predetermined conclusion or that if a set of generic ethical 
principles was adopted by the Academy of Social Sciences it 
would become a condition of membership on the Learned 
Societies. Robert Dingwall assured the audience that this was 
not the case. Whilst it was important to distinguish between 
the different disciplines of the social sciences other people, 
including the general public, might have a more singular picture 
of the social sciences and social scientists. John Oates noted 
that part of the purpose of the Academy of Social Sciences 
adopting a set of generic principles would be to inform the 
various publics (funders, sponsors, the public at large, including 
participants and communities being researched, ethical 
regulators and those involved in research governance) about 
the ethical nature of social science research. 
Dingwall also noted that any generic principles would remain 
open to local interpretation and application. He also suggested 
that those involved with the symposia series saw it as a 
‘bottom-up’ process and that we were seeking to form a useful 
consensus but remained open to the possibility that there 
would not be one. Ron Iphofen echoed these comments. 
Matei Candea (ASA) expressed concern about how much the 
eight principles had been modified from the previous symposia 
and raised the question of whether principles, rather than 
values or virtues, was the best way to do ethics in the social 
sciences. John Oates noted the eight principles had been 
modified, and that in retrospect their inclusion in the summary 
was unfortunate as they were not a conclusion of Symposium 
One and could have been distributed in a separate document. 
Stimulus paper: Matthew Sleat 
Commencing the morning schedule Sleat offered a brief 
summary of the views he set out in his discussion paper. It 
was, Sleat said, the first time he had considered research 
ethics and governance in any detail and he was immediately 
struck by the way in which it was easy for social science 
research ethics to follow the tracks previously laid out by 
biomedical research ethics and the shape of regulation in the 
US, Canada, and Australia. 
Whilst recognising difference, Sleat suggested that one thing 
these models had in common was that they centred on what 
he called the Participant Protection Model (PPM) of research 
ethics. Reflecting the post-World War Two consensus this 
model accords precedence to the rights of the participants. 
However, Sleat wanted to question whether the 
responsibilities of social scientist were the same as those of 
biomedical researchers, and who should be given ethical 
priority in social scientific research. 
Sleat suggested that the PPM is an inappropriate model for 
governing the ethical aspect of social scientific research. He 
argued that the social sciences have a critical and normative 
function within any given society. This means that the social 
sciences have a different ethical structure to biomedical 
research and therefore different sets of responsibilities pertain 
to biomedical and social scientific researchers. Furthermore 
Sleat suggested that, whilst there was an asymmetry of power 
between biomedical researchers and participants who are 
often ill, this was not always the case in the social sciences. 
Furthermore the potential for harm was, generally speaking, 
far less in the social sciences than in biomedical research. 
Sleat also argued that because social scientists researched ‘the 
social’ the focus was often on the public roles and actions of
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research participants not on their biology. Thus we might 
think there is a different dynamic to the principle of autonomy 
in each case. Furthermore if we considered the concept of 
‘vulnerability’ we might think that, whilst the participant in 
biomedical research was always more vulnerable, in the social 
sciences the researcher might be the more vulnerable party. 
For example, in his own discipline of political science, 
researchers often sought to study politicians and other 
individuals who occupy positions of power far greater than 
academic researchers. 
Responses by discussants 
Professor Rosemary Hunter began her talk in the spirit of 
reflexivity – a value that emerged from the previous 
symposium – by noting several of her social locations relevant 
to the discussion. These included: being a socio-legal scholar; a 
researcher trained in the US and Australia; a teacher of 
research ethics to postgraduate and undergraduate students; a 
feminist; and a chair of a Learned Society with its own code of 
ethics. In the light of Sleat’s discussion about the normative 
and critical function of the social sciences it is interesting to 
highlight Hunter’s commitment to feminism and, presumably, 
feminist research in the social sciences. Hunter also 
highlighted the relationships researchers have to their: 
institution (including its ethical governance procedures); 
research team; disciplinary colleagues and community; 
participants; funders; and other stakeholders including users 
of research. She felt that Sleat’s focus on the PPM captured 
only one aspect of the ethics of social scientific research and 
felt that highlighting these other relationships indicated that 
‘ethics’ involved reciprocal relationships and parties had duties 
to each other. 
Hunter felt that the process of ethics review and the 
requirement to fulfill some bureaucratic requirements was a 
good opportunity to reflect on the design and conduct of 
research. That the PPM captured some of the ethics issues in 
conducting research indicated that it ought to be built upon 
rather than jettisoned. Furthermore, Hunter felt it was 
important to retain the PPM as, in her experience, some 
researchers and students did not pay sufficient attention to 
the potential impact of research on participants. She felt there 
could be a lack of empathy with or for participants on the part 
of researchers. She also disagreed with Sleat’s characterisation 
of relationship between researchers who sought to research 
those in positions of power. She felt that we should reject the 
idea that someone was or was not more powerful than 
someone else and adopt a conception of power as circulating 
through social networks and relationships. Thus in some 
social scientific research there ought to be a stronger sense of 
the mutual relationship between researcher and researched 
and their duties to each other. 
Hunter then turned to the question of values in social 
scientific research. She suggested that values are too general 
to stand alone and that they needed to be seen as informing 
principles. She also questioned whether ‘lowest-common- 
denominator’ values that achieved wide consensus at the cost 
of being informative would be all that helpful. She considered 
and rejected a number of candidate values from the previous 
symposium. Those she assessed in a positive light and others 
she suggested were: 
· Autonomy and dignity, for both research participants 
and as an aspect of the other relationships, such as 
those that researchers have to institutions, funders, 
colleagues, and communities. 
· Respect for cultural difference/pluralism. With the 
caveat that we avoid cultural essentialism. 
· Reflexivity. 
· Integrity. 
· Transparency, social responsibility, independence, 
competence, accountability. 
· Collegiality. 
· Trust. 
· Inclusiveness. A value that may encourage ethics 
committees to take a more facilitative approach. 
· Empathy. 
· Open-mindedness, particularly in regard to the 
conclusions of a research project. 
Hunter concluded that, while the PPM may not be a good fit 
for social scientific research, it is not wholly without value. 
The PPM should be situated within a consideration of the 
range of relationships engendered by the social practice of 
social scientific research. 
Professor Kenneth Boyd’s talk was informed by his 
experience of teaching professional and research ethics to 
biomedical researchers and medical professionals. He 
highlighted the historical and contemporary commitment of 
medicine to ‘doing no harm’ and the way the Hippocratic 
Oath was designed to engender trust. These commitments 
served to guide the medical profession until the seeds of 
professionalisation were sown in the late 17th century, 
culminating in the establishment of the General Medical 
Council in the 19th century. Nevertheless medical ethics 
continued to be absorbed via socialisation into the ethos of 
medicine, perhaps with some discussion of the ‘Rule of A’s’ 1 
until the mid-20th century. Furthermore the ethics of 
research rested on an implied contract, predicated on 19th- 
century charity hospitals, where patients provided the human 
material for research in return for medical attention. This 
contract was shattered by various revelations of abuse in the 
20th century resulting in responses such as the Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
Boyd suggested that whilst such documents, and biomedical 
research ethics more generally, have focused on the 
importance of fully informed consent there is now a general 
consensus that it is an impossible ideal. Public health research 
is one such area where it can be impossible to obtain 
individual level consent. As with public health research the 
risks to participants in the social sciences are of a different 
order to those posed by biomedicine. 
There is a degree of irony in the application of the biomedical 
model of research ethics to the social sciences as, via an 
increasing recognition of the need for the kind of trust that is 
engendered by the virtuous physician, medicine is now 
moderating its procedural approach to research ethics. Boyd 
suggests that like other institutions debates about social 
scientific research ethics and its governance are being swept 
along by the social momentum of professionalisation in 
medicine and healthcare more generally. Furthermore a 
principle-based ethics is more easily defended in public fora 
and medical professionals have found them, and the tensions 
between them, useful in practice.
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However Boyd argued that spelling out a principle-based 
ethics for the social sciences might be more difficult. He 
thought this might be because of a blurring in the distinction 
between science and politics that is unavoidable in the social 
sciences. Nevertheless he maintained that ideally that, like all 
science, social scientific research should be conducted 
‘outside action’ or independently from ‘politics’ and the kinds 
of actions it undertakes. In the age of impact and engagement 
the appropriate maintenance and transgression of this 
boundary is itself an ethical challenge. 
Morning discussion 
Following the talk by Matthew Sleat and the responses by 
Hunter and Boyd the floor was opened for comment, 
questions and discussions. Woody Caan (RSS) raised the issue 
of the benefit research participants, particularly young people, 
derived from being involved in research. Boyd expressed 
concern that exercises in protecting the ‘at risk’ could quickly 
become a bureaucratic exercise whilst Hunter wished to 
resist labeling groups as ‘vulnerable’ and therefore treated in a 
particular way. Caan redirected by suggesting he was 
particularly interested in whether young people should derive 
some direct benefit from their participation in research. David 
Carpenter (Research Ethics Advisor, University of 
Portsmouth) later suggested it was not problematic for 
research with young people to benefit them as a group rather 
than as individuals. 
Tim Bond (BACP) suggested that research can give voice to 
individuals and members of particular groups and therefore 
contribute to broader social discourses that might otherwise 
be closed to their perspectives. Annabelle Mark (SHOC) 
recalled her experience with the National Institute for Health 
Research where patient representatives were involved in 
decision-making and the award of grants. She found the direct 
inclusion of patients to be very useful and felt that academic 
interpretations rooted in research was not a replacement for 
this. Stina Lyon (BSA) felt that it was too easy to consider 
people as beneficiaries on ideological grounds and that if 
research was to be beneficial then it must be conducted with 
(scientific) integrity. Boyd followed this up with the question 
of how integrity could be obtained and maintained. He felt 
that the best way to maintain an ethical culture was through 
continually addressing ethical conflicts and not producing 
finalised statements, positions or ‘solutions.’ Agreeing with 
this view Lyon concluded it was the responsibility of 
researchers and research communities to maintain this 
discourse. 
Matei Candea (ASA) gave his support to the way Hunter had 
suggested we added values, such as mindedness, and felt that 
it echoed the discussion of the previous symposium on the 
meta-value of disciplinary pluralism in the social sciences. He 
also reflected on what might happen when organisations spell 
out their values. He felt we should be clear about to whom 
this spelling out of values or ethics is addressed and that the 
language we use, or what needs to be said, might be different 
if we were addressing the public or other scholars and 
learned societies. In the light of a commitment to (the value 
of) disciplinary pluralism Candea was concerned that speaking 
with a single voice would involve the somewhat paradoxical 
stance of needing to present the plurality of views that stand 
behind this ‘single voice.’ 
Dingwall again reiterated the view of the organising 
committee that this project was not about talking down to 
learned societies but in bringing the societies into dialogue 
with each other. He noted that there was a good deal of 
variation in the amount of attention paid to research ethics 
across the learned societies. The aim was to feed back the 
discussions to the learned societies and that this would 
include areas of dissent, dispute and conflict as well as 
commonalities. Boyd agreed that a positive outcome or aim of 
this project could be an on-going conversation amongst the 
learned societies. 
Sheila Peace (BSG) noted that her society involved 
researchers from a range of disciplines including social and 
biological sciences. Furthermore gerontologists work with 
vulnerable people some of whom have, and some of whom 
lack, capacity. Because BSG members have their own 
disciplinary codes of ethics to draw on, the BSG itself does 
not offer a code but a set of best-practice guidelines. 
David Hunter (Editor of Research Ethics) suggested the 
apparent problems with the ESRC’s FRE and other such codes 
were only apparent as, if they were properly understood, the 
perspective they offered was open to a greater degree of 
interpretation than commonly thought (and sometimes 
assumed by more detailed guidance based on the documents). 
He also thought it was more productive to focus on the 
required standards rather than the ideal, as the latter may not 
always be achievable. 
James Parry (UKRIO) felt that starting a conversation would 
be invaluable in engaging with the problem of a tick-box 
culture. He also felt the potential audience might be the 
universities themselves. Having previously surveyed the ethics 
statements of UK universities he clearly perceived the 
influence of work in biomedical research ethics. Things had 
developed since then but he felt the current discussion could 
further the redevelopment of frameworks and bureaucratic 
procedures such that they were more appropriate to the 
social sciences. Helen Simons (UK Evaluation Society) 
suggested that when the UKES produced its ethics guidelines 
they drew on existing codes from within and without the 
social science. Nevertheless they sought to provide 
instruction and information for researchers and those who 
reviewed research. 
Mary Brydon Miller (UC, currently a Fulbright Fellow at 
Keele) offered a warning from her experience in America 
where IRBs seemed to be a pre-emptive form of liability 
defence or mitigation on the part of the university. It was not 
so about improving the ethical dimension of research or 
addressing the moral questions raised by research. Thus we 
must bear in mind the different interests in institutionalising 
ethics review. She wondered how we institutionalise inclusive 
ethics reflection that includes the views of others who are not 
normally represented, such as laypersons and those who are, 
or who ‘represent,’ subjects or communities being research. 
Aware of the problems of ethics review in America, Ron 
Iphofen (Organising Committee and SRA) nevertheless 
acknowledged that universities needed to institutionalise 
ethics review as a form of research governance but that it 
should be separated from questions of liability. He was also 
concerned to ensure that there was always room for broader 
ethics conversations to continue. He also raised the question 
of whether ethics could be fully distinct from politics,
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particularly in the case of emerging technologies such as 
nanotechnology and surveillance. Ron also encouraged people 
to suggest possible outcomes from the series of symposia. In 
response Matei Candea (ASA) thought that online resources 
and collections of case studies would be useful. James Parry 
(UKRIO) said his office was keen to develop such resources 
and provide a ‘point of collation’ where researchers could find 
links to existing codes produced by learned societies. 
There was some discussion of what a principle was and a 
suggestion that they were norms and therefore what might be 
usually desirable, not absolute rules. Thus one should have to 
argue the case for transgressing a principle or norm and 
bodies charged with regulating research ethics must make 
room for this. Michelle Dodson (ESRC) offered her support 
for the project and this interpretation of principles. She felt 
the ESRC adopted an approach that saw the ethics of research 
as a developing area needing on-going attention and that 
forums such as this were one way of doing that. She felt 
collecting ‘difficult’ case studies that presented not only 
solutions but gave some idea of how people worked through 
the problems would be valuable. She suggested the ESRC was 
open to expanding, (re)creating or supporting a web-portal for 
research ethics in the social sciences. 
Stina Lyon mentioned the RESPECT code of conduct for socio 
-economic research in Europe and that it might be usefully 
drawn upon in developing research ethics for UK social 
science. 2 Van Den Hoonaard suggested the UKRIO might also 
collect articles by researchers critiquing the system or offer 
alternative perspectives, justifications and empirical evidence. 
Ann Buchanan said that her priority in working on research 
ethics and regulation was to ensure there were no un- 
necessary barriers to research. Her group also collected 
‘protocols’ or standardised ethical approaches to particular 
forms of research. A number of other delegates thought that 
collecting examples, cases and approaches as guides to others 
would be very useful. In making this point, calling for actual 
grounded and real cases, Libby Bishop (UK Data Archive) 
identified a possible theme of the discussion. This was a 
commitment to an alternative to the single event tick-box 
model of ethics review. The UK Data Archive are trying to 
collect examples of how data can be made available for reuse 
in an ethical manner. 
Nathan Emmerich commented on Matt Sleat’s suggestion that 
social scientists were interested in ‘social roles’ rather than 
(biological) individuals, as was the case with biomedical 
research. The ethical relationship between biomedical 
researchers meant that researchers and researched could 
focus on ‘the biological body’ as an objectified site of research. 
In contrast the interests of social scientific researchers were 
such that the focus had to be on the social lives of individuals, 
something inseparable from their personal and public identify 
and conception of self. Paul Atkinson (Cardiff and Symposia 
Chair) suggested that this view could be reflexively applied to 
biomedical research and be used to suggest that research 
ethics had an under-socialised view of the individual flatly 
contradicted by, for example, genetic and genomic research. 
Boyd also supported this view arguing that the atomistic 
individual was a legal fiction that should not be allowed to 
overly dominate ethical debate. 
James Parry (UKRIO) suggested that the government did not 
show any signs of bringing forward legislation on this issue but 
felt that we should bear in mind quasi-regulatory structures 
and the publish or perish culture. Dingwall commented that 
the absence of regulation did not mean that other normative 
structures would not occupy the same space. He felt that 
universities, and therefore researchers, over-complied with 
insurance requirements, and demands made by these private 
companies were treated and understood differently to those 
imposed by public bodies. 
Matthew Sleat closed the discussion be reminding the 
symposium that the ethics of research has been an ongoing 
part of the social sciences throughout its lifetime and 
wondered if we should be bolder in asserting this fact and in 
taking ownership of the ethics of research and its governance. 
Kenneth Boyd noted that the concern for ethics in the social 
sciences mirrored interest in such issues elsewhere in society 
both in biomedical research but also beyond. Universities, for 
example, increasingly have ethics committees that are 
concerned with the actions and investments of the institution. 
Discussion paper by Professor Will C van den 
Hoonaard 
Following lunch Professor van den Hoonaard (University of 
New Brunswick) gave a talk on his perspective on social 
scientific research ethics and the difficulties generated by a 
bureaucratic form based on that used to govern biomedical 
research. 3 The basic concern addressed by van den Hoonaard 
might be described as whether ethics review of social scientific 
research is conducted ethically. He suggested that the social 
sciences are being asked to ‘other itself’ by framing the ethics 
of research through a foreign lens. He considers sociology, 
anthropology and the social sciences more generally to have 
been colonised by biomedical research ethics with the result 
that research has become more conservative. One example of 
this is the increasing use of the interview as a research 
method, to the detriment of all others, particularly ethno- 
graphy or participant observation. He also noted the degree 
to which words such as protocol (something he felt was an 
account of research which was supposed to eliminate 
interpretation), best practice (which appears to suggest one 
‘best’ way of doing things), investigator, and informed consent 
have been imported into social scientific discourse. 
Van den Hoonaard felt that the current system of ethics 
review mirrored the approach taken to reviewing grant 
applications. This, he suggested, was not a basis for doing 
ethics. In the first instance this approach would encourage 
decision-making to be made in the absence of researchers, as 
not doing so did not strike him as a good, or ethical way to do 
ethics. Furthermore ethics committees operated according to 
a ‘trust but verify’ approach that seemed to him to be a 
paradoxical basis for a relationship. Finally he noted that there 
seemed to be an on-going search for ethics horror stories 
that, in the social sciences, are notable by their absence. This 
search for horror stories speaks volumes about the 
relationship between ‘research ethics’ and ‘social scientists.’ 
The problematic relationship between researchers and 
research ethics committees can also be perceived in the 
attitudes of PhD students who are often intimidated by ethics 
committees, something that can also continue after approval 
when the research does not go exactly to plan. Van den 
Hoonaard considered the ethical legitimacy of such a system 
to be deeply questionable. There is a deep irony in a system of 
research ethics that requires social scientific researchers to 
follow 23 virtues whilst making no ethical commitments
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regarding its own activities. Van den Hoonaard argued that we 
should articulate the virtues and values that guide ethics 
review. 
Furthermore van den Hoonaard called for a revitalisation of 
the social sciences which asserts their own ethical and moral 
culture. He pointed towards examples of researchers that had 
refused the imposition of anonymity on research participants 
that did not wish to be anonymised. Finally he suggested 
academics should stand up to research ethics committees on 
behalf of themselves, their students and their discipline. 
Discussion following van den Hoonaard’s presentation 
Professor Caan strongly supported van den Hoonaard’s call to 
challenge the over-use of anonymity where it is neither 
(ethically) warranted nor desired by research participants. Van 
den Hoonaard wondered why we lacked the courage to reject 
unnecessary demands for anonymisation whilst Professor Mary 
Brydon Miller followed up by suggesting that we had a 
tendency to over-respond to ethics review according to our 
internalised expectation. She suggested IRBs were sometimes 
open to different approaches if they were justified. Van den 
Hoonaard noted this internalisation was, as per his argument, 
a classic response to colonisation. Atkinson noted that it was 
important not to over-respond to (or even further) this 
colonisation by needlessly producing extended forms of self- 
regulation. Helen Simons (UK Evaluation Society) reminded 
the symposium that anonymisation was the correct norm for 
most research conducted by social scientists and van Den 
Hoonaard followed up with the idea that people did not 
necessarily have to be anonymous or not anonymous. He 
referenced the idea of ‘broken identities’, which is where a 
single research participant might be given a number of 
pseudonymous identities in published research. This is usually 
used as an aide to anonymisation but could be used in 
conjunction with non-anonymous reporting of a research 
participant’s views or actions. 
There was a feeling that there was a particular problem in 
regard to anonymisation in research with elites. On the one 
hand it can be particularly difficult to ensure anonymity whilst 
on the other it can be particularly important to attribute views 
to individuals in positions of power and to hold them to 
account. Van Den Hoonaard used this comment as an 
opportunity to note that the motive of the researcher and the 
research was central to its ethical conduct and the standards 
that it should conform. There was a feeling that that the 
researchers ethics responsibilities did not end if a research 
participant waived their right to anonymity and Nathan 
Emmerich later echoed this view. Professor Boyd felt that this 
debate was illustrative of the problems of taking over the 
ethics formed within a different paradigm of research. 
Anonymisation of health data means, simply, the removal of 
names. In social science research this becomes a more 
complicated operation. He also felt that it was easier to 
identify vices rather than virtues, things we should not do 
rather than things we must do. He recommended that we 
might concern ourselves with the identification of the vices of 
social scientific research. 
Professor Caan suggested many PhD students were now 
supervised by inexperienced researchers whereas it used to 
be the case only experienced researchers had the privilege of 
doing so. This increased the risk of unethical behavior and 
research. Van den Hoonaard followed up by noting that ethics 
committees increasingly offered methodological ‘advice’ to 
research students or stipulated methodological requirements; 
they engage in supervision by committee. The idea that only 
‘good’ research is ethical maps onto the increasing use of 
interviews discussed by van den Hoonaard. 
Group discussions 
Following van den Hoonaard’s talk and the discussion, the 
symposium split into groups to discuss the worksheets 
containing the updated principles for review and research. 
Group One 
This group began with the suggestion that naming the vices or 
social scientific research might be productive. They 
considered: misconduct; incompetence; abuse of individuals or 
communities; irresponsibility; and injustice. However their 
view was that it was better to be aspirational and consider 
positive virtues than negative vices. They also considered what 
are ethics and how they can be dynamic systems. They 
considered how ethics review created a focus on a point in 
time and negatively impacted on considering research 
throughout the process of research. They discussed the idea 
of engaging communities in research by using a structured 
ethics reflection process, usually associated with action 
research. The aim was to inform the practice of researchers 
and to negotiate a set of guiding questions that the research 
addressed. 
They then discussed the development of large data sets as a 
resource for social scientific research. Focusing on education, 
where student’s assessment data is accumulated into a large 
data set, they considered what informed consent might mean 
in the case of longitudinal research. They also reflected on 
cultural and cross-cultural ethics as well as the language of 
ethics. They questioned whether the term ‘generic’ in the title 
of this symposia series was a fruitful term as it was 
synonymous with ‘standard issue.’ This was something they 
felt clearly not appropriate when the aim was to engender 
more ethics engagement across the disciplines. They felt there 
might be some basic ethical foundations around which all the 
social science could unite however these would be 
‘operationalised’ and further articulated in particular disciplines 
and research projects. 
Returning to the aspirational challenge they set for themselves 
at the beginning of their discussion they felt the following were 
fruitful terms: good conduct; competence; respect for 
individuals and communities; responsibility; and justice. Finally 
they made a plea for whatever emerges to be consistent with 
the ongoing exercise of ethics reflexivity on the part of 
researchers, disciplines and the social sciences as a whole. 
Group Two 
Group Two set out to consider the principles listed on the 
worksheets provided, to reflect in the morning’s discussion on 
the hegemony of the biomedical model, and to think about the 
way to move forward at the end of the symposium series. 
They noted that the principles listed on the ethics review 
worksheet and the ethical practice worksheet touched on 
quite different things. Their discussion wasn’t centered on the 
content of the principles themselves but on the processes of 
review. Their main concern was on how to balance the 
competing interests in an ethics review process. In particular 
there were the competing interests between the 
independence of review, on the one hand, and the need for
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deliberation, reflection and engagement on the right kind of 
ethical principles, on the other. They felt that constructing a 
process that adequately mediated between and facilitated 
these imperatives was a difficult challenge. They felt that the 
symposium series could aim to offer some guidance on this 
matter and this might be more valuable than specifying generic 
principles. 
Thinking about the principles on the ethics review worksheet 
they considered adding ‘proportionality’ (and expedited 
review for minimally risky research). They also felt that the 
review process itself should encourage ethical engagement and 
dialogue between ‘stakeholders.’ They felt this would be 
different in different disciplines and across institutions, 
particularly with regard to the availability of resources. 
They felt that the tension in the biomedical model was in 
whether it was appropriate to social science research or 
whether it needed to be more adequately interpreted and 
nuanced in this new context. They felt the latter was the right 
perspective. This led them back to previous discussion of 
proportionality and to the question of the ethics, and ethics 
principles, that should guide ethics review. 
Group Three 
This group considered the difference between values and 
principles. They suggested that in order to get beyond the 
biomedical model of research ethics we must engage with 
those we research and include those communities. This may 
be a challenge to the norm of anonymity. Furthermore they 
also felt that inclusivity could conflict with the value of 
objectivity in the social sciences as certain questions might be 
vetoed by research participants. However they also felt 
reflexivity was promoted by such inclusion. 
Group Three felt we were in a situation where regulation was 
a shock. This has arisen because we do ethical research and 
the issues raised are not so problematic as they are in the 
biomedical sciences. They felt ‘regulation was the new 
aristocracy’ and they wondered how we go beyond this to 
speak to our society. They felt ethics review gives ‘certificates 
of comfort’ which can prevent ethical thinking. They felt that 
guidance for researchers was important but that it should also 
be provided to research participants (including information on 
what social science is as well as ethics standards) and, more 
importantly, to institutions and reviewers. They felt that it was 
important that ethics review avoided becoming 
‘protectionism’ i.e. being about reputation management. Ethics 
should be about how we treat people and that this required 
on-going dialogue and discussion with research participants. 
Group Three highlighted the fact that the ‘situation does not 
stand still.’ The moral landscape continues to change and 
develop both within and without the social sciences. They felt 
that the utility of this group might be in educating those 
outside the social sciences, including those in positions of 
power over social science research, about social science as a 
whole. However we must reflect on how this can be done 
with humility and integrity. This also applies to the 
dissemination of particular research findings, but the group felt 
there was a point at which dissemination ceased and ‘diffusion’ 
began. 
Group Four 
Group Four took each of the worksheets and the listed 
principles in turn. They considered the ways in which ethics 
review could be independent, these being independence from: 
a discipline; from the funders; the researcher; independent 
from the research project or proposal; from the institution 
within which the research takes place; from the research 
participants. Whilst review could (and should) be independent 
from funders, institutions (at least in the juridical sense) and 
the research project it cannot be (fully) independent from the 
researcher (who first considers the ethics of a project when 
forming its initial design); the discipline(s) of the research 
(which gives some indication of the relevant ethics norms and 
is a matter of competence in the review process); or from 
representatives of the research participants (via, for example a 
lay person on the review committee or through some sense 
of empathy on the part of reviewers and researchers). They 
felt that independence was a way to manage potential conflict 
of interests and that collaborative working could complicate 
matters in this sphere. 
This group distinguished between independence, transparency 
and accountability. Inclusion of lay-persons could contribute to 
all of these and help fulfil our social responsibilities. However, 
increasing transparency and making researchers mutually 
accountable could help to avoid the bureaucratisation of 
review and a tick-box approach. This was also the locus where 
proportionality of review could be addressed. The dialogue 
between researchers and reviewers could be promoted by 
these virtues. They felt that committees needed to be 
collectively responsible and act as a committee rather than as 
a number of individual members. Nevertheless this group 
discussed the idea of ‘face-work’ 4 where the meaning of a 
committee’s judgment could be personally communicated to 
researchers and the meaning(s) of official written feedback 
decoded. Again this would encourage collaboration in 
developing the ethics of a research proposal rather than the 
opposition currently experienced by many. 
The group then turned to consider the principles that guide 
the conduct and practice of social science research. The first 
of these was ‘respect for autonomy and dignity of persons as 
individuals and members of communities’ (this being the 
updated version of respect for autonomy). They discussed 
relational autonomy and the idea of people as socially 
embedded beings. This idea was reflexively turned onto 
researchers which suggests the ability of researchers to 
conduct research is a function of the fact they are members of 
communities (of practice) and of social institutions such as 
universities and disciplines. Furthermore these social locations 
could not result in research without being further related to 
research participants as socially located individuals and 
members of groups that are of interest to the social scientist. 
This was felt to support the need for disciplinary, 
methodological and ethical pluralism. 
This also highlighted the virtue of empathy as researchers 
must be able to empathise and comprehend the viewpoint(s) 
of those they seek to engage in research in order to both 
design research and to design ethical research. Group Four 
felt that the principle of integrity included being open-minded, 
particularly in relation to: potential research findings; the need 
to remain ethically aware; the consequences of research and 
the ways in which it might be followed up by other 
researchers, including researchers with differing points of 
views. They felt that scientific integrity required researchers 
to be socially inclusive and to seek ways to represent the
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potential diversity, and diversity of views, that exist within the 
communities they were involved in researching. This group 
thought it was important to be aware of the impact of 
research findings but that there was a distinction between 
disseminating research and the point at which this stopped and 
it becomes diffusion. They also considered the responsibilities 
of the researcher to aim towards the social good but that this 
was a rather imprecise concept. 
Conclusion: 
The following bullet points were felt to be the primary 
messages of the day’s presentations and discussions: 
· The internal and public discussion of ethics should 
remain an ongoing aspect of the social sciences. 
· The PPM needs to be situated within the moral 
landscape of social scientific research with a greater 
degree of nuance and reflexively connected to wider 
ethical concerns in such research. 
· This ethical reflexivity should also challenge the ‘legal 
fiction’ of the autonomous individual present in 
(biomedical uses of) the PPM. 
· There was support for identifying the range of values 
that support social scientific research and for 
considering some more relevant to different stages of 
research. 
· The symposium series might seek to produce 
documents that represent social science research and 
its ethical commitments to the public, to funders and 
institutions in such a way as to make commonalities 
clear but whilst also clearly demonstrating the 
pluralities at play. 
· This should include information on the history of ethics 
reflection in social science research. 
· There was support for collecting codes, cases, guides, 
approaches and perspectives, including published 
critical perspectives, in one place as a resource for 
researchers and stakeholders. 
Notes 
1. The rule of A’s (Abortion, Addiction, Adultery, 
Advertising and Association with unqualified 
practitioners) is a set of prohibitions for medical 
doctors said to be common to the UK prior to the 
advent of modern medical ethics. See Boyd et al (1997). 
2. See: http://www.respectproject.org/code/ 
3. Amongst other work on the ethics of social sciences 
Will van den Hoonaard is the author of The Seduction of 
Ethics: Transforming the Social Sciences. University of 
Toronto Press, 2011. 
4. Hedgecoe (2012, online first). 
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Developing Standards for Research Practice:  Some Issues for Consideration 
Discussion ‘Stimulus’ Paper for Symposium 3:  (Standards) 
James Parry 
UK Research Integrity Office 
Introduction 
In recent years, there has been increased discussion and 
scrutiny of issues such as ‘research integrity’, ‘scientific 
integrity’, ‘research practice’, ‘good research conduct’ and 
‘research misconduct’. While the terminology used, and indeed 
the meaning of that terminology, have often varied, these 
discussions have generally focused on what standards – both 
voluntary and mandatory – there are for the conduct of 
research and whether these standards are being met. 
A wide range of organisations have explored whether 
researchers are obeying the norms of their profession and if 
their research is honest and reliable. Issues of research 
integrity have been examined by Government (Council for 
Science and Technology 2006), Parliament (House of 
Commons Science and Technology Select Committee 2011), 
research funders (UK Research Integrity Futures Working 
Group 2010), learned societies (Academy of Medical Sciences 
2011) and other bodies (British Medical Journal and 
Committee on Publication Ethics 2012), and a variety of 
international organisations (2nd World Conference on 
Research Integrity 2010; ALLEA and European Science 
Foundation 2011). In some cases, this has led to new guidance 
for the conduct of research (Universities UK et al 2012), while 
in others it has led to changes in structures for research 
governance (GOV.UK 2011). It should be noted that the 
Government has declined calls to legislate on these issues, 
such as setting up oversight or investigatory bodies 
empowered by statute (UK Government 2012). 
There has also been increased interest in research integrity in 
the media, both mainstream (Jha 2011) and academic (Jump 
2012; Cressey 2013). While there has been a great deal of 
thoughtful discussion of research integrity, often the focus of 
media interest has been on so-called ‘scandals’, whether the 
term might be applicable (General Medical Council 2010) or 
not (Russell 2010). At the same time, there has been increased 
interest from the public, perhaps driven by and/or driving the 
media interest. Universities and journals have seen the rise of a 
particular type of anonymous complainant: a pseudonymous 
person or group that scrutinises large numbers of academic 
papers online for evidence of fabrication, plagiarism or other 
fraud (Marcus and Oransky 2011). Blogs that discuss 
questionable and unacceptable practices in research can attract 
a large readership (Goldacre 2013; Marcus and Oransky 2013). 
Major initiatives on research integrity have often been carried 
out by employer groups and funding bodies (UK Research 
Integrity Futures Working Group 2010; Universities UK et al 
2012; Higher Education Funding Council for England 2013; 
Research Councils UK 2013). Theirs is a valuable perspective 
but it is not the only one. All involved in research – including 
the public – have an important contribution to make in 
support of research integrity. In particular, it is essential that 
learned societies and professional bodies play a role in the 
ongoing discussions. The 2012 Concordat to Support Research 
Integrity (Universities UK et al 2012) recognised the 
importance of learned societies and professional bodies, as 
well as the duty of employers and others to support 
researchers in reporting concerns to professional bodies. 
UKRIO lobbied for, and welcomed, these elements of the 
Concordat and we hope that learned societies and 
professional bodies will be listened to when they speak out. 
The role of the UK Research Integrity Office and the 
purpose of this paper 
The UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO) was set up to 
support good practice in academic, scientific and medical 
research and to assist with the prevention and investigation of 
questionable practices and misconduct. Since 2006, it has 
provided independent and expert support across all disciplines. 
UKRIO is the only body in this country that offers dedicated 
support to the public and the research community on issues of 
research integrity. We have amassed a great deal of practical 
experience on these issues. 
UKRIO is an advisory body, not a regulator. Our advice and 
guidance are not mandatory; instead, they reflect and reinforce 
existing good practice. We have no interest in micro-managing 
researchers or telling them what they ‘must’ do. Our intent is 
to provide practical and proportionate advice, which the public 
and the research community may find useful. 
In that spirit, this paper sets out some issues for consideration 
when discussing and agreeing the conclusions and outputs of 
these symposia. UKRIO has helped a wide variety of research 
organisations, learned societies, research funders and other 
bodies to develop standards for research conducted under 
their auspices. While the appeals for our help and our 
response must remain confidential, we share the issues and 
solutions identified in our advisory work through our other 
activities. Accordingly, this paper will explore some ‘lessons 
learnt’ from UKRIO’s involvement in the creation or revision 
of standards for research practice, both our own and those of 
other organisations, as well as ‘lessons learnt’ the hard way by 
researchers and organisations – from when things have gone 
right and from when they have not. 
Isn’t some of this stuff obvious? In short, yes. Some of these 
questions asked and issues explored below may well appear to 
be obvious. Ensuring high standards in the conduct of research 
is often thought to be straightforward. At their most 
fundamental level, standards for research practice do not ask a 
great deal: researchers must not lie when reporting data or 
results; they must not steal the work of others nor spend 
research funds on purposes for which they were not granted; 
and, most importantly, they must protect the safety, dignity 
and well-being of research participants. Organisations also 
have responsibilities: they must support their staff, students or 
members in meeting the necessary requirements and not 
hinder them from doing so. 
As the standards are so self-evident, so the thinking goes, it 
must be straightforward for organisations to articulate these 
standards to researchers, for those researchers to understand 
and adhere to them, and for the author organisations to
37 
Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research 
support them in doing so. The experiences of UKRIO suggest 
otherwise and any guidance for researchers must overcome 
this challenge. 
What are the aims? 
What do the Academy of Social Sciences and other bodies 
involved hope to accomplish by developing generic ethics 
principles in social science research? Such principles would be 
useful in themselves, by adding to the discussion and 
development of research ethics in the social sciences, but 
presumably the participants have additional aims in mind. 
These might include: 
· To help social scientists continue to conduct research 
that advances knowledge, is high quality and of a high 
ethical standard. This (obvious) aim suggests that the 
principles would be used in a variety of ways, for 
example: standards that could be referred to when 
planning and conducting research, and also when a 
researcher reflects on their completed work; a 
teaching/training aid; a reference tool for research 
institutions to use when developing their own guidance 
for social science research; guidance to inform 
research participants and other interested parties of 
the ethical principles which would guide a research 
project; a reference tool for social sciences research 
ethics committees; an information note for researchers 
from other disciplines who plan to collaborate with 
social scientists, to inform them of the ethical norms of 
the discipline; and/or a set of mandatory standards for 
professional/membership organisations for social 
science researchers. 
· To protect the safety, well-being, dignity and rights of 
research participants, other persons (including 
researchers themselves) and communities involved in 
research. A caveat would be that this would not 
include a duty to protect the reputation of research 
participants etc. at all costs, thus giving researchers 
freedom to criticise when this would be warranted and 
demonstrated by research data and findings. 
· To help retain public trust in social science research. 
Research has become fundamentally important to 
society. The knowledge generated through research is 
used for making decisions that are crucial for economic 
development and the general welfare of individuals and 
society. Significant public funds support research and 
researchers. Public trust in research – and in 
researchers – is based on the ‘professional promise’ 
that research will be honest, objective, accurate, legal, 
safe, ethical and efficient. To be worthy of the public’s 
trust, research needs to fulfil that promise. 
· To help reduce the incidence of poor practice, 
questionable behaviours and misconduct in the social 
sciences. A sense of perspective is important: UK 
research, including that in the social sciences, is not rife 
with fraud. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of 
evidence which suggests research misconduct is not as 
rare as many would like to think (Fanelli 2009, 2010; 
Fang et al 2012). Pressures, whether internal or 
external, can drive researchers to cut corners or 
worse. There is no doubt that more systematic and 
long-term examination of the frequency and nature of 
misconduct in UK research is needed. In the meantime, 
while UK researchers might be more competent, 
careful, honest and immune from temptation than the 
average person, professional responsibility includes 
taking steps to minimise predictable harm. This aim 
suggests that whatever output is generated by these 
symposia should be relevant to three types of situation: 
the most common, where researchers conduct 
research that meets relevant standards and support on 
sustaining and improving those standards would be 
welcomed; cases of (major) research fraud; and the so- 
called ‘questionable research practices’, lesser but still 
unacceptable behaviours sometimes described as 
‘deliberately sloppy science’. The output of the 
symposia should also include guidance for researchers 
and others who wish to raise concerns about problems 
or alleged fraud. 
· To suggest a way of moving towards clarity across the 
profession on what is ‘good’ social sciences research. 
Or is this something that the profession wishes to 
avoid, for fear of seeming to micro-manage researchers 
or place barriers in the way of innovative or cross- 
disciplinary research? A reasonable approach may be to 
suggest some possible areas of common agreement 
and, where there is difference, to explain why. 
· To ensure that the social sciences profession has a 
broadly unified voice in determining standards for the 
research that it carries out, rather than leaving this by 
default to other actors, such as Government, research 
funders and employers. The profession already has 
standards in place in the form of those set out by 
various professional and other bodies in the social 
sciences, hence the use of the term ‘broadly unified’; 
however, there may be professional and political 
rationales for seeking common public standards. There 
may also be a practical benefit, and this will be 
discussed later. 
The above aims are not intended to be exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive. They are articulated because each will require 
different approaches in terms of actions taken following the 
conclusion of these symposia. For example, a set of principles 
aimed at sustaining and improving the conduct of social 
sciences research could be seen as primarily ‘inward facing’ – 
by the social sciences profession, for the social sciences 
profession. If such principles were also designed to retain 
public trust in social sciences research, then they would need 
to be disseminated to a much wider audience and perhaps in a 
different format than guidance aimed solely at researchers. 
Principles which attempted to tie together existing guidance 
from professional and other bodies to ‘give a voice’ to the 
profession as a whole would need to be designed with an 
action plan in mind, one to advance the professional and 
political rationales behind their creation. 
How should the generic ethics principles be articulated? 
The two previous symposia and their associated papers have 
discussed in detail the roles of ethics, values and principles in 
social sciences research and the strengths and weaknesses of 
the various approaches. I will not repeat those discussions 
here but focus instead on ways the principles or other outputs 
agreed following the symposia might be articulated. By way of 
background, UKRIO would agree with speakers at the 
previous symposia that principles: can elaborate values; can be 
used to instruct the complexities of research; and are ‘things 
to keep in mind’ rather than a set of rigid instructions. These 
views on principles underpin the discussions below.
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A single output or an ongoing process? 
The agreed principles might be articulated in a code of 
practice or other form of written guidance. Alternatively, such 
a publication could be the first step in a more lengthy process, 
a continuing dialogue between the stakeholders of these 
symposia and the social sciences research community, 
including participant and lay groups. There would be ongoing 
outputs from this process in a variety of forms. 
The second option would be more challenging to devise, 
launch and sustain than simply publishing a code or reference 
tool. However, it would enable the issues to be examined in 
more depth, allow for greater involvement from the social 
sciences research community and other groups (including lay/ 
participant involvement), and ensure that new developments 
in research policy or practice could be incorporated into the 
ever-developing generic ethics principles. It would also help 
guard against the adoption of a ‘job done’ attitude regarding 
issues of research ethics and integrity. 
Basic standards or something more aspirational? 
Should the principles describe the minimum acceptable 
behaviour for social sciences research – so-called ‘good 
practice’ – or something more aspirational – so-called ‘best 
practice’? Or would a combination of the two be the most 
suitable approach? 
A document which sets out the basic norms for social sciences 
research practice would presumably summarise, in an 
accessible format, existing guidance/requirements from 
relevant bodies in the social sciences. It would highlight areas 
of commonality across the social sciences professions and 
explain where differences arose, perhaps providing discipline- 
specific guidance in such cases. 
Describing ‘best practice’ would be a more challenging 
exercise. In UKRIO’s experience, there is little consensus on 
the meaning of the term. It can sometimes be used by 
organisations to describe standards which go slightly further 
than the bare minimum required – in effect, anything more 
than merely ‘ticking the boxes.’ I assume that such an 
approach would not be welcomed. A conclusion of these 
symposia could be to go beyond such a definition and agree to 
identify principles, standards and/or practices in social science 
research which reliably lead to better outcomes than other 
methods. 
This could be a considerable piece of work and it may well 
prove difficult, if not impossible, to agree so-called ‘best 
practice’ principles, standards or practices which were 
applicable to most, let alone all, of the social sciences. If this 
approach were adopted, it would be sensible to describe the 
existing basic standards (as these can be regulatory or 
contractual requirements) as well as how they might be built 
on and exceeded. It would also be sensible to describe the 
benefits of going beyond the minimum standards. UKRIO has 
often found that individuals and institutions can consider issues 
such as research ethics and research integrity as a matter of 
regulatory or contractual compliance, rather than as an 
inherent part of professional conduct. 
A hybrid approach might include basic standards for social 
sciences research underpinned by more aspirational principles. 
This might be the most appropriate way forward, marrying the 
values/principles generated by these symposia with a synthesis 
of existing guidance/requirements from relevant bodies in the 
social sciences. As before, any areas of differences between 
the various professions should be highlighted, to avoid the 
assumption of commonality in such cases, and relevant 
guidance from the various disciplines signposted. For the 
reasons given above, it would be sensible to explore why 
researchers should aim to do more than just meet basic 
requirements. 
What type of content? 
Existing guidance on the conduct of research varies in terms of 
content and length/detail. Some different approaches are 
outlined below. Please note the sample documents, in 
particular the one from UKRIO, are included for illustration 
only and not to indicate a preferred approach. 
1. Short principles only. This has the advantage of 
setting out the information in a short and accessible 
format, hopefully increasing the chance of it being read 
and acted on. Disadvantages are the lack of detail and 
lack of examples of how the principles translate into 
standards for research practice and/or can be put into 
practice. 
Sample document: Council for Science and Technology, 
2006. Rigour, respect and responsibility – a universal ethical 
code for scientists. Available from: www.bis.gov.uk/ 
assets/bispartners/goscience/docs/u/universal-ethical- 
code-scientists.pdf 
2. Broader principles, with some defined standards 
based on them. The principles are either longer than 
in the previous approach or, while brief, are expanded 
on through supplementary text. The sample document 
for this approach follows the latter model, containing 
short principles (‘commitments’) which are then 
described in more depth. While the principles provide 
more information than in the previous example, care 
must be taken to ensure that the principles are not so 
broad as to be essentially meaningless. This can be 
mitigated by the defined standards, which illustrate how 
the principles can be put into practice, though it is 
helpful if the standards themselves are not too broad. 
Sample document: Universities UK et al, 2012. The 
Concordat to Support Research Integrity. Available from: 
http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/ 
POLICYANDRESEARCH/POLICYAREAS/RESEARCH/ 
Pages/Researchintegrity.aspx 
3. Short principles plus standards. A declaration of 
interests is in order at this point, as this was the chosen 
approach for UKRIO’s Code of Practice for Research 
(reference below). The format allows the articulation of 
standards for research practice underpinned by 
aspirational principles. An advantage compared to 
example 2, above, is that the greater number of 
standards provides greater illustration of how the 
principles might be put into practice. As the bulk of the 
document focuses on standards rather than on the 
principles, care must be taken to ensure that the 
former do not overshadow the latter. 
Sample document: UK Research Integrity Office, 2009. 
Code of Practice for Research: Promoting good practice and 
preventing misconduct. Available from: www.ukrio.org/ 
publications/
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4. A handbook describing what can be involved in 
doing research that is high quality and of a high 
ethical standard. It would describe principles, 
regulatory and other mandatory requirements, 
voluntary standards/guidance and common practices, 
covering the research process from conception to 
publication and archiving. It would also included topics 
for discussion, questions for the consideration of the 
reader, useful resources and sources of help. 
This type of document provides in-depth instruction on 
the norms and complexities of research and is 
therefore incredibly useful. Their detailed and wide- 
ranging nature also provides a welcome alternative to 
the often much shorter and more prescriptive guidance 
from employers and funding bodies. Creating such a 
document is clearly a large piece of work. Their length 
and level of detail can count against them, as longer 
guidance documents can tend to go unread. 
Sample documents: Steneck, N., 2007. Office of Research 
Integrity Introduction to the Responsible Conduct of 
Research Revised Edition. Available from: 
www.ori.hhs.gov/documents/rcrintro.pdf 
Social Research Association, 2003. Ethical Guidelines. 
Available from: http://the-sra.org.uk/wp-content/ 
uploads/ethics03.pdf 
5. Guidance for organisations as well as for 
individual researchers. The proposed generic ethics 
principles would be useful in themselves to research 
organisations. For example, they could use them as a 
reference tool to use when developing their 
institutional guidance for social science research, as 
noted above. The focus of the principles could be 
broadened, to describe how research organisations can 
better support research and researchers in the social 
sciences. 
This would be an additional element incorporated into 
one of the four approaches described above, rather 
than a separate approach in its own right. In addition to 
setting out principles and standards for researchers, the 
document would also discuss how organisations could 
support researchers in meeting those standards. It 
would also note those responsibilities which fall to 
organisations alone. 
Sample documents: UK Research Integrity Office, 2009. 
Code of Practice for Research: Promoting good practice and 
preventing misconduct. Available from: www.ukrio.org/ 
publications/ 
Universities UK et al., 2012. The Concordat to Support 
Research Integrity. Available from: http:// 
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/POLICYANDRESEARCH/ 
POLICYAREAS/RESEARCH/Pages/ 
Researchintegrity.aspx 
Prescriptive or non-restrictive principles and 
standards? 
Should the outcome of these symposia attempt to describe 
‘the right way’ to conduct social sciences research, ‘the right 
ways’ to conduct such research or ‘some of the right ways’? In 
other words, would the preferred outcome be: 
1. a defined set of principles and standards which set out 
how to conduct high quality and ethical social sciences 
research? 
2. principles and standards that support a variety of 
approaches to high quality and ethical social sciences 
research? 
3. principles and standards that aim to get researchers 
thinking about how they might do high quality and 
ethical social sciences research but which do not set 
out any particular approaches? 
I assume that the preferred option would not be a set of 
prescriptive principles and standards (option 1) but have 
included it for the sake of completeness. This option runs the 
risk of suggesting, either tacitly or overtly, that there is a single 
‘right way’ to conduct social sciences research, ‘straitjacketing’ 
the conduct of researchers who follow such guidance and 
limiting innovative research questions and methodologies. It 
would also be challenging to devise a set of prescriptive 
principles and standards which were sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate existing research practices within the social 
sciences. 
I believe that an approach that was more inclusive/open would 
be preferable (options 2 or 3). It would hopefully avoid micro- 
managing research while encouraging the consideration of 
what is involved in research that is of a high ethical standard. 
Option 2 would be most suited to a guidance document of 
some sort containing principles and standards (examples 1–3 
in the sample content types described above), while option 3 
would suit the ‘handbook’ approach (example 4). Any of the 
above three options could also include guidance for 
organisations as well as researchers (example 5). 
It should be noted, however, that any guidance for researchers 
runs the risk of becoming prescriptive. Principles for research 
practice are commonly designed not as rigid guidance for 
researchers but as a starting point for reflection on the 
practical and ethical challenges involved in research. In our 
experience and that of others, such principles can come to be 
perceived very differently – for example, when the stature of 
stakeholder organisations means that their guidance is seen by 
researchers and/or employers as something which must be 
followed, rather than as an aid to reflection and improvement. 
Mandatory or voluntary principles and standards? 
At the second symposia, the organisers made clear that there 
are no plans to make the generic ethics principles (and any 
associated standards) mandatory. However, I feel it is worth 
discussing some implications of taking either a voluntary or 
mandatory route. 
Voluntary guidance is more likely to avoid the pitfall of 
consideration of ethical issues in research being reduced to a 
matter of regulatory or contractual compliance. A caveat: we 
have found that researchers and organisations alike can adopt 
the so-called ‘tick box’ approach even with non-mandatory 
guidance. In some cases, as noted above, this has apparently – 
and inadvertently – been caused by the stature of the 
organisation(s) which produced the guidance. Other factors 
which have been cited include: a lack of time to consider 
ethical and associated issues in any depth; lack of leadership on 
these issues from senior researchers; and attitudes towards 
research ethics/integrity which can be paraphrased as ‘this is 
something other researchers have to worry about but not me’ 
or ‘this is something to get out of the way so we can get on
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with the actual work’. 
We have observed through our advisory work that a number 
of factors are essential to help ensure the uptake of guidance 
produced by research organisations and other bodies. This is 
discussed later (‘How useful are standards for research’) but 
for now I will note two factors that seem particularly relevant 
for voluntary guidance. In our experience, researchers and 
their employers naturally pay attention to the requirements of 
regulatory and funding bodies. Voluntary guidance can be 
somewhat left by the wayside in comparison. If voluntary 
guidance is to succeed (i.e. be read and acted on when there is 
no obligation to do so), then it needs to be of practical value 
and in an accessible format. This cannot be emphasised 
enough. 
‘Practical value’ does not necessarily only mean principles and 
standards which can be easily translated into practice; it could 
equally mean guidance which encourages researchers to 
reflect on their professional conduct and research, and on 
how they might meet and exceed standards for research 
conduct. In terms of format, quasi-legal phrases and pages of 
dry text tend to be ignored, whether in hard copy or online. 
Mandatory guidance: if any organisations did decide that the 
generic ethics principles generated by these symposia must be 
adhered to by their members (or equivalent), there would be 
a number of implications: 
· How to make their members aware of the principles/ 
standards that they must adhere to. 
· How to make sure that their members are meeting the 
required principles/standards! Simply creating 
mandatory standards and making people aware of them 
would not be enough. 
· How concerns about members falling short of the 
required principles/standards could be raised with the 
relevant organisation, both by other members and 
those from outside. 
· How those concerns would be investigated by the 
relevant organisation and a conclusion reached on the 
allegation(s). 
· What action would be taken against members by an 
organisation which had found its required principles/ 
standards for social sciences research had been 
breached. 
· Most importantly, would the introduction of mandatory 
standards and a mechanism for sanctioning those who 
had breached them change the nature of an 
organisation, or at least how it was perceived by its 
members? For example, a professional or learned body 
might have criteria for membership but no mechanism 
for sanctioning or disciplining its members. It then 
brings in required standards for research practice 
which its members must meet, and a process for 
investigating members and possibly sanctioning them if 
they fail to meet the standards. Members are now 
subject to a regime, even if only a light-touch regime, of 
standards, monitoring and, potentially, sanctions. They 
are, in effect, chartered or licensed in terms of 
research conduct. This could have wide-ranging effects 
on the ethos and purposes of an organisation, as well as 
changing how it is viewed by members and outsiders. 
The introduction of a regime of standards, monitoring 
and sanctioning would also require additional 
resources, the creation of relevant processes and 
access to sufficient expertise when investigating alleged 
breaches. 
Adoption by research organisations: a middle ground 
between voluntary and mandatory standards. The 
stakeholder organisations should consider the implications of 
research organisations adopting the principles generated by 
these symposia and publicly stating that they have done so. For 
example, a university might consider the principles to be of 
such quality that it will require its researchers to adhere to 
them. Many implications of this would be positive. Organisa- 
tions which adopted the principles would presumably use their 
resources to embed them in social science research 
conducted under its auspices. However, there are some 
implications to consider. 
Would the stakeholders allow any organisation to adopt the 
principles if it wished to do so? Or would there be some sort 
of ‘licensing’ process, by which the stakeholders’ permission 
had to be sought, and possibly certain criteria met by the 
research organisation, before adoption was allowed? What if a 
research organisation asked the stakeholders to review and/or 
endorse its systems for ethical review of social sciences 
research? Both the licensing and review/endorsement 
approaches have implications for: the relationship between the 
stakeholders and the research organisations; the activities and 
aims of the stakeholders; how the guidance is perceived by 
other bodies now it had become something that was ‘licensed/ 
endorsed’; and the resources which the stakeholders would 
need to undertake the licensing and review/endorsement 
activities. The stakeholders would also need to consider the 
implications of a ‘licensed/endorsed’ research organisation 
failing to adhere to the standards or being perceived as failing 
to adhere to them. 
Even if the stakeholders decided not to proceed down a 
licensing/review/endorsement route, adoption of the principles 
by research organisations might cause some misconceptions. 
For example, a university might adopt the principles and make 
a public statement as follows: 
‘Social sciences research conducted by this organisation 
adheres to the standards generated by the 2013 Generic 
Ethics Principles in Social Science Research symposia convened 
by the Academy of Social Sciences, the British Psychological 
Society, the Association of Research Ethics Committees, the 
Economic and Social Research Council, The Open University 
and the British Sociological Association.’ 
In such circumstances, it might be assumed that the 
stakeholders have taken on a degree of responsibility for that 
university’s social science research, in particular that they 
have: 
· endorsed in some way the social sciences research 
conducted by that institution 
· reviewed and approved the institution’s ethical review 
processes for social science research or even for all 
research 
· an oversight role in relation to the university’s ethical 
review processes 
· the power to hear and judge appeals against the 
decisions of research ethics committees 
· the ability to investigate any concerns about the
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university’s social sciences research. 
The above scenarios might seem far-fetched; however, such 
misconceptions have arisen concerning UKRIO following the 
adoption of our (voluntary) guidance by some research 
organisations and I am aware of other cases as well. The 
stakeholders might wish to consider how they would address 
such misconceptions if they arose. 
How useful are standards for research? 
Principles and standards for research practice are a tool. Like 
any tool, these guidance documents (‘guidance’ is used here to 
cover both voluntary and mandatory principles and standards) 
are good at some things, reasonable at others, and 
inappropriate or useless in certain circumstances. 
Guidance documents are essential, however, in that they set 
out the basic values, principles and standards for research 
practice. Perhaps more importantly, they also define the 
particular ethos and requirements of individual organisations 
concerning research. In UKRIO’s experience, it should not be 
assumed that staff, students or members will automatically 
know and understand an institution’s ethos or standards, even 
those who are established researchers. 
Despite being essential, guidance documents can only ever 
form part of activities or initiatives to sustain and enhance 
standards for research ethics and integrity. If merely published 
and left unsupported, guidance on research practice tends to 
be either ignored or interpreted in a ‘tick box’ manner. I leave 
it up to the reader to decide which of these outcomes is 
worse. 
Social scientists and others have examined factors which 
incentivise or permit acceptable professional behaviours and 
those that incentivise or permit behaviours that deviate from 
professional norms. As someone from outside the discipline, I 
will not embarrass myself by seeking to report or build on 
that research to those who are much more familiar with it; 
instead, I will continue to share some key lessons learnt by 
UKRIO from its involvement in the creation or revision of 
standards for research practice, in particular those of other 
organisations. 
As noted, standards for research cannot stand on their own. 
They are part of an ongoing process – ideally a long-term 
dialogue with those who are supposed to adhere to the 
standards. Guidance for researchers, whether employees, 
students, members of a professional body or learned society, 
or others, must be supported following their publication by 
sufficient resources: personnel, time, facilities, funding, training 
and, in particular, sources of help. They must be strongly 
disseminated and promoted by the stakeholder organisation 
(s). Their uptake and use must be monitored and comments 
on the content and utility of the guidance invited from 
researchers, participants, organisations and other involved 
persons, bodies or communities. Monitoring and gathering of 
feedback must take place whether the guidance is voluntary, 
mandatory or licensed in some way. 
Above all, guidance for research practice should be a ‘living 
document’, revised periodically in response to feedback, 
monitoring and developments in research practice, ethics, 
policy and legislation. The support that is provided to 
researchers to help them adhere to the guidance and other 
mechanisms to promote its uptake and use should also be 
revised periodically. 
Earlier in this paper I asked what the stakeholder organisa- 
tions hope to accomplish by developing generic ethics 
principles in social science research, in addition to the basic 
aim of adding to the discussion and development of research 
ethics in the social sciences. Each selected aim will require its 
own programme of dissemination, awareness raising, support, 
gathering of feedback, monitoring and periodic revision. Many 
elements of these action plans would be common to many, if 
not all, of the desired aims but some would require bespoke 
measures. 
Standards for research are not a cure-all (and I recognise 
there is debate over whether there is a problem with 
research in social science that needs to be ‘cured’; similar 
debate is taking place in other disciplines) but they have the 
potential to support and, hopefully, enhance the conduct of 
research that is honest, accurate, safe, legal and of a high 
ethical standard. However, the publication of such standards is 
merely a step in this process of support and enhancement, 
and not the end. When properly supported, standards for 
research practice can encourage researchers to: 
· engage critically with the practical, ethical and 
intellectual challenges of conducting high quality 
research 
· consider the wider implications of their work 
· perhaps most importantly, consider issues and 
problems in advance and how they might be resolved. 
There are a variety of implications for organisations which 
publish standards for research practice, some of which have 
been discussed already (for example, under ‘mandatory or 
voluntary principles and standards’, above). It is vital that 
learned societies and professional bodies have a voice in the 
development of such standards but they must also consider 
the practical and practice consequences when they devise, 
promote and protect them. They must be aware of the 
tendency of researchers and organisations to treat guidance 
for research practice as a matter of regulatory or contractual 
compliance, rather than as an inherent part of professional 
conduct. They must also be aware that they might have to 
adopt certain ‘protectionist’ devices, such as the ‘licensing’ 
issues discussed earlier (Iphofen 2013). They could also have 
such ‘protectionist’ devices bestowed upon them if you will, 
through serious misconceptions about the stakeholders’ 
relationship with the standards. 
Relevancy of standards for research: a personal view 
There are many codes of practice and other guidance for 
research. Their scope, the type of their content, the nature of 
their authors, and whether the principles and standards they 
contain are voluntary or mandatory, all vary. The sheer 
number of codes can cause confusion when organisations wish 
to represent externally their own work on research ethics, 
practice or integrity, and runs the risk of hindering rather than 
helping novice researchers who need practical help in thinking 
through their own approaches (Iphofen 2013). 
In UKRIO’s experience, researchers, understandably, tend to 
pay attention to research standards from their employers and 
from funders: standards that are a condition of their 
employment and standards that are both a condition of their
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research funding and a gateway to further funding. This does 
have some benefits: when researchers and commissioners of 
research follow the same guidance, it should enhance 
relationships and understandings between the two (Iphofen 
2013). When they do not, we have observed that problems 
can easily arise. In addition to employer- and funder-generated 
standards, we have seen that researchers also pay attention to 
standards backed by statute, for obvious reasons. 
Organisations which are not employers, funding agencies or 
regulators face a significant challenge when devising and 
promoting new guidance for research. They are not only, in 
effect, launching a new product in an already crowded 
marketplace. They also run the risk of their ‘product’ being 
seen, wrongly in my view, as ‘second tier’, somehow less 
relevant than the three types of standards mentioned earlier. 
What then is the role of research standards from learned 
societies, professional bodies and similar organisations? My 
personal view is that it could be to go beyond ‘research 
standards as contractual or regulatory requirement’. The value 
of guidance without a contractual or regulatory ‘kick’ behind it 
is that it can go into more depth than guidance from 
mandatory sources. Guidance from sources which must be 
followed runs the risk of micro-managing or otherwise limiting 
research if it is too detailed. This can come about 
inadvertently, perhaps as a result of poor content or the 
intent of the stakeholders being misconstrued (see earlier) or 
as part of a poorly applied regulatory, or quasi-regulatory, 
approach. 
That is not to say that learned societies and professional 
bodies should not articulate the ethos and norms for their 
fields of research or professions. This is an important aim, 
especially as failing to achieve this may allow other actors to 
set out standards which might, inadvertently and tacitly, be 
seen as the norms for the profession instead. However, I feel 
that learned societies and professional bodies can go beyond 
this. They, more than employers, funders or regulators, are 
well placed to get researchers thinking about research – its 
wider implications, and how to engage critically with the 
practical, ethical and intellectual challenges of conducting high 
quality research. This would hopefully not only benefit 
research and researchers but also the other individuals and 
communities involved in social science research. 
To achieve this, guidance from learned societies and 
professional bodies must be: informative; accessible; promote 
debate and reflection; and, above all, be useful. The authors 
must recognise that they are writing for those who have, for 
whatever reason, potentially little or no knowledge of these 
issues. They are also writing for those who have knowledge 
and wish to know more. Perhaps most importantly, they are 
writing for the future, hopefully identifying emerging 
developments in social sciences research and challenges to 
conducting research of a high ethical standard. 
Generated by learned societies and professional bodies in the 
social sciences, the proposed generic ethics principles could 
benefit both the profession as a whole and the general public, 
beyond the potential benefits (and potential detriments) for 
individual researchers. A straightforward benefit for the public 
would be if the principles and associated standards could help 
ensure the safety, wellbeing, dignity and rights of individuals 
and communities involved in social sciences research. 
Both the public and the social sciences professions would also 
benefit if the principles, through their use/adoption and 
dissemination, could help retain the public’s trust in social 
science research. This would tie in with the mission and ethos 
of the stakeholder organisations – for example, the Academy 
of Social Sciences’ mission is to promote social sciences in the 
United Kingdom for the public benefit. This approach would 
involve the political, reputational and representational value of 
principles and standards for research. It is part of how one 
‘sells’ a particular approach to the ‘outside’ world and has 
effects for status, reputation and ‘economic value’ (Iphofen 
2013). 
As noted earlier, public trust in research is based on a 
‘professional promise’ to the public and to other researchers 
that research will meet certain standards. The generic ethic 
principles might help social sciences research to fulfil that 
promise. They might also help explain the ethos and norms of 
the profession to the public. The latter could be achieved if 
agreement on generic ethics principles across the social 
sciences provided a degree of clarity on what is ‘good’ social 
sciences research, which could then be communicated both 
within and beyond the discipline. 
While care would need to be taken to avoid micro-managing 
or limiting researchers – or glossing over differences between 
the social sciences professions where they exist – this clarity 
could be useful. As well as helping to inform the public, it 
would help explain professional norms to researchers new to 
the social sciences, whether those at the beginning of their 
careers or researchers from other disciplines who plan to 
collaborate with social scientists. It would also be a valuable 
resource for commercial organisations and independent 
researchers involved in social sciences research. It has been 
noted that, ‘to a large extent [such organisations and 
individuals] rely on the relevant professional and discipline- 
based bodies to monitor current practice and enforce high 
standards’ (Academy of Social Sciences 2012). 
There would also be a further professional, even political, 
rationale for seeking clarity on what is ‘good’ social sciences 
research. It could provide a broadly unified baseline for 
determining standards for the profession, rather than leaving 
this – by default or by design – as a job for others to step in 
and take on. There might be value in professional bodies, 
learned societies, researchers and universities coming 
together to develop mutually acceptable and deliverable 
solutions, as a means of circumventing top-down pressures, 
whether intentional or not, for new regulatory or quasi- 
regulatory processes. It would also ensure that the voices of 
learned societies and professional bodies were at the heart of 
initiatives to support and enhance research ethics and 
research integrity in the social sciences, as they should be. 
‘Learned societies and professional bodies are well capable of 
taking the lead in setting standards applicable to research in 
new and emerging fields and any challenges posed by 
interdisciplinary research’ (Academy of Social Sciences 2012). 
Scope and terminology: research ethics or research 
integrity? 
Is the goal of the symposia to generate generic principles for 
the social sciences on research ethics or research integrity? 
Definitions of ‘research integrity’ vary and there is no 
consensus on the meaning of the term. Some view it as sitting 
alongside research ethics, covering issues of the
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professionalism of researchers – in effect, are they meeting 
the norms/standards of science? - and the reliability of 
research (Jacob 2013). Others view it as having a wider focus 
than research ethics, including research ethics and all aspects 
of, and issues relating to, the design, conduct, dissemination, 
governance and management of research. The stakeholders of 
The Concordat to Support Research Integrity (Universities UK et 
al 2012) would appear to view ‘research ethics’ as a sub-set of 
‘research integrity’, with the document addressing ethical 
issues in research in one of its five commitments on research 
integrity. 
Having said that, some organisations do use ‘research ethics’ 
as a catch-all to describe research conduct/integrity, 
particularly ‘good’ research conduct. In practice, one 
institution might have a ‘code of practice for research 
integrity’ to which all of its researchers must adhere, while 
another might have a ‘code of practice for research ethics’ 
that fulfilled the same purpose. Despite the different terms 
used in their titles, both documents would cover pretty much 
the same issues. 
I mention this not to argue over semantics but to note that 
there is no standard terminology in use to define clearly the 
scope of guidance on research practice. The various terms can 
have different meanings to different people and organisations. 
This should be kept in mind when devising guidance for 
researchers, to ensure clarity. 
It should also be considered whether the aim of these 
symposia is to create to create standards/principles for 
research ethics only or if the output(s) of the symposia should 
have a wider focus. If nothing else, it might be sensible to 
acknowledge if and/or when the generic ethics principles stray 
into aspects of research practice outside of research ethics 
and note sources of guidance and assistance available on issues 
of research integrity. 
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Response 1 to ‘Developing Standards for Research Practice:  Some Issues for 
Consideration’ 
Susan V Zimmerman 
Executive Director, Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research 
(Canadian Institutes of Health Research; Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada; 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) 
The challenge of the session on Standards was, in my view, to 
determine the response to three questions: 
1. what is the desired goal of the exercise? 
2. who has primary responsibility for achieving and 
maintaining that goal? 
3. what is the preferred mechanism for achieving that 
goal? 
The first is a question of substance; the second, of 
governance; and the third, of process. The Canadian 
experience since 1998 and particularly since 2010 offers a 
concrete example of developing common guidance on 
principles of research ethics, implementing those principles 
and ensuring their evolution. 
First, the question of substance. It is important to clarify the 
aim of the exercise, as there is much confusion with respect 
to the use of terminology. Is the goal to establish guiding 
principles for the ethics of research, in particular research 
involving humans? If so, the focus is on the relationship 
between the researcher and the participant (or subject). Is it 
to establish principles of research integrity, usually understood 
as professional relations among researchers, and their 
interaction with the research community (i.e. their peers)? Or 
is it to establish overarching principles governing both of these 
topics and, more generally, good research practice, sometimes 
referred to as responsible conduct of research? 
The Canadian research agencies 1 have opted for a unified 
approach to policies and procedures in each of these three 
areas. The guiding principles for the ethics of human research 
are contained in the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct 
for Research Involving Humans, 2 nd edition (known as TCPS 2). 
Originally developed in 1998 and substantially revised and 
expanded in 2010, this policy statement aims to provide 
general ethics guidance for research involving humans, 
whether it is conducted in the social sciences, health sciences, 
natural sciences or engineering. The decision to establish a 
unified policy was based on the belief that there are certain 
fundamental ethical principles that apply across disciplines, and 
that it strengthens these principles to have them presented as 
applying to all researchers who do research involving human 
participants. 
TCPS 2 reflects an evolution from earlier guidelines and codes 
established separately by the medical and the social sciences 
agencies. It is based on respect for human dignity, as 
expressed through three core principles: respect for persons, 
concern for welfare, and justice. How these principles apply to 
different types of research will depend on the methodologies, 
approaches and customs of specific disciplines or multi- 
disciplinary collaborations. The policy therefore allows for a 
diversity of research approaches when assessing the ethics of 
a proposed study. In particular, the second edition of the 
TCPS has taken great care to incorporate changes based on 
critiques from the social science research community. As a 
result, TCPS 2 is seen as better reflecting the reality of social 
science research, and providing more relevant and useful 
guidance as a result. 
Next, the question of governance. In Canada, the 
responsibility for establishing and maintaining ethics principles 
for human research as well as policies on research integrity 
and responsible conduct of research has been shouldered by 
the research agencies. While individual institutions and 
organizations representing distinct disciplines craft their own 
policies in these areas, the research agencies see their 
responsibility, as guardians of public funds, to set the 
standards of accountability for the use of those funds. They 
have evolved, over the last 15 years or so, to viewing this 
responsibility as one that is better carried out in a unified 
manner, rather than continuing to have each Agency develop 
and implement separate policies. This choice recognizes and 
reflects the significant commonality of ethics and integrity 
principles across disciplines, and the need for common 
guidance with respect to responsible conduct of research. The 
agencies also wished to ensure harmonization in their 
interpretation and enforcement of these policies, so as to 
provide clearer, more reliable guidance to the research 
community, which is increasingly multi-disciplinary. 
Finally, the question of process. The Canadian research 
agencies, having no regulatory authority, have chosen to use a 
policy statement to achieve their aim of establishing standards 
– both for human research ethics, through TCPS 2, and for 
the overall goal of responsible conduct of research, through 
the Tri-Agency Framework: Responsible Conduct of Research. 
These policies have force because the Agencies require 
compliance with them as a condition of eligibility for research
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funding. This applies to individual researchers as well as to 
institutions (universities, colleges, hospitals). Given the 
importance of eligibility to both researchers and institutions, 
this has proven to be a very effective mechanism for 
implementing these policies across the country. With Agency 
support for education and training through a centralized tri- 
Agency Secretariat, these policies have become a vehicle for 
enhancing understanding and implementation of the important 
principles they embody. 
There was no consensus at the symposium in May on the 
questions outlined above, although the discussion offered 
many perspectives on potential directions to pursue. In 
assessing the options available, it is worth considering the 
Canadian model. After more than a decade of experience and 
evolution and despite some significant initial resistance, in 
particular from social scientists, the adoption of common 
guidance for human research ethics has proven to be a 
resilient and effective approach, underscoring the importance 
of core principles while equally reflecting the importance of 
respect for the diversity of disciplinary practices. 
Notes 
1. The Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the 
Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada 
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada (“the research agencies”). 
2. Available at http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy- 
politique/initiatives/tcps2-eptc2/Default/ 
3. Available at http://www.rcr.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy- 
politique/framework-cadre/ 
4. The Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research, 
together with two advisory Panels, is responsible for 
overseeing the implementation and evolution of both 
TCPS 2 and the Framework on Responsible Conduct of 
Research (for information on the Secretariat and 
Panels, see http://www.rcr.ethics.gc.ca/default.aspx ). 
A Summary of Symposium 3:  Standards 
23rd May 2013, British Psychological Society, London 
Organising Committee: Robert Dingwall, Ron Iphofen, Janet Lewis and John Oates 
Summary by Dr Nathan Emmerich, Queen’s University Belfast 
Introduction: 
The third and final symposium of the series was focused on 
standards. The aim was to consider potential standards 
suitable for the governance of social science research ethics, 
how these might link to the principles and values discussed in 
the previous symposia and what actions might be taken 
forward. The role of integrity in the contemporary landscape 
of the social sciences, research ethics and governance was also 
discussed. 
Professor Paul Wiles, formerly the Government’s Chief Social 
Scientist and Chief Scientific Adviser to the Home Office, 
chaired the day’s discussions. 
Stimulus Paper: James Parry, Chief Executive, UKRIO. 
After acknowledging that he is not a social scientist (his 
discipline being archaeology) James Parry offered some 
considerations on the process and purpose of developing 
standards for research practice. These were informed by his 
work in the UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO). 1 Parry felt 
that it was worth explicitly stating what might be considered 
self-evident or obvious. His paper aimed to consider: 
· What do we want to achieve by generating and 
articulating these ethics principles? 
· What methods might be used to achieve those aims? 
· What challenges do we face in putting these objectives 
into practice? 
· How does this work fit into the wider, diverse and 
increasingly crowded landscape of research ethics? 
At the present time there is a lot of guidance and scrutiny of 
research, however the UK government does not seem inclined 
to go down a wholly regulatory route and the UKRIO has no 
interest in acquiring such powers. The existing key actors 
(researchers, employers, funders, publishers and the learned 
societies and professional bodies) are those who have 
responsibilities in this area. In the UK employers and funders 
have thus far taken the lead in articulating guidance and 
governance; the recent Concordat on Research Integrity being 
one example of this. There is no overall statutory regulation of 
research in the UK. Parry felt existing key actors need to 
develop a stronger voice in this area and the outcomes of this 
symposia series could make an important contribution. 
Parry felt that what we might seek to achieve in this area is to 
help researchers to conduct good social science research; to 
help to sustain and support good practice; to help to protect 
research participants and others involved in research, including 
researchers; and to assist in the maintenance of public trust in 
social science research. Social science research needs to be 
accurate, honest, safe, ethical and legal – Parry thought that 
the principles could facilitate these ends. He felt that unethical 
and bad practices were not more widespread in UK social 
science than in any other discipline but that there were three 
categories the symposia outputs needed to be able to handle: 
1. The majority of researchers that do good work. 
2. Cases of outright fraud. 
3. Questionable research practices. 
These different categories required any standards to be 
flexible. Parry wondered if the Academy could offer a 
definition of what constitutes good social science and if not, 
whether this meant definitions offered by other bodies would 
become the de facto standard which informed the public
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understanding of social science research. 
Parry noted that the previous symposia had suggested the 
output from the series should not be a single statement but an 
ongoing process of dissemination, engagement, reflection and 
revision with the rights, wrongs and goods of social science 
research. He felt this would be really valuable and support the 
development of the social sciences in the long term and 
enable researchers to engage with the challenges presented by 
future advances in research and changes in wider society. He 
raised the issue of whether the Academy should set out basic 
standards or aim at something more aspirational, including 
setting out basic norms, considering when researchers should 
go beyond these norms, and what ‘best practice(s)’ in the 
ethical conduct and dissemination of research might be. 
Parry then considered how these outputs should be presented 
and to whom they were aimed. It could be that the outputs 
were just aimed at researchers and learned societies. 
However it could be that outputs were also aimed at funders, 
employers (universities) and other organizations. The interests 
of these bodies, including those that have supported the 
symposia, are among the ‘communities of interest’ that a 
broader view of research integrity and ethics should seek to 
encompass. 
The ESRC considered its REF/ FRE to be a starting point and 
whilst this was not always the way in which it is taken, this 
ought to be the way this group understood it and other 
documents which structure the landscape of social science 
research ethics. How, then, should the symposia outputs be 
presented? There seemed little will for them to be mandatory 
but, nevertheless, a lack of formal mandate would not prevent 
their adoption and so it was important to engage with the 
communities of interest in order to prevent the guidance 
becoming another document responded to in a ‘tick-box’ 
manner or, worse, ignored. 
Parry thought that research ethics standards are useful as they 
can set out the basic norms of an institution or a funding body 
and can usefully characterize the ethos of a profession or 
learned society. In this latter case they can also encourage 
researchers in their thinking about how to do good research, 
what criteria define good research, what implications, issues 
and pitfalls might result from conducting research and how 
these might be engaged with. Learned societies play an 
important role because they are not offering mandated 
standards but standards with which researchers can engage. 
Parry suggested that what the Academy might offer could be 
likened to a teaching aid, which researchers could use 
dynamically, rather than as formal rules, to which researchers 
often respond in a static manner. 
Parry closed with some comments on what he perceived to 
be a wider issue for anyone engaged in articulating research 
standards. Standards exist in a social context and compete for 
researchers’ attention. The other demands and pressures on 
researchers include: publishing, publishing in better places, 
attracting funding etc. As with any other social field, the way 
in which it is structured has consequences for the practices 
that take place within it. For the case in hand this means the 
way(s) in which the social organization of academic institutions 
impacts on  the academic research that is carried out. The 
methodological and ethical standards of a discipline are such 
social structures. Furthermore they can be clearly positioned 
as such and used to engage with the positive and negative 
aspects of other institutional and institutionalized pressures. 
Explicit standards for research practice must be sensitive to 
context and designed in recognition of the other positive and 
negative institutional pressures on practice. 
Response 1: Susan Zimmerman (Executive Director, 
Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research, 
Government of Canada): 
Susan Zimmerman began her response by positioning the 
Canadian context half-way between that of the USA and the 
UK. She felt that the US approach was very regulatory and 
bureaucratic. In contrast the UK felt more free-flowing where 
people had a diversity of independent and nuanced opinions 
with ‘regulation’ and bureaucracy being conducted in a less 
formal manner. She felt that Canada also aimed to regulate 
with a light touch and this was in part accomplished through 
the office she represented. The Secretariat is involved in 
research ethics and the responsible conduct of research, 
which includes research integrity. It was created and is 
supported by the three main Canadian research agencies, and 
so it covers research in the health sciences, natural sciences 
and engineering as well as the social sciences and humanities. 
Nevertheless it has no formal regulatory powers, relying on 
eligibility for funding as the basis for requiring compliance with 
ethics standards. She was in broad agreement with Parry’s 
stimulus paper and so proposed to take the audience through 
the way in which research governance has been developed in 
Canada as she felt it was something of a living lab for the ideas 
contained in his paper. 
Zimmerman felt it was important to be clear about terms 
such as ethics, integrity and the responsible conduct of 
research but did not want to argue for particular definitions in 
her presentation. Nevertheless, having clear definitions, is, she 
felt, important for articulating what it was that we wanted to 
do, how we wanted to do it, and how we could make sure it 
was done correctly. Clear terminological definitions would 
help in the articulation of such aims. She also felt that 
addressing procedural and substantive aims separately was 
important and that this meant distinguishing between who 
should be engaged in a process that aimed to achieve the 
adopted ends, and who had responsibility for conducting that 
process. 
Zimmerman then compared the recently revised Canadian 
Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS2) to the RESPECT code 
that had been previously brought to the attention of 
delegates. 2 The TCPS2 is much bigger than the first version 
(which is more like the length of the RESPECT code). 
However she felt that the revision provided better guidance 
and was more widely used. She felt that the entire document 
could be summarised by the underlying value of ‘Respect for 
Human Dignity’ and the three core principles: Respect for 
Persons; Concern for Welfare; and Justice. The TCPS2 is 
structured by 13 chapters, with the first seven applying to 
research in general. The later chapters address ethical issues 
specific to particular types of research such as, for example, 
qualitative research and research involving (Canadian) 
Aboriginal peoples (to a large extent also applicable to any 
marginalised or culturally specific community). In the process 
of drawing up the document she often found that issues which 
initially seemed to be unique to, say, qualitative research, were 
found, upon further reflection, to be more generally applicable 
and so were incorporated into the earlier chapters. Each of
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the chapters has a series of ‘articles’ followed by a discussion 
section about their application. 
The theoretical and practical aim of the document is to 
facilitate the movement from the general to the particular. 
Thus Canadian research ethics boards must contain members 
who are expert in the disciplinary methodologies under 
review, as well as members generally knowledgeable about 
ethics. This provides for a link between the general principles 
and the standard practices and accepted norms of particular 
disciplines. The document itself does not prescribe what a 
good anthropologist, sociologist, biomedical researcher or 
whatever will do and whilst the Interagency Advisory Panel on 
Research Ethics offers a consultation service, it is up to 
researchers and disciplines to articulate their own norms 
within the TCSP2 framework. When it is felt to be useful, the 
Panel publishes the advice it provides and has built up a 
repository of these interpretations for consultation on its 
website. Zimmerman felt this represented the on-going 
process of articulating ethics and other standards in and for 
research. This was embedded in the basic activities of her 
office that continued to engage in educational activities 
including discussions about the document with researchers. 
She noted that whilst the TCPS1 remained unchanged for 10 
years, her office and the Panel had already produced some 
revisions and further guidance related to TCPS2. Zimmerman 
felt this indicated that the aim of producing a ‘living document’ 
was being met. 
Zimmerman then offered brief definitions of her terms and the 
way they are used in Canada. Research ethics is the ethics of 
the interaction between researchers and research participants. 
Research integrity is about the interaction between 
researchers, their colleagues and the scientific community. The 
responsible conduct of research is a broader umbrella term 
and encompasses all aspects of research including research 
ethics, research integrity and the interaction with the public, 
other stakeholders and funders. 
The Canadian research agencies have also produced a joint 
policy framework with respect to responsible conduct of 
research, also administered by Zimmerman’s office. The 
approach adopted by the Agencies is, at least initially, to focus 
on compliance with Agency policies, including TCPS2, rather 
than on misconduct. Repeated non-compliance (whether 
intentional or not) may indicate misconduct and institutions, as 
well as the Agencies, may respond with more serious 
sanctions. However a key role of Zimmerman’s office was 
engagement and education – something that was made a lot 
easier because of the funders’ support for her office and for 
TCPS2. Zimmerman closed by suggesting that the key to 
articulating good guidance is education and activities that 
support the document and engage with wider research 
communities. She again reiterated the question of who has 
responsibility for the tasks, as opposed to who should be 
engaged in the tasks themselves. 
Response 2: Isidoros Karatzas (Head of Ethics Sector, 
DG Research and Innovation, European Commission): 
Note: The original paper has not been available for this 
publication and so is not included elsewhere. 
Isidoros Karatzas began by noting a few things that had 
occurred to him whilst reading the stimulus paper. First, he 
was reminded of the case of Diederik Stapel, 3 who has become 
the poster-boy for research misconduct. He felt the case 
illustrated the fact that codes of practice and guidance cannot, 
by themselves, be sufficient to guarantee the integrity of 
research. Karatzas felt that the students who had reported 
Stapel’s misconduct should be awarded their PhD’s and asked 
to teach others about ethical issues in research integrity. 
Second, he wondered if self-regulation in science and banking 
(or the press) had anything in common? He noted that there 
are a great many ethics codes, guidance and other documents 
available across Europe and their number is increasing. Many 
of them evinced a commitment to more education in research 
ethics and integrity. Karatzas felt that it is about time we 
stopped talking about such education and actually started 
delivering it, possibly by making research ethics a mandatory 
part of a higher education. He noted that in medicine ‘ethics’ 
was increasingly externalised, with responsibility being 
outsourced to committees. He did not want the social 
sciences to adopt this way of doing things. 
That said, Karatzas felt that the social sciences needed their 
own ‘Helsinki Code.‘ Such codes have major international 
recognition and backing; they are popular, useful and effective. 
Furthermore, these codes have the power to garner political 
support. Karatzas felt the social sciences would greatly benefit 
from developing a unified voice in public and, especially, in 
political fora. Natural scientists often disagree behind closed 
doors, he said, however when they talk to funders they will 
usually need to present a unified opinion. Social scientists need 
to develop a collective voice for use in public and political 
spheres. 
Karatzas again reiterated that the problem that needed to be 
addressed is not bad people doing bad things but good people 
doing bad things. Codes could not fully solve this problem, as 
it is impossible to fully police all research. He felt that we 
needed to address the deeper pressures on researchers, 
pressures that sometimes lead to sloppy research and the 
cutting of corners. Some of these pressures are the imperative 
to research and to publish but also the administration of 
research. He felt that we needed a governance system that 
had integrity and that space within the field(s) of research was 
opening up to this possibility.  Ethics review and research 
misconduct have been treated separately but these are 
becoming merged. Karatzas felt that distinctions between 
mandatory and voluntary approaches to research governance, 
ethics and misconduct are becoming blurred and that many 
apparently voluntary codes were, in practice, mandatory. 
Karatzas felt that codes often fail to pay attention to the needs 
of particular research subjects, such as children. He felt that, 
following the Arab Spring, ‘warzones’ are another issue as 
many researchers had wanted to conduct research in 
response to these protests and subsequent political changes. 
He was particularly concerned that only minimal attention is 
paid to what might happen to research participants following 
the completion of the research. On that point he drew to a 
close. 
Morning Discussion: 
Tim Bond (British Association of Counselling and Psycho- 
therapy) wondered what the panel thought of the relationship 
between the social sciences and the law, and if we should 
engage with the law as morality and ethics. In response James 
Parry thought there were many scholars in law and socio-legal 
studies who thought similarly and it was certainly a view 
worth pursuing. Birgit Whitman (University of Bristol) raised
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the question of what possibilities we open up when we think 
about ethics differently. She wondered what a social science 
research ethics that was not constrained by the biomedical 
model might look like. James Parry (UKRIO) thought that 
these issues highlighted why it was important that the 
profession have a voice in the development of regulation and 
research governance. He felt that the biomedical model is not 
being pushed on the social sciences by medics, who also 
struggle with their system. The approach to governance and 
ethics in biomedical research has been developed over time 
and often in a responsive mode. A recent review of medical 
research governance advocated the streamlining and 
harmonisation of medical regulation. 4 Current regulatory 
approaches focus on minimising risk (particularly for 
participants) and promoting good professional practice. This 
needs to be the heart of research regulation but that, were 
the social sciences to speak with a single voice, it was 
possible they could effect alterations to the review of social 
science research. 
Stina Lyon (British Sociological Association) enquired as to 
the funding of the UKRIO and this led to a discussion of the 
way such bodies were funded beyond the UK. The UKRIO 
was initially set up as a pilot project with by a broad range of 
stakeholders, including the UK Higher Education Funding 
Councils, the UK Departments of Health, the Research 
Councils, the Royal Society and research charities. The 
current position is that UK HEI’s choose to subscribe to 
UKRIO which, as a charity, aims to assist all those involved in 
research on request. Paul Wiles suggested that the 
government did not offer direct funding as it would not be 
appropriate for the government to be directly involved in the 
ethics of (social) science research. Zimmerman (Secretariat 
on Responsible Conduct of Research) said that her 
organization was funded by the three (major) funding 
agencies of Canada and that it had responsibility for research 
integrity and ethics. Wiles suggested this was the equivalent 
of UKRIO being an office of UKRC. Robert Dingwall 
(Academy of Social Sciences) highlighted that the UKRIO 
focus was on the integrity of research and not ethics, which 
was still a concern of RCUK. He felt that some of the 
discussion over the three seminars raised the question of 
whether it was sensible to treat these things separately. 
Mary Brydon-Miller (Cincinnati/ currently a Fulbright Scholar 
at Keele) raised the point of education – for students and 
research on the ethics of research – and contrasted it with 
the problem of the structural arrangements of institutions. 
She read the following quote: “We need to put more 
emphasis on trying to arrange social institutions so that 
human beings are not placed in situations in which they will 
act badly.” 5 Brydon-Miller thought that institutional 
arrangements are such that they could encourage unethical 
behavior. She felt we ought to emphasis our own ability to 
examine these structural arrangements and to comment on 
institutional reform. Karatzas agreed, suggesting we should 
rethink the way academic careers are built, and wondered 
why institutions do not give credit to researchers for serving 
on ethics committees. He felt we must change the ‘end 
product’ if we are to change how we get there. 
James Fairhead (Association of Social Anthropologists) 
commented on the summary of ethical codes and the 
variation and diversity found within. 6 He felt that the 
distinction between a code and a guidance document was 
whether or not the publishing association felt able, at least in 
theory, to ‘enforce’ them. He felt that the existing guidelines 
and codes demonstrated that the Learned Societies had 
developed their own approaches and this meant that 
whatever this project produced could, at most, be a guideline 
document. He felt the RESPECT document was an exemplar 
of what was possible at a ‘supra-discipline’ level. 7 
Gemma Moss (BERA) raised some concerns about the set up 
of the discussion and the way in which the day’s speakers 
spoke from their positions as regulators. However, those 
being regulated, the (present and not-present) audiences 
were individual researchers who face a diverse set of ethical 
challenges. She felt it was a mistake to roll-up ‘ethics’ with 
‘misconduct’ and ‘quality.’ The former concerned the issues 
faced by individual researchers whereas the latter was a 
concern for regulators. She felt that the summary of codes of 
ethics mistakenly differentiated between research and 
professional ethics and that the effect was to bracket-off a 
range of ethical concerns for researchers. In particular it 
bracketed-off concerns about funders and institutions, as well 
as the position of researchers in relation to funders and 
institutions, in favor of focusing on the narrower concern of 
the treatment of research participants. She felt this division 
and its influence had misled the discussion. 
Ron Iphofen (Academy of Social Sciences) reiterated his view 
that this symposia series was trying to assist researchers in 
addressing the issue of ethics in research and that there was 
no sense in which it had been organized to come to a specific 
conclusion or to instantiate a particular approach. He said 
that the panel for this symposia on standards had been 
invited due to the insights they offered into the governance 
of research and the institutionalization of research ethics. He 
felt the TCPS2 was an excellent document that respected the 
diversity of research, researchers and researched. 
Stina Lyon (BSA) had a broad comment on a statement in 
James Parry’s (UKRIO) paper. She cited a couple of lines that 
expressed the idea that “the public trust in research was 
based on a professional promise that research would be 
honest, objective, accurate, legal, safe, ethical and efficient. To 
be worthy of the public’s trust, research needs to fulfill that 
promise.” 8 She felt this reflected the standard mission 
statements issued by a variety of public and semi-public 
bodies at the present time and towards which the public was 
skeptical. The public did not trust them as they were ‘cover- 
ups’ rather than a transparent description of what actually 
goes on. She felt it was a mistake to go down this ‘mission 
statement’ route and that we should pursue a policy of 
transparency. This meant explaining to politicians and the 
public about the risks and the need to occasionally break 
commonly assumed ethical norms (as in the case of covert 
research). Lyon then reflected on the public’s attitude to 
‘mystery shoppers.’ She suggested that the public are happy 
for mystery shoppers to be used in almost any setting 
(supermarkets, care-homes), excluding private homes. She 
said the public feels an increasing desire for and right to 
information. This runs counter to the idea that we have to 
educate the public about ethics, as this is a public that has 
access to the internet and all the information it could 
provide.  She felt that we needed to understand the 
skepticism of the public towards institutional guarantees of 
knowledge. Her view is that transparency is the key to 
overcoming this scepticism and this is an area in which the
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Academy could make a contribution. She closed by mentioning 
a excellent UN report on good research practice in 
development studies as it emphasizes the participation of 
those being studied. 9 
David Hunter (Editor of Research Ethics) raised the issue of the 
importance of maintaining the particularity of disciplinary 
approaches to research ethics. However he felt that the 
underlying principles remain the same even if their particular 
operationalization or application in different disciplines are 
quite varied. 
Sheila Peace (British Society of Gerontology) discussed the 
multidisciplinary nature of her Learned Society and how this 
influenced the fact that they offered generic ethical guidelines 
rather than an ethics code. She is conscious of issues to do 
with the professional conduct of research, which may include 
whistleblowing. However she felt that the ‘supra-disciplinary’ 
guidance offered by the BSG focuses on issues of research 
ethics, rather than issues of professional ethics, because of the 
multidisciplinary constitution of its membership. 
Robert Dingwall (Academy of Social Sciences) fondly recalled 
watching a scene in the second Pirates of the Caribbean movie 
where the pirates debated the nature of the ‘pirate code’ and 
whether it was a code or merely a set of guidelines. He drew 
our attention to a point that Will Van Den Hoonaard made at 
the second symposia concerning the ethics of the research 
ethics process. Dingwall questioned the fairness with which 
institutions treated their researchers and students. He 
commented that we know quite a lot about the conditions 
that lead researchers to engage in bad behaviors, citing 
research from the 1960s and 1970s into misconduct in bio- 
medical research. 10 He felt that the idea of institutional 
structures leading to malpractice is not news, but that we have 
failed to learn the lessons of such ideas. He also commented 
on the ethics of mystery shopping, noting that in pharma- 
ceutical practice research this was a common method. 11 He 
wondered why we bother to regulate participant observation 
in the age of Google-glass and head cams? 12 Nobody feels the 
need to create elaborate structures of regulation around these 
phenomena. Dingwall wondered if we were chasing shadows 
and what led us to pursue these special professional claims? 
Annabelle Mark (Society for Studies in Organizing Healthcare) 
commented that the next-generation is increasingly struggling 
with the rule-based organizations (HEI’s and funders) through 
whom they have to negotiate their futures. She felt that we 
have to help early career researchers to understand how to 
produce good social science in spite of, rather than because 
of, those rule based organizations. She felt that the constraints 
placed on researchers will increase and that the Academy has 
a role in pushing back the institutionalization of overly pre- 
scriptive rules in the interests of research and researchers. 
Janet Lewis (Academy of Social Sciences) picked up on these 
points and wondered how Zimmerman’s office set about 
supporting researchers, particularly early-career researchers 
and students, in a ‘rule-based’ culture that was not particularly 
supportive. She felt that research ethics review focused on the 
research design phase and neglected wider ethics aspects. 
James Fairhead (Association of Social Anthropologists) wished 
to comment on the relationship between academic ethics and 
ethics outside of academia. He had three points. The first was 
to question whether ethical principles are really the same 
across the social sciences. He felt that we are not as similar as 
we are being led to believe. He cited a recent apology made 
by UK economists to the Queen for the financial collapse and 
suggested that economics could be just as dangerous as 
medicine. However it was dangerous in a different way and 
through a different form of ethics encounter with its 
population. It is not just about the relationship between the 
researcher and the research participant. Second, he suggested 
that universities have taken a great deal of responsibility for 
research governance. HEI’s in the UK all have structures, 
guidelines and educational programs and they are informed by 
disciplinary standards. However, much social science research 
takes place outside of universities and such research is not 
subject to the same restrictions. He wondered to what extent 
this process could be about research conducted by businesses. 
He wondered where that left the relationship between 
researchers in different settings, and universities and 
businesses more generally. 
Tim Bond (BACP) felt that we should also be aware of the 
media’s role in contemporary society and their capacity to 
investigate and make things transparent. He felt it would be 
problematic if formal guidance prevented academic research 
into certain topics, which was then only commented upon by 
the media. 
Sue Williams of the Social Services Research Group (SSRG) 
explained that the members of her learned Society, who come 
from a variety of backgrounds, wanted to ensure that social 
care research was seen as different to medical research and 
that the ‘medical model’ of scientific research, i.e. assumptions 
made by reviewers based on norms concerning research 
designs and methods commonly used in clinical research, was 
not imposed on social care research by the Research 
Governance Framework. 13 SSRG sat on the DH advisory 
group for Research Governance in Social Care, and were 
instrumental in developing the Implementation Plan for Social 
Care 14 which recognised a) that there are important 
differences in the health and social care contexts in respect of 
the kinds of research undertaken, b) Local authorities with 
Social Services Responsibilities have a key role in governance. 
SSRG members took part in commissioning training for local 
authority staff, based on an evaluation of training needs and in 
partnership with the DH, academics and the Association of 
Directors of Social Services (ADASS), SSRG members, 
contributed to, and published, the Research Governance 
Framework Resource Pack for Social Care (version 1 and 2). 15 
SSRG were members of the Advisory Group that set up the 
Social Care Research Ethics Committee (SCREC) 16 and a 
member contributed to the Roadmap for Social Care 
researchers 17 which, inter alia, states that no research should 
be ethically reviewed more than once. Sue Williams noted that 
the SCREC was only really relevant to a small proportion of 
research (i.e. mainly grant funded, DH funded or high risk 
research). Following the Mental Capacity Act (2005) 
implementation the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees (GAfREC) 18 was harmonised across health 
and social care. 
In response to the comments, Zimmerman pointed out that 
the TCPS2 was not a regulatory document and that her office 
had no regulatory power. That said, it is the case that 
government funding does make compliance with TCPS2 a
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precondition. Nevertheless the process of (re)developing the 
document was one in which the concerns of social scientists 
were taken into account. There was an independent advisory 
panel that had a strong input into the document and it was 
intended to be a document that reflected what researchers do 
and the concerns they have in doing their work. This included 
being cognizant of ‘critical enquiry.’ She felt it is a mistake to 
see any one discipline as having its own very specific concerns 
and, therefore, ethical autonomy. In no small degree this was 
because much research is multi- and inter- disciplinary and 
therefore requires a commonality of approach. She felt that 
the Canadian system facilitated a marrying-up of the specific 
and the general, and that it allowed for clarity. 
Karatzas commented that it was easy to repeat the mantra 
that lessons should be learnt from what had gone before. He 
was unaware of anyone who wished to prevent good research 
from taking place. He felt that social scientists become risk 
averse when they engage in reviewing the ethics of research 
because they hate to see anything bad happening to 
participants. 
Paul Wiles closed the session by suggesting that contemporary 
social science is a much more complicated endeavor than 
when he started out in his career. He questioned what the 
role of a body like the Academy is or could be in this area. He 
felt that the morning’s discussion had been very interesting 
and useful. However it had focused on what we as researchers 
think about it. He wondered to what extent researchers want 
to maintain their autonomy over this process. The discussion 
had also focused on the need for ethics guidelines to make 
sure that things don’t go wrong. In addition he thought that 
there was a need to support research because it does good. 
Afternoon Session 
The programme for the afternoon involved the delegates 
being randomly assigned to three different groups and asked 
to discuss the possible outcomes of this series. They were 
provided with a worksheet to guide discussion and it included 
the following headings, some of which were related to the 
stimulus paper by James Parry: ‘Purposes’ of this Exercise; 
Target audience(s); Desired Outcomes (rest of workshop); 
Options (1. Precisely defining how to conduct high quality 
social science research, 2. Supporting a variety of approaches 
to high quality social sciences research, 3. To be ‘aspired’ to 
without precise specification); and Outcomes (what activities 
should the working group now pursue). Following the group 
discussion the symposium reconvened and the groups fed back 
the main points of their discussions. These were as follows: 
Group 1 
There was a recognition that the social sciences need to find 
some common ground across the disciplines. They agreed that 
ethical reasoning was an important factor for enhancing the 
practice(s) of social science research and that procedures 
needed to be rooted in values and a nuanced respect for the 
dignity of research participants. They felt that the Academy 
could provide a framework of reference that outlined 
standards, ethical values and processes. This group also felt 
that there was a need to address the issue of internet 
mediated research. They agreed that ethics should be centrally 
embedded in the practice of research, particularly in training, 
and with the aim of ensuring a culture of ethics in the social 
sciences. 
Group 2 
The recommendations from Group two were for three 
different documents and one event. They felt there was scope 
for a web-based document that highlighted the distinctive 
contribution of social science research and then focused on 
shared dilemmas. These could be things like working with 
children, working in dangerous places, and conducting 
research on the internet. Principles and virtues would be 
embedded in the answers. These documents could have a wiki 
structure and be designed with researchers in mind. It could 
provide a teaching and learning resource. 
Their second document was to focus on how to handle the 
ethics of review boards. It would contain examples on how to 
run such boards, educating ethics review boards, and 
separating out functions such as ethical review and research 
governance. Their third document proposal was to showcase 
excellence in social science research, showing how difficult 
issues were resolved, and resolved differently be different 
disciplines. It would link back to the codes of the Learned 
Societies. 
They thought there would be some mileage in having a virtue 
ethics day. And there also felt it was important to involve 
students and those working beyond HEI’s. 
Group 3 
Group three talked about virtues but also rhetoric in the 
Aristotelian sense. They felt that the Academy could provide a 
public face for the social sciences and communicate more 
directly to the public about what social science is and what the 
ethical commitments of social science research meant. They 
also felt that it could provide an important online resource, 
particularly for novice or early-career researchers. They felt 
that when putting forward a ‘common face’ the Academy 
should also present  social science research in its diversity and 
respect the differences of the Learned Societies. They 
discussed the tension between articulating principles whilst 
not getting into a formal governance or regulatory role. They 
discussed the role of the Academy in public policy–making and 
connecting social science and social science researchers with 
the political process. They felt the Academy could provide a 
web-portal that connected social science with its public(s) and 
communicated the idea(l) of the common characteristics of 
the virtuous researcher and ethical research. It could discuss 
commonly encountered dilemmas or difficulties and the way(s) 
in which they could be resolved or engaged. They wondered if 
such a portal should try to use more inclusive language that 
encompassed the range of practices that constituted social 
science research (such as evaluation, assessments, audits etc.). 
This group felt that the next task was to think explicitly about 
what a common statement might look like. 
Following the Group presentations there was a brief 
discussion about how an ethical culture of research could be 
built and how this must involve all those engaged in the 
process of research (funders, administrators, university 
managers) and not just the researcher and the researched. 
Closing Remarks by Janet Lewis: 
As this was the final symposium in the series Janet Lewis 
offered some closing remarks on behalf of the working group. 
She gave a brief account of the working group’s activities since 
2009. At the beginning of 2011 they began planning this 
symposia series and support was gained from the Open
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University, the BPS, the BSA and the ESRC. She was very 
pleased with how the events had gone and believed that her 
views were borne out by the fact that more people had 
attended the third event than the first. 
The symposia series had opened out into a fuller discussion 
than had been initially anticipated. This included reflexivity, 
virtue ethics, the ethics and practice of ethics review and the 
Participant Protection Model, and was not just restricted to 
the relationship between the researcher and the researched. 
There had been an underlying theme about the role of the 
Learned Societies and the Academy in guiding the ethics of 
research. There had been debate about the value of collecting 
together all the codes of ethics and guidance offered by the 
Learned Societies. 
Lewis felt that the day’s discussion had added a lot more and 
had raised issues not discussed in the previous symposia. She 
felt that more thought was needed about how the debates 
from all three events fitted together and what the next steps 
might be. In the longer term there was potential to find some 
shared principles or approaches. For her the document 
summarizing the codes of ethics demonstrated that the 
commonalities between the learned societies were more 
significant than any differences. Nevertheless there remained 
an issue about the difference between research ethics and 
professional ethics and the diversity of the latter. 
Lewis felt that the huge regulatory framework facing new 
researchers was counter productive and that while ethics 
review caught occasional significant lapses in judgment it was 
nevertheless the case that what was really significant went on 
elsewhere. She felt that an advisory, rather than a review, 
body would be more useful and that the New Brunswick 
Declaration was at one with her thinking on this issue. 19 
In closing Lewis remarked that this was the end of the 
beginning, rather than a final end. There are two events in the 
planning stages and the working group will rethink these 
events in the light of the points, issues and debates that had 
been raised and explored in the symposia series. She also felt 
that there is a need to identify the additional aims and 
objectives that had emerged and to consider how others 
might be included in the process of moving forward. 
Notes 
1. http://www.ukrio.org/ 
2. TCPS2 and the RESPECT code can be found at: http:// 
www.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2- 
eptc2/Default/ and http://www.respectproject.org/main/ 
ethics.php 
3. Karatzas made reference to this NY times interview: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/magazine/diederik- 
stapels-audacious-academic-fraud.html but also see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diederik_Stapel 
4. James Parry is referring to the Rawlins Review: http:// 
www.acmedsci.ac.uk/p47prid88.html 
5. I am not sure of the book Brydon-Miller was reading 
but the quote appears to be from Gilbert Harmen’s 
“Skepticism About Character Traits.” The Journal of 
Ethics. 2009;13(2–3): 235–242. Also found in his 
Unpublished Manuscript: “My Virtue Situation.” (2005) 
http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Situ.pdf 
6. This summary is also available on our website: http:// 
www.acss.org.uk/Ethics/ 
AcademyGenericEthicsProject2013home.htm 
7. See: http://www.respectproject.org/code/ 
8. See the seminar 3 stimulus paper by James Parry 
(UKRIO) available in this document. 
9. UN Human Development Report: Human Rights and 
Human Development. New York/Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 2000. See also: http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
reports/global/hdr2000/ 
10. Barber, Bernard. Research on Human Subjects: Problems 
of Social Control in Medical Experimentation. Transaction 
Publishers, 1979 [1973]. 
11. Dingwall, R., P. Watson, and A. Aldridge. Covert 
Research: Poor Ethics and Bad Science. Pharmaceutical 
Journal. (1992) 250:182-183 
12. Or helmet video cameras: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/bike-blog/2012/mar/20/best-bike-helmet- 
cameras and http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
lifeandstyle/2013/apr/28/cyclist-regrets-posting-video- 
road-rage-attack 
13. http:// 
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/ 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/ 
dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/ 
dh_4109577.pdf 
14. http://www.screc.org.uk/background.asp 
15. http://www.researchregister.org.uk/files/ 
RGFGuidancepack2010.pdf 
16. http://www.screc.org.uk/ 
17. http://www.screc.org.uk/files/routemap.pdf 
18. See: http://www.nres.nhs.uk/nres-publications/news/ 
governance-arrangements-for-research-ethics- 
committees/ 
19. http://the-sra.org.uk/sra_resources/research-ethics/the- 
new-brunswick-declaration/
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Making the Case for the Social Sciences 
A series of themed booklets of stories of social science research 
that has had an impact. 
1. Wellbeing 
2. Ageing 
3. Sustainability, the Environment 
and Climate Change 
4. Crime 
5. Sport and Leisure 
6. Management 
7. Scotland 
8. Longitudinal Studies 
9. Mental Wellbeing 
Contemporary Social Science 
The journal of the Academy of Social Sciences, this 
interdisciplinary, peer reviewed journal is published three 
times a year by Taylor and Francis. Recent special issues 
include: 
· Post-conflict Societies 
· The Social Dynamics of Web 2.0 
· Crowds in the 21st Century 
· Biologising the Social Sciences 
· Alcohol , Public Policy and Social 
Science 
· Young People, Social Science 
Research & the Law 
Some special issues are also being published in book form. 
Other publications by the Academy of Social Sciences 
Professional Briefings is a series of occasional papers 
produced by the Academy of Social Sciences. The 
development of the artwork was made  possible by 
kind assistance of the Society for the Advancement 
of Management  Studies. 
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